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Police governance arrangements formalised by the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 under 
which responsibilities and powers of governance were shared between central 
government, local government, through the local police authorities, and chief 
constables.  
 
‘Central government’  
Any references to central government prior to 1998 refer to the Parliament of Great 
Britain, based in Westminster. Following the Scotland Act 1998, policing and criminal 
justice became a devolved matter for the Scottish Executive, that became the Scottish 
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This thesis examines the emergent role of the Scottish Police Authority (SPA) in 
delivering organisational accountability of the Police Service of Scotland, following 
reform in 2012. The Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 amalgamated the 
eight local police forces into a single force, ‘Police Scotland’, and replaced the 
concomitant local police authorities, responsible for maintaining and governing those 
forces, into a national governing body: the SPA. The study draws on a broad range of 
qualitative data that includes official policy documents, selected minutes of public 
meetings held by the Justice Committee, and the SPA, inspection reports by HMICS 
and Audit Scotland, and interviews with a cross-section of stakeholders including a 
former Minister, senior police officers, members of the SPA, and MSPs.  
 
This study chronicles the inception and early development of the SPA, and critically 
assesses the SPA’s emergent accountability processes in relation to the perennial 
problems of police governance. Firstly, the doctrine of operational independence of 
chief constables, rooted in the traditional, and to-date “sacrosanct”, notion of 
constabulary independence (Reiner, 2013: 169), makes organisational accountability 
of the police a complicated and contested matter (Lustgarten, 1986; Walker, 2000; 
Donnelly and Scott, 2002a; Jones, 2008; Reiner, 2010). Secondly, there is a perpetual 
debate about whether the governance of police should be situated within local 
government structures, or delivered through central government. There is consensus 
among policing scholars that the persistent trend towards greater centralisation, 
coupled with the operational independence doctrine, curtailed the performance of the 
local police boards and their ability to hold chief constables to account (Walker, 2000; 
Donnelly and Scott, 2002a; Scott, 2011; Reiner, 2013). Amidst the tussle between 
central and local political actors for democratic control of the police, the recent policy 
discourse in Scotland, that led to the reforms and the creation of the SPA, has 
highlighted that the governance of the police requires expertise, skills and capacities, 






In light of the persistent difficulties of democratic governance, and the creation of the 
SPA as an expert body, the study presents an original conceptual framework outlining 
an ‘epistocratic and deliberative’ approach to police governance. The framework seeks 
to reconcile democracy and expertise and offers a prescriptive solution to resolve the 
underlying problems of police governance. The study applies the notion of epistocracy 
or knowledge-based rule (Estlund, 2003, 2008) to the role of experts in institutional 
settings (Holst, 2012; Holst and Mollander, 2014). Conceiving the SPA as an 
institutional epistocracy, it is argued that such an arrangement needs to be underpinned 
by the right Composition, and that it needs Power, and Autonomy in order to function 
effectively and independently. It is further argued that principles of Deliberation, 
including reasoning and justification, can further strengthen epistocratic governance 
arrangements, as well as providing a crucial democratic dimension.  
 
The analysis of the SPA provides a strong empirical basis for the framework. The study 
shows that while the SPA was created as a professional body of experts, it was unable 
to resolve the underlying problems of police governance in its first three years.  This 
was due to inadequacies in its composition resulting from insufficient expertise and a 
lack of training for new board members, differing interpretations of its role and 
statutory powers, and external pressures and impositions resulting in a lack of 
autonomy. Looking to recent developments, the study suggests that deliberative 
principles are now implicit in the SPA’s approach to more proactive scrutiny, which 
has started to serve to alleviate some shortcomings and problems it encountered in its 
formative years. However, the study concludes that further strengthening of the SPA’s 
composition, clarity around its role and powers, greater autonomy, and explicit focus 








“This is a movable feast, I can provide an answer but it probably wouldn’t be relevant 
six months from now, and that’s not a criticism, it’s a reflection of the very rapid sort 
of change that we’ve accounted for here and the fact that in the grand scheme of things 
we’re less than two years old and we’re still a fledgling organisation, and the authority 




“A lot of remarkable credit goes down to the police officers and police staff who 
delivered significant change in a short period of time… All my inclination is that the 
current structures are roughly right. Some of it is down to personalities, some of it is 
just down to the period of time in which we are in, and that will change… so I think it 
has got to be allowed to develop and evolve over time… the SPA has to be allowed to 
blossom, you don’t create a culture for an organisation overnight” - (Interview: 
Former Minister). 
 
This study took place in a dynamic, and a rapidly evolving landscape. The research 
takes into account the developments leading up to the 2012 Act, through the inception 
of the SPA and Police Scotland, to the SPA’s Governance Review submitted to the 
Cabinet Secretary for Justice in March 2016. The SPA was created as a new 
organisation, and unsurprisingly there have been developments in its organisational 
structure and its approach to police governance and accountability since 2016. Whilst 
the analysis of the post-2016 developments are outside the scope of the study, where 






Chapter 1 - Introduction  
 
The Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 (henceforth, the 2012 Act) introduced 
extensive changes to the policing landscape of Scotland. The eight local police forces 
(Central Scotland, Dumfries and Galloway, Fife, Grampian, Lothian and Borders, 
Northern Constabulary, Strathclyde, and Tayside) were amalgamated into a single 
Police Service of Scotland (Police Scotland). The concomitant local police 
authorities1, responsible for governing and maintaining the local police forces were 
abolished, and the governance of Police Scotland was placed under a centralised body; 
the Scottish Police Authority (the SPA). This PhD charts the incipient role of the SPA 
in managing and delivering police2 organisational accountability in the new landscape 
of police governance in Scotland. In addition, through the empirical analysis of the 
SPA, this study puts forward a framework for envisioning the role of experts in 
delivering and enhancing democratic governance of the police.  
1.1 - Research aims and Contribution 
This study is underpinned by the following research aims: 
 
i. Explore and analyse the role of the SPA in managing and delivering police 
organisational accountability in the new governance landscape. And, 
ii. To what extent, if at all, has the creation of the SPA, as an expert body, 
resolved, or exacerbated, the perennial problems of police governance? 
 
This study is important in three significant ways. Firstly, several scholars have argued 
that policing in Scotland has traditionally been neglected (Walker, 2000; Barrie, 2008), 
                                                 
1 Prior to the reforms there were eight local police authorities in Scotland. Six of the regional forces 
including Central Scotland, Grampian, Lothian and Borders, Northern, Strathclyde and Tayside 
represented more than one local authority area and they were maintained by Joint Police Boards, 
whereas, Dumfries and Galloway and Fife police had a unitary local police authority.   
2 Throughout this thesis, the focus is on the governance and accountability of the public police, paid for 
and maintained by the public purse. It is understood that there has been a proliferation of private policing 
and security industry and that the public police do not have a monopoly over policing functions or the 




and the studies on ‘British’ policing largely focus on England and Wales3. Similarly, 
while there is a substantive body of literature on police governance and accountability 
focusing on the constitutional arrangements and structures in England and Wales 
(seminal contributions include Marshall, 1965; Lustgarten, 1986; Day and Klein, 
1987; Reiner and Spencer, 1993; Jones, Newburn and Smith, 1994; Walker, 2000; 
Jones, 2008; Reiner, 2010; Lister, 2013; Lister and Rowe, 2015), there is a dearth of 
scholarly research into the Scottish police governance and accountability arrangements 
(except notable contributions from Walker, 2000; Donnelly and Scott, 
2002a,2002b,2008,2010). This gulf was recognised by Scott and Wilkie as they argued 
that: “policing remains one of the least-explored areas of Scottish public life. A good 
deal more research is needed into Scottish policing, which is under-researched 
compared to England!” (Scott and Wilkie, 2001: 66-67). Although the recent trend 
has seen an increase in independent academic research on policing in Scotland (see for 
example, Etherson, 2013; Harkin, 2014; Murray, 2014a; and the myriad published and 
ongoing research projects through the Scottish Institute for Policing Research4), this 
study is the first independent academic study exploring the new governance and 
accountability arrangements introduced by the 2012 Act. The study focuses on the role 
of the SPA, which occupies a central position in the new governance landscape, 
charting its evolution, from inception, following the 2012 Act, to the first governance 
review submitted to the Scottish Parliament by the SPA Chair Andrew Flanagan in 
March 20165.  
 
Secondly, this research critically assesses the SPA’s processes and mechanisms of 
accountability in relation to the perennial problems of police governance. Police 
governance scholars have routinely highlighted that the previous governance 
                                                 
3 For instance, Reiner’s (1985, 2000, 2010) historical and sociological oeuvres repeatedly mention ‘the 
British police’, but only focuses on the police in England and Wales. 
4 SIPR is a consortium of thirteen Scottish universities. It works collaboratively with Police Scotland 
and the SPA, and provides a single platform for policing researchers across Scotland to undertake and 
share independent research, engage in knowledge exchange, and disseminate widely to academics and 
practitioners involved and interested in policing in Scotland and abroad.  
5 In September 2015, the Scottish Government announced that the new SPA Chair will undertake a 
review of the governance and accountability arrangements in Scotland. The Governance Review was 
submitted in the Scottish Parliament in March 2016, marking the three years of the new arrangements, 




arrangements, particularly the local police boards, were not effective in delivering 
organisational accountability of the police due to the operational independence of chief 
constables and the perpetual tussle between local and central political stakeholders for 
democratic control over the police (Lustgarten, 1986; Walker, 2000; Reiner, 2010; 
Donnelly and Scott, 2002a; Jones, 2008). The notion of operational independence of 
chief constables, whilst ensuring that policing remained insulated from undue partisan 
influence, made the implementation of organisational accountability a complicated 
and contentious affair (Lustgarten, 1986; Walker, 2000). Further, policing in Scotland 
developed through local government structures (Gordon, 1980; Barrie, 2008), 
however, there has been a consistent trend towards greater centralisation. The 2012 
Act represents the pinnacle of this trend. I argue that these problems identified in the 
police governance literature are ‘perennial’ problems and they have resulted in 
tensions at different times between all participants of the previous tripartite governance 
arrangements. This research engages with these perennial problems, exploring whether 
the 2012 Act, and the creation of the SPA, has resolved, or even exacerbated them. 
Further, an original conceptual framework is put forward, strengthened by the 
empirical analysis of the SPA, as a prescriptive solution to resolve these problems.   
 
Thirdly, the SPA was envisioned as to bring greater expert capacity into police 
governance. By drawing on the notion of epistocracy (Estlund, 2003, 2008), I put 
forward an original conceptual and analytical framework. The framework allows for 
an understanding of how an epistocracy could be conceived and institutionalised 
(Holst, 2012, 2014; Holst and Mollander, 2014) in the context of police governance. 
Further, the inclusion of deliberation (Dryzek, 2000; Landemore, 2013a, 2013b; 
Escobar, 2014a, 2014b), adds a crucial democratic dimension to an epistocratic 
arrangement, making an original contribution to the existing canon of literature on 
police governance and democratic policing (Lustgarten, 1986; Jones, Newburn and 
Smith, 1996; Walker, 2000; Jones, 2008; Manning, 2010; Reiner, 2010; Aitchison and 




1.2 - Research Focus and Rationale  
The subject of police governance and accountability is as complex as the role of the 
police itself (Bittner, 1974). It poses distinct challenges that are deeply political 
(Lustgarten, 1986; Reiner, 2010) and require democratic direction (Jones et al., 1994, 
1996), legal safeguards (Marshall, 1965; Lustgarten, 1986; Walker, 2000), and to add 
to the existing body of literature, moral and ethical considerations, particularly where 
police policies comply with ‘legal’ demands but are nevertheless contentious (Murray, 
2015b; Lennon and Murray, 2016). Those charged with the overall control of shaping 
or scrutinising policing policy also require knowledge of local needs and national 
objectives (Tomkins, 2009), professional and financial expertise (Laing and Fossey, 
2011) and quite often just pragmatism, in a literal sense.  
 
Policing scholars have acknowledged the difference between individual and 
organisational accountability (Jones, 2008; Reiner, 2010). Individual accountability 
has nominally been achieved through legal safeguards, or through direct complaint 
mechanisms6, or indeed historically through what Reiner calls a “mystical process of 
identification with the British people, not the state” (2010: 74). The emphasis of 
organisational accountability, since the market-based reforms in 1993, has been on 
financial checks-and balances and key performance indicators (Reiner and Spencer, 
1993; Walker, 2000; Donnelly and Scott, 2002b). Yet it has long been recognised that 
the governance of police is not just concerned with financial management and 
efficiency, crucial as it may be in the current financial climate. There are other 
considerations such as operational policies, the strategic direction of police forces, the 
style of policing, matters that have traditionally been the domain of chief constables, 
which come under the scope of organisational accountability and democratic oversight 
(Marshall, 1965, 1978; Lustgarten, 1986; Reiner, 2010). It is indeed the elected 
representatives who decide whether the police should have a broad social welfare role, 
or a narrow crime prevention one (see for instance the discourse in England and Wales: 
Home Office, 2010). There are other matters that also require democratic input, such 
                                                 
6 The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) in England and Wales, and the Police 
Complaints Commissioner for Scotland (PCCS), which has been replaced by the Police Investigations 




as police priorities (Lustgarten, 1986; Walker, 2000; Millie, 2013). For instance, 
should police resources be effectively used by deploying more officers on the streets 
or whether public funds should be spent on better technology and intelligence, and 
evidence-led policing techniques? Should police officers wear body-worn cameras or 
carry firearms on routine patrols? Is stop and search a viable tactic for crime prevention 
and order maintenance? Should there be more front counter provision or call handling 
staff? How should the specialist departments, such as roads policing, serious crime 
detection, and armed response units, be distributed and shared across the country? 
These are just some of the issues that require careful consideration and a balancing of 
competing interests, public demands, policing doctrines and operational expertise, 
financial constraints, and political agendas. The focus of this thesis, therefore, is on 
police organisational accountability of operational policies, within the broader 
contours of police governance and accountability. There is an abundance of literature 
and ethnographic research on the role of the police in Britain, primarily focusing on 
England, and driven by the tumultuous relationship of the Metropolitan Police with 
London’s black and minority ethnic (BME) communities (Smith and Gray, 1985; 
Keith, 1993; Foster, Newburn and Souhami, 2005; Souhami, 2012). The two major 
reviews, since the Royal Commission (1962), into the police use of powers led by Lord 
Scarman (1981) and Sir William Macpherson (1999) drew attention to organisational 
accountability and institutional culture, but the scope of their reviews and 
recommendations was limited to police forces in England and Wales, and Scotland 
remained largely overlooked.  Of the studies focusing on organisational accountability 
of police in Scotland, Walker (2000) and Donnelly and Scott (2002a, 2002b) provide 
sufficiently in-depth analyses of the tripartite arrangements and other emergent forms 
of accountability (such as market-based approaches) through the lens of constitutional 
law. However, there has been a dearth of qualitative research into the previous 
governance and accountability arrangements in Scotland. 
 
My approach explicitly tackles the perennial problems of police governance raised in 
these earlier studies and offers a prescriptive framework, strengthened by the empirical 
analysis of the SPA, to resolve these problems. Further, the qualitative nature of this 




Police Scotland, making an original and timely contribution to the body of knowledge 
on police governance and accountability in Scotland following the 2012 Act. 
1.3 - Summary of Thesis Argument 
This thesis is about the SPA’s emergent role in delivering organisational accountability 
of police operational policies after the 2012 Act. In cognisance of the SPA’s model as 
a body composed of members with professional expertise and skills, I draw on the 
notion of epistocracy, i.e. knowledge-based governance (Estlund, 2003, 2008; Holst, 
2011, 2012, 2014) and develop an original conceptual framework that seeks to 
reconcile democracy and epistocracy and provides a conceptual solution to the 
‘perennial’ problems of police governance, - i.e. the operational independence doctrine 
and the perpetual tussle between the local and the central for control over the police. 
The analysis of the SPA provides a strong empirical basis for the framework.  
 
Through the analysis of the official policy agenda in the lead-up to the 2012 Act, I 
establish that whilst austerity became a strong catalyst for change, the reforms were 
also driven by weaknesses in the tripartite governance arrangements. In particular, the 
policy discourse identified that the local police authorities were often unable to provide 
oversight over how police resources were being spent to deliver local policing 
priorities and national objectives (Justice Committee, 2008; Tomkins, 2009). It was 
also identified by HMICS inspections that the local police authorities lacked expertise, 
capacities and skills to effectively govern their respective police forces (Tomkins, 
2009; Laing and Fossey, 2011). The creation of the SPA as a body of professional 
members, located centrally, explicitly sought to resolve these problems (Scottish 
Government, 2011c). Crucially, however, the official policy discourse did not address 
the operational independence doctrine, failing to recognise the need for robust 
organisational accountability mechanisms for police operational policies. The 
perpetual tussle between the local and the central was seemingly settled, with the SPA 
given wide ranging powers to govern Police Scotland and to hold the chief constable 
to account for the policing of Scotland, and the inclusion of ‘local policing’ within the 
statutory framework, placing the duty of local scrutiny upon local authorities (Henry, 




implementation of the new arrangements to negotiated agreement between the 
stakeholders. In effect, the 2012 Act, that replaced tripartism, created two complex 
tripartite relationships between the Scottish Government, the SPA and Police Scotland, 
and between the local scrutiny committees, the SPA and Police Scotland. 
Consequently, while the new legislative arrangements were being negotiated and 
settled into practice, the perennial problems that predated the 2012 Act, manifested 
after the reforms in the most abrasive fashion.  
 
Kath Murray’s PhD found that Police Scotland’s use of stop and search powers 
disproportionately targeted young people. Whilst the bulk of the data looked at the 
stop and search rates before the reforms, Murray’s research showed that the use of 
non-statutory stop and search had increased markedly under the newly centralised 
Police Scotland (Murray, 2014a). Further, as soon as the new arrangements came into 
effect, the former Chief Constable issued a Standing Firearms Authority, allowing 
armed police officers, attached to the Armed Response Vehicles, to be deployed on 
routine patrols across Scotland. The deployment of armed officers caused considerable 
controversy, particularly in areas with traditionally low levels of crime. This 
‘operational policy’ came into effect without prior consultation or engagement with 
the SPA, or indeed the local scrutiny committees (Henry et al., 2016). Other 
‘operational’ decisions such as the removal of traffic warden support, closures of front 
counter provisions and the raids on Edinburgh’s previously tolerated sex-for-sale 
saunas, all in the first year of the new arrangements, without prior consultations with 
the local authorities of affected areas, or the SPA, raised question marks about the 
effectiveness of the new police governance and accountability arrangements (Scott, 
2014; Murray, 2015b; Terpstra and Fyfe, 2015). All of these decisions were vigorously 
defended as within the ‘operational’ domain of the Chief Constable, and exacerbated 
the tensions between the local and the central. I argue that at least in its formative 
years, the SPA did not just replace the local police authorities but also inherited the 
same problems that marred the previous tripartite governance arrangements.   
 
Despite the continuation of the ‘perennial’ problems of police governance, and the 




introduced a multifaceted approach to police governance. In addition to the SPA and 
the local scrutiny committees, there are other key stakeholders such as the Scottish 
Government and the Scottish Parliament’s Justice Sub-Committee on Policing 
providing direct democratic oversight, the Police Investigations and Review 
Commissioner (PIRC) responsible for handling complaints and investigating serious 
incidents involving the police, and HMICS and Audit Scotland charged with powers 
of inspections and financial audits of both Police Scotland and the SPA. This network-
based governance approach resembles broader developments elsewhere in public 
service administration (Rhodes, 1996; Bevir, 2010, 2012). I argue that the SPA’s 
model as a body composed of members appointed on the basis of specific skills and 
expertise represents a dimension of epistocracy (Estlund, 2003, 2008) or knowledge-
based governance (Holst, 2011, 2012, 2014) within the broader landscape of police 
governance. Due to police claims to professionalism (Lustgarten, 1986; Ericsson, 
1994; Jones, 2008; Reiner, 2010; Fyfe, 2013) and inherent dangers of direct forms of 
democratic governance, such as majoritarianism and partisanship (Lustgarten, 1986; 
Jones et al., 1996; Walker, 2000), I argue that an epistocracy may not only be justified, 
but it may in fact be desirable if such an arrangement can encapsulate key principles 
of democratic governance.  
 
Following a conceptual justification for an epistocracy I propose a conceptual 
framework to show, - a) how an epistocracy could be institutionalised in the context 
of police governance, b) how an institutional epistocracy could provide robust 
mechanisms for police organisational accountability, whilst enhancing key principles 
of democratic governance, c) how the proposed epistocratic arrangement could resolve 
the perennial problems of police governance. 
 
Specifically, I draw on Holst and Mollander’s (2014: 13-36) notion of epistocracy by 
democratic delegation, Boven’s restricted definition of accountability as a mechanism 
(2010), and the principles of democratic governance proposed by Jones, Newburn and 
Smith (1996) to sketch out the key components of the framework, i.e. Broad 
Composition, Power, Autonomy, and Deliberation as a necessary democratic check on 





I argue that the knowledge credentials of an institutionalised epistocracy would be 
reflected in a broad composition, which also explicitly addresses the demographic 
objection to epistocracy (Estlund, 2008). An epistocracy situated within a democratic 
order will also need delegated powers, creating a division of labour between experts 
and democrats, enabling its members to carry out their duties within the prescribed 
legislative framework, and to perform specific functions as required by the democratic 
state (Holst and Mollander, 2014). In the context of police governance, power also 
relates to the overall capacity of an epistocratic arrangement to establish processes and 
mechanisms of organisational accountability. Further, I argue that it is imperative that 
the proposed epistocratic arrangement is non-partisan and serves as an intermediary 
between the local and the central. Therefore, it will need a degree of autonomy in order 
to balance various competing interests. The inclusion of deliberation within the 
institutional design of an epistocracy allows it to operationalise accountability 
mechanisms (Bovens, 2010), whilst also encapsulating certain key principles of 
democratic governance (Jones et al., 1996).  
 
Utilising the framework for the analysis of the SPA, in its formative and perhaps most 
turbulent years, I found that while the SPA’s composition reflected a broad range of 
expertise and competencies, it was insufficient for the purposes of police governance 
and accountability. The non-executive board members of the SPA acknowledged that 
they lacked knowledge of operational policing and did not feel confident to scrutinise 
and challenge the information provided by the police. Late appointments and an 
emphasis on financial accountability and strategic oversight meant that board members 
did not receive sufficient training specifically in relation to police operational policies, 
and most members felt that they had to ‘learn on the job’.  The powers of the SPA, and 
its specific role in police governance was also subject to contestations and differing 
interpretations in the first year of the new arrangements. The initial period, in 
particular, was marred by a turf-war between the former Chief Constable and the 
former Chair of the SPA, with the Justice Minister interfering, often in favour of the 
Chief Constable. This meant that the SPA could not establish itself as an independent 




perceived as an extension of the Scottish Government, exacerbating the tensions 
between the local and the central. The culmination of these shortcomings meant that 
in the first three years since its inception, the SPA was unable to establish effective 
mechanisms of police organisational accountability.   
 
Looking to recent developments, particularly since the high-profile cases of stop and 
search and armed policing, I found that deliberative principles have become implicit 
in the SPA’s approach to governance and accountability, and this has helped alleviate 
some of the problems the SPA encountered in its formative years. As the new 
governance arrangements have evolved and settled, the SPA has gradually established 
an accountability relationship that encompasses proactive scrutiny as well as 
retrospective accountability, and it is underpinned by deliberative principles of 
justification and reasoning. The analysis of the SPA has also shown that through 
horizontal deliberation with other stakeholders such as the Scottish Parliament’s 
Justice Sub-Committee on Policing, HMICS, PIRC, Audit Scotland, the Scottish 
Government, and the senior leadership of Police Scotland, the SPA has regained some 
of the influence that it ceded after the initial turf-war. In the absence of a clear 
hierarchical power relationship, through deliberation, the SPA has managed to develop 
mechanisms of accountability under the ‘shadow of hierarchy’. This has also resulted 
in an improved provision of information from the police. In addition, deliberation with 
external stakeholders such as the Scottish Institute for Policing Research has also 
enabled the SPA to shore up weaknesses in its knowledge composition, enhancing its 
own epistocratic credentials.  
 
I conclude by arguing that despite weaknesses in its composition, a lack of clarity in 
its powers, and impositions resulting in a lack of autonomy, the SPA’s approach to 
police governance and accountability is evolving and encapsulating the ideals of an 
‘epistocratic and deliberative’ approach to police governance.  These developments 
have enabled the SPA to proactively scrutinise police operational policies, and to 
increase its influence over the future strategic direction of the police, as exemplified 
by the publication of the Policing 2026 strategic plan. This ‘epistocratic and 




‘operational independence’ doctrine, or at least render it dormant, until invoked once 
again by an overzealous chief constable. By engaging in horizontal deliberation with 
other stakeholders in the broader landscape of police governance, and by drawing on 
external and internal knowledge and expertise to scrutinise policing policies 
proactively, the SPA is also strengthening its position as an intermediary, to provide a 
balance between the local and the central. However, the perpetual tussle between the 
local and the central may not be resolved until the SPA is able to establish some 
distance from the Scottish Government.   
1.4 - Thesis Structure 
This chapter outlined the key research aims, the rationale and the main argument of 
this thesis.  
 
Chapter 2 situates the focus of this study on police organisational accountability within 
the broader context of police governance. Two recurring trends in police governance 
literature, - i.e. the notion of operational independence of chief constables and the 
perpetual tussle between the local and the central for control over the police are 
examined (Marshall, 1965, 1978; Gordon, 1980; Lustgarten, 1986; Reiner and 
Spencer, 1993; Reiner, 2000, 2010, 2013; Walker, 2000; Scott and Wilkie, 2001; 
Donnelly and Scott, 2002a, 2002b; Jones, 2008; Scott, 2011). I argue that these trends 
are ‘perennial’ problems that have historically complicated the implementation of 
police organisational accountability. These problems are cast as ‘the research problem’ 
for the ensuing discussions and analysis of the SPA in the post-2012 Act governance 
arrangements.  
 
In Chapter 3, I map out the powers and responsibilities of the key actors involved in 
the post-2012 Act governance arrangements and critically assess the policy discourse 
to identify the rationale for the creation of the SPA. I argue that while austerity 
provided a strong impetus for the reforms, the official policy agenda also sought to 
strengthen police governance in relation to the allocation of resources, local service 
delivery, and national policing requirements. The policy discourse also highlighted the 




of the SPA. However, the official policy agenda neglected the need for police 
governance arrangements to provide stringent mechanisms for organisational 
accountability of police operational policies. Whilst it may appear that the perpetual 
tussle between the local and the central was settled with the creation of the SPA and a 
statutory requirement for local policing and local scrutiny, the implementation of the 
new arrangements were left to negotiated agreement creating complex relationships 
between the new stakeholders. Further, the 2012 Act, left the notion of ‘operational 
independence’ undefined. In effect, the perennial problems that predated the 2012 Act, 
were left unresolved following the reforms.  
 
Chapter 4 provides conceptual clarifications for the terms ‘governance’, 
‘accountability’ and ‘epistocracy’. I adopt the restricted definition of accountability as 
a mechanism (Bovens, 2010) for this thesis, and chart the developments in police 
governance and accountability mechanisms in Scotland (Marshall, 1965, 1978; Reiner 
and Spencer, 1993; Walker, 2000; Donnelly and Scott, 2002b). I then draw on the 
notion of epistocracy (Estlund, 2003, 2008; Holst, 2011, 2012, 2014) and argue that in 
the context of police governance, an epistocracy can not only be justified, but it may 
in fact be desirable. The premise of my argument rests on the rise of police 
professionalism (Ericson 1994; Jones, 2008; Fyfe, 2013) solidifying the operational 
independence doctrine, and the underlying weaknesses and unintended risks of direct 
democratic control such as majoritarianism and partisanship.  
 
In Chapter 5, I put forward an original conceptual framework to show how an 
epistocracy could be institutionalised in the context of police governance. I argue that 
knowledge is the defining characteristic of epistocracy and it would be reflected in its 
composition, that needs to be sufficiently broad in order to counter the demographic 
objection (Estlund, 2008). By drawing on Holst and Mollander (2014), I argue that an 
institutional epistocracy will also need delegated powers to perform its functions. 
Further, I argue that it is pertinent that the proposed arrangement is non-partisan, and 
serves as an intermediary between the police and local and central political actors, 
therefore it will need sufficient autonomy within the confines of its powers (Jones et 




institutional design of an epistocracy allows it to operationalise accountability 
mechanisms (Bovens, 2010), whilst also encapsulating certain key principles of 
democratic governance (Jones et al., 1996). The framework is then adapted for the 
later analysis of the SPA.  
 
Chapter 6 outlines the research design, methods and the rationale for my analytical 
approach and provides an overview of the key research questions in relation to the 
framework that I will address in the findings chapters.   
 
The findings are presented in Chapters 7-9. Chapter 7 deals with the primary research 
aim: to what extent, if at all, has the SPA resolved the perennial problems of police 
governance?  I argue that the perennial problems of police governance, i.e. the 
operational independence doctrine, and the tussle between the local and the central 
manifested in the most abrasive fashion following the 2012 Act. A series of scandals 
and high profile cases highlighted shortcomings in the new governance arrangements. 
I analyse how these problems manifested at a time when the SPA was developing as 
an organisation, contributing to the SPA’s inability to deliver effective mechanisms of 
police accountability in its formative years. I specifically draw on the perceptions of 
the stakeholders involved in the current police governance landscape and aim to 
establish the status of the long unresolved notion of ‘operational independence’ 
doctrine in the post-2012 Act landscape.   
 
In Chapter 8, I analyse the SPA’s credentials as an institutional epistocracy, focusing 
on its composition, power and autonomy. The analysis provides a strong basis for my 
framework, as I show that the SPA’s inability to deliver effective mechanisms of 
accountability, in its first three years, were compounded due to weaknesses in its 
composition, differing interpretations of its role and powers, and external impositions 
resulting in a lack of autonomy.  
 
In Chapter 9, I focus on deliberation, and looking to recent developments I argue that 
deliberative principles have become implicit in the SPA’s approach to police 




from the police, and enhanced mechanisms of proactive scrutiny of police operational 
policies. These developments have the tendency to finally bypass the traditional notion 
of ‘operational independence’. Further, I argue that through deliberative principles, 
and engagement with the stakeholders, the SPA is better situated to serve as an 
intermediary to ensure that policing policies strike a balance between local priorities 
and central objectives.   
 







PART I – THE CONTEXT: LITERATURE AND POLICY REVIEW 
Chapter 2 - Police Governance and Accountability: ‘The Problem’  
 
This chapter situates the focus of this study on police organisational accountability 
within the broader context of police governance. By drawing on the literature on police 
governance and accountability in Britain (for e.g. Marshall, 1965, 1978; Lustgarten, 
1986; Reiner and Spencer, 1993; Reiner, 2000, 2010, 2013; Walker, 2000; Jones, 
2008) and, specifically, through the analysis of the historical developments of the 
tripartite governance arrangements in Scotland (Gordon, 1980; Walker, 2000; Scott 
and Wilkie, 2001; Donnelly and Scott, 2002a, 2002b, 2010; Barrie, 2008), two 
recurring trends, i.e. the notion of operational independence of chief constables and 
the perpetual tussle between local and central democratic control of the police are 
examined. I argue that these trends, solidified and exacerbated by the previous 
tripartite arrangements, are perennial problems and could be considered as, using 
Walker’s terminology (2000: 4-5), part of the “regulatory puzzle” or the “paradoxes 
of police governance”. Both problems have often resulted in tensions in the previous 
tripartite governance arrangements in Scotland, making organisational accountability 
of the police a complicated and contentious matter. This chapter casts these problems 
as ‘the research problem’, providing a foundation for the ensuing discussions 
throughout the thesis and, particularly the conceptual framework (Chapter 5) and the 
subsequent analysis of the SPA (Chapters 7, 8 and 9) in the post-2012 police 
governance landscape.  
2.1 - Situating Police Organisational Accountability  
Before the problems of police governance are considered, there is a need to situate 
police organisational accountability within the broader contours of police governance 
and accountability, and in relation to what is it that the police do. The task of 
determining the role of the police becomes ever more complex because of its many 
functions and myriad responsibilities (Bittner, 1970). Very little of what the police do 




be involved in peace-keeping (Banton, 1964; Bittner, 1974; Reiner, 2010), protection 
and maintenance of ‘specific’ and ‘general’ order (Marenin, 1982), and act as social 
workers through their interactions with the public in different circumstances on a day-
to-day basis (Punch, 1979). When things go wrong, the police are viewed as the “stand-
in authorities” (Cohen, 1985: 37). As Walker elaborates, the police “fill an 'authority 
vacuum' where other specific authority figures, such as parents, teachers, social 
workers, and doctors, cannot or will not act” (Walker, 1996: 56). The public police are 
also an instrument of the state apparatus. Due to the considerable discretion at the 
lowest levels of hierarchy, a police constable has an “infinite range of legal 
possibilities to act within” (Lustgarten, 1986: 10). One of those legal possibilities may 
involve legitimate use of force and coercion (Bittner, 1970: 46). It is this monopoly to 
use legitimate force that makes the public police the “bedrock of state’s power” 
(Reiner, 1993: 1). Although the use of force may not be a substantial part of the police 
role and rarely used in routine police work (Bittner, 1970: 41; also, Terpstra, 2011), a 
“benign bobby … still brings to the situation a uniform, a truncheon, and a battery of 
resource charges which can be employed when appeasement fails” (Punch, 1979: 116). 
Bayley (1985: 8) argues that while the public police may not be the only state actor 
authorised to use force, they are distinct from the military because of their legitimate 
authority to use power within a state, even when the military is called in for internal 
order maintenance it is deemed to be acting as the police.  
 
In the context of police governance and accountability, Reiner differentiates the role 
of the police between general policy decisions and the exercise of legal powers 
(Reiner, 1993: 6). Drawing on Reiner’s broad typology (Reiner, 1993: 10-12), general 
policies may involve housekeeping such as the purchasing of land, vehicles and 
acquirement of resources. Exercise of legal powers may involve policy decisions 
specific to law enforcement, such as personnel management, deployment of resources, 
and policing priorities, styles and tactics. On the other hand, the use of legal powers of 
individual officers may refer to specific operations such as powers of arrest, detention, 
and stop and search, more narrowly relating to the role and function of the police 
constables. This distinction is important, in the context of my arguments in this chapter 




democratic representatives and accountability bodies can legitimately intervene, or ask 
questions ex post facto.  
 
Based on Reiner’s distinction above, the mechanisms of police accountability can also 
refer to both organisational and individual accountability (Jones, 2008: 694). The 
former, often termed more broadly as police governance (see Chapter 4), is concerned 
with the legal framework within which the powers of the police are situated 
(Lustgarten, 1986; Walker, 2000). The legal framework may also stipulate the 
processes and mechanisms for democratic oversight and control, particularly in 
relation to resource allocation and strategic objectives and priorities (Jones, 2008; 
Reiner, 2010; Millie, 2013). Individual accountability mechanisms could include 
statutory standards and limits on police powers, such as the Police and Criminal 
Evidence7 (PACE) codes of practice in England and Wales, other legal safeguards 
from individual abuses of power, corruption and bribery, and direct complaint 
mechanisms against individual officers and police forces (Jones, 2008: 694; Reiner, 
2010: Chapter 7). The former requires formal or informal structures and mechanisms 
of accountability, whereas the latter can refer to accountability to law. It is argued that 
“police cultures are resistant to legal rules and can, and do, subvert them” (Lennon and 
Murray, 2016: 8). Further, whilst legal powers are useful tools “for controlling the 
behaviour” of public servants, they are not sufficient for holding them to account 
(Mulgan, 2000: 564). Yet individual accountability of the police to law, has never been 
a matter of contention (Reiner, 1993: 13; also, see Reiner, 2010: 74, Chapter 7). Even 
in areas such as the detection and investigation of crimes, where police officers have 
traditionally enjoyed considerable discretion under the common law, recent cases8 in 
England and Wales, have underlined increased accountability through contemporary 
legal developments such as the Human Rights Act 1998, superseding the apparent 
common law “immunity in the investigation and detection of crime” (Arnell, 2014: 
111). Conversely, organisational accountability of the police has long been a matter of 
contention, as I argue in the ensuing sections. However, whilst the distinction between 
organisational and individual accountability is useful for situating the analytical focus 
                                                 
7 As enacted in statute under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 




of this thesis, in practice, actions of individual officers can also reflect organisational 
decision-making (Reiner, 1993: 8, also Jones, 2008; Reiner, 2010).  
 
There are several points where individual and organisational accountability 
mechanisms would converge. Particularly whilst actions of police officers, deemed to 
be excessive or in breach of legal safeguards, may be subjected to appropriate legal 
action, the principles of organisational accountability would mean that the 
organisational policies of their respective forces, are also subject to review and 
sanction retrospectively by political or non-political external agencies, as defined by 
the legislative framework. For instance, following the shooting of Jean Charles De 
Menezes in London, in July 2005, the two officers involved in the shooting were not 
charged with a criminal offence, however, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) 
charged the Office of the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police for breaching the 
Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. Whilst the jury returned a ‘guilty’ verdict, none 
of the senior officers of the Metropolitan Police, who led the operation, were held 
personally culpable (IPCC, 2007: 6). Whilst the shooting of De Menezes may point to 
individual action in the first instance, the Independent Police Complaints 
Commission’s (IPCC) recommendations, following the legal trial, focused on 
organisational decision-making, particularly operational policies in relation to 
surveillance, firearm response, command and control, communications infrastructure, 
training, and post-incident management (IPCC, 2007: 161-168). The exceptional case 
of De Menezes’ shooting, and other seminal cases, for instance the inquiries led by 
Scarman (1981) and Macpherson (1999), underline that police accountability to law 
alone is insufficient. There needs to be a holistic approach to police governance and 
accountability that includes legal safeguards, direct complaint mechanisms, 
inspections, and mechanisms of organisational accountability that may involve 
proactive and retrospective scrutiny of police operational policies and tactics, 
deployment of resources, and policing priorities. It is the latter that the rest of my 




police governance in Scotland, as in the rest of Britain9, this aspect of police 
accountability has been a complicated and contentious matter.  
2.2 - The problems of police governance 
The different dimensions of police governance and accountability outlined above form 
part of the “regulatory puzzle” for the democratic state, or the “paradox of police 
governance”, as conceived by Walker (2000: 4). For Walker, on the one hand, the state 
empowers the police to act on its behalf, sets out the legal boundaries for police 
organisations to operate within, allocates public funds and resources to buy land, 
property, equipment, and to employ staff, and sets national policing objectives and 
priorities. On the other hand, the state seeks to restrict the same powers to ensure 
policing conforms to core democratic values such as fairness and equity, to maximise 
efficient use of public resources, to ensure policing is responsive to shifting public 
concerns (such as concerns about hate crimes following a major terror incident, or 
cases of historical child sexual abuse), monitor police performance against national 
and local policing objectives, and to seek an explanation on how public resources have 
been spent, particularly where policing has failed to deliver on agreed objectives 
(Walker, 2000: 4-6). In addition to this, and paradoxically, the state also has to ensure 
its own influence in day-to-day policing is limited, so that policing remains free from 
partisanship and competing party political rhetoric (Walker, 2000: 54-55; also, see 
below, 2.4.1).   
 
Taking Walker’s argument as a conceptual premise, I argue that the implementation 
of police organisational accountability mechanisms (the various mechanisms are 
examined in Chapter 4) has traditionally been hampered by competing demands and 
interests, giving rise to two perennial problems that form part of the regulatory puzzle 
– two further paradoxes within the original paradox of police governance, as conceived 
by Walker (see above). Firstly, while it is accepted that the democratic state needs to 
seek to limit the powers of the police and set out the structures, processes and 
                                                 
9 The developments in Scotland did not take place in a vacuum, these problems have also existed in 
England and Wales during tripartism and continue to be discussed (for instance, see Walker, 2000; 




mechanisms for police organisational accountability, where exactly those powers 
reside is a matter of contention. Early modern police forces in Scotland developed at 
the behest of local administrations, however, there has been a steady tide towards 
greater centralised control in the interests of uniformity, harmonisation and efficiency 
(Gordon, 1980; Walker, 2000; Dinsmor and Goldsmith, 2005; Barrie, 2008, 2012; 
Emsley, 2008; Davidson, Jackson and Smale, 2016). Yet, large part of policing was, 
and continues to be delivered locally and there is a consistent demand and appetite for 
local democratic accountability, as it will be explored further in Chapter 3 in the 
context of the 2012 Act. While local political representatives may have a legitimate 
interest in the oversight of policing in relation to local priorities, central government 
too has a national mandate and concerns around national objectives such as counter-
terrorism, organised crime, and the expenditure of public resources. These competing 
demands require a balancing of local and central interests, and a governance 
framework that gives due regard to national strategic objectives (one of the stated 
rationales for the 2012 Act, see Chapter 3), as well as local priorities and service 
delivery. However, the previous tripartite governance arrangements were unable to 
balance these competing interests (see below, 2.3; also, Chapter 3, 3.3.2). Secondly, 
the doctrine of constabulary independence, while ensuring that local and central 
political representatives could not interfere in day-to-day policing, evolved into a much 
broader notion of ‘operational’ independence during tripartism (Lustgarten, 1986; 
Walker, 2000; Donnelly and Scott, 2002a; Reiner, 2010; Jones, 2008; Scott, 2011). 
This broad application of the concept complicated the implementation of police 
organisational accountability mechanisms, further weakening local democratic 
accountability. By demarcating the boundary between ‘policy’ and ‘operations’, chief 
constables have traditionally sought to limit the influence of accountability bodies, 
particularly the local police authorities (Lustgarten, 1986). I concur with Lustgarten 
(1986: 20-22), that this is a false distinction and there is a blurring of boundaries 
between policing policy and operations (see below, 2.4.2). However, the notion has 
remained “sacrosanct” (Reiner, 2013: 169), often resulting in tensions between police 
organisational decision-making and the need for external democratic oversight and 
organisational accountability. These perennial problems are rooted in the historical 




the following sections, I present a brief historical analysis of the development of the 
early modern police forces in Scotland, and the history of tripartism. I argue that the 
centralising trend (see fig. 2.1 below), coupled with the growing autonomy and 
operational independence of chief constables, created an imbalance of power and a 
steady erosion of local government influence in policing policy (Marshall, 1965; 
Lustgarten, 1986; Oliver, 1987; Walker, 2000; Scott and Wilkie, 2001; Donnelly and 
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Act 2012
Figure 2.1 - Timeline of police governance legislation in Scotland 
Establishment of the first early modern police force in 
Scotland. Throughout the early part of the nineteenth 
century local burghs and counties raised locally 
funded police forces. Policing part of local 
administration. (See below, 2.2.1). 
The beginning of the centralising trend, creation of the 
Inspectorate of Constabulary for Scotland. Central 
government became responsible for efficiency grants, 
harmonisation of standards and regulation of service 
conditions (See below, 2.2.1). 
Formalisation of the 'tripartite' structure of 
governance. Powers distributed between central 
government, local police authorities, and chief 
constables (See below, 2.2.2). By 1968, there were 
twenty-two police forces in Scotland (Gordon, 1980: 
30). 
Town and County councils replaced by a two-tier 
regional and district model. Local government 
reorganisation resulted in eight regional police forces, 
six regional police authorities and two joint police 
boards (See below, 2.3). 
The two-tier system replaced with thirty-two unitary 
local authorities. The eight regional police forces 
remained but local government reorganisation 
resulted in six joint police boards and two unitary 
police authorities (See below, 2.3). 
Devolution of the Scottish Parliament. Justice 
Secretary and the Scottish Ministers assume 
responsibility for national policing policy, force 
budgets and amalgamations. Tripartism intact but 
only in legislative terms (See below, 2.3). 
The eight regional police forces:  Central Scotland, 
Dumfries and Galloway, Fife, Grampian, Lothian and 
Borders, Northern Constabulary, Strathclyde, and 
Tayside amalgamated into 'Police Scotland'. Local 
police authorities and joint boards replaced by the 




2.2.1 - From local beginnings to early tripartism 
The establishment of the Metropolitan Police in 1829 is commonly regarded as the 
birth of the modern police in Britain (Reiner, 2010: 39). Described as a “protracted 
and painful process, in the face of bitter resistance and smouldering hostility” (Reiner, 
2010: 39), Reiner’s historical accounts on the development of early modern police 
forces were limited in scope to England, even the chronological lists in the Appendix 
(Reiner, 2000: 221-223) supposedly outlining “British police history” (Reiner, 2000: 
16) made no mention of Scotland.  Others have correctly identified London’s 
Metropolitan police force as the first modern police force in England (Emsley, 2008: 
71, emphasis added). In Scotland, statutory police forces consisting of professional 
officers with wide-ranging duties and a strong civic focus developed at least two 
decades before the Metropolitan Police Act of 1829 (Gordon, 1980; Walker, 2000; 
Dinsmor and Goldsmith, 2005; Barrie, 2008). The Glasgow Police Act established the 
first police force in Glasgow in 1800, Edinburgh followed suit with its own local force 
in 1805 and throughout the early part of the nineteenth century local burghs in Scotland 
continued to raise locally funded police forces (Dinsmor and Goldsmith, 2005: 42; 
also, Walker, 2000; Barrie, 2008, 2012). 
 
The growth of early local police forces in Scotland was largely informed by what 
Walker describes as a “distinctive but broadly familiar set of social practices and 
historical development” (Walker, 1999: 94). Familiar because the establishment of the 
Metropolitan Police was perceived in some quarters as a centralised response to an 
increase in crime, disorder and political unrest (Miller, 1989: 43) caused by the 
“pressures of urban and industrial revolution” (Reiner, 2010: 40). The development of 
organised police forces in Scotland, although a result of local initiatives, also coincided 
with the broader socio-economic transformation triggered by an increase in migration 
from rural areas, and across the Irish Sea (Walker, 2000: 153), to urban centres due to 
a rapid, albeit later than England, “industrial and commercial expansion, and 
transatlantic trading” (Barrie, 2012: 454). While the early modern police forces in 
England had similar duties to their counterparts in the north, Sir Robert Peel’s early 
instructions to the newly recruited Metropolitan Police officers, that came to be known 




a point reiterated by the recent discourse of police reform in England and Wales (Home 
Office, 2010). Yet, there was no paradigm shift between the old and the new police in 
Scotland (Walker, 2000: 153) as policing was, and continues to be10, perceived as “for 
the public good” (Dinsmor and Goldsmith, 2005: 41-42).  
 
Early police officers in Scotland had a broad social welfare role that included 
“patrolling the streets and detecting crime, dealing with environmental nuisance, 
suppressing riots, squabbles, begging and singing songs, and for arranging the paving, 
cleansing and lighting of the streets” (Donnelly and Scott, 2008: 183). As the costs of 
raising and maintaining the early police forces had to be met by local government, 
central11  legislation merely played an “enabling” role and did not make it obligatory 
for burghs and counties to establish professional police forces (Bunyan, 1976: 64; 
Gordon, 1980: 20, also Walker, 2000; Barrie, 2008). Gordon notes that while the 
English and Welsh counties were reluctant12, the Scottish counties raised local forces 
at their own behest without the need for central government interference13 (Gordon, 
1980: 20). This arguably laid the underlying foundations of localism that continues to 
feature strongly in the Scottish police governance discourse, however, it must be noted 
that these local initiatives were “sanctioned, and often encouraged by the centre” 
(Barrie, 2012: 455). The increased local government autonomy was recognised and 
accepted by Westminster, it was deemed that allowing local administrations to 
“‘cherry-pick’ provisions most relevant to their particular needs, would be more 
                                                 
10 The Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 sets out the role and purpose of the police as to 
“improve the safety and well-being of persons, localities and communities in Scotland” (s32(a)). 
Further, it recognises that the police need to work in collaboration with other partners in order to 
“promote measures to prevent crime, harm and disorder” (s32(b)).   
11 Any references to central government prior to 1998 refer to the Parliament of Great Britain, based in 
Westminster. Following the Union of the Scottish and English Parliaments in 1707, Scotland maintained 
a distinct social and political system and had autonomy over education, legal and religious matters 
(Walker, 2000: 151). These areas of domestic policy and the implementation of legislation enacted by 
the Parliament at Westminster became the responsibility of the Lord Advocate of Scotland (Barrie, 
2012: 454), later replaced by the Scottish Office, in 1885 under the tutelage of Secretary of State for 
Scotland comprising of civil servants and policy experts (McAra, 2005: 285-286). Following the 
Scotland Act 1998, the Scottish Office became the Scotland Office and policing and criminal justice 
became a devolved matter for the Scottish Executive (later known as the Scottish Government following 
the SNP victory in 2007) through the Cabinet Secretary for Justice. 
12 Until compelled to do so by the County and Borough Police Act of 1856. 
13 Police (Scotland) Act 1857 made it compulsory for counties and the Burgh Police (Scotland) Act 
1892 made it compulsory for towns to raise and maintain a police force, however, by 1860s all of 




effective and less consuming of parliamentary time than the existing bespoke acts” 
(Pugh, 2014). In return, the central government relied on the local administrations “to 
regulate public order” (Davidson et al., 2016: 93).  
 
Despite central legislation playing an enabling role, the governance structure of the 
early modern police forces in Scotland was “piecemeal” and a “patchwork affair” 
(Walker, 2000: 41). The Royal Burghs Municipal Reform Act 1833 established the 
early boundaries for each police burgh, and enabled burghs to raise local police forces 
and maintain them through elected commissioners (Gordon, 1980: 18). The 1833 Act 
also enabled local governments to develop "a limited democratic franchise on the basis 
of property ownership" (Walker, 2000: 154). This allowed the affluent middle classes 
to increase their influence on local politics, and the governance of police swiftly 
became part of local government administration (Walker, 2000: 154). Since the police 
forces were raised and maintained by the local government, local ratepayers became 
key stakeholders with a “vested interest in making policing work” (Donnelly and Scott, 
2008: 184).  
 
Local government in Scotland continued to enjoy significant control and influence 
over the governance of local police forces and any notion of a centralised police force 
was "traditionally met with increased hostility" (Gordon, 1980: 77). For instance, 
attempts to amalgamate the police forces within the county of Inverness-shire in 1942, 
were perceived as a “centralising agenda” of the Scottish Office, and swiftly rejected 
by the local councillors (Davidson et al., 2016: 99). Yet a gradual move towards 
"centralised and harmonised administrative structure" had begun as early as in the 
1850s (Walker, 2000: 154; also, Gordon, 1980).  The County and Burgh Police 
(Scotland) Act 1857 initiated the trend towards central government control by making 
it compulsory for local administrations to maintain a police force through police 
committees comprising of police commissioners in burghs, commissioners of supply 
in counties, local sheriffs and the lord lieutenant (Walker, 2000: 154; Barrie, 2012: 
474). The 1857 Act also gave formal powers of force amalgamations to central 
government and created a new office of the Inspectorate of Constabulary for Scotland. 
The Inspector, appointed by Westminster, and answerable only to the Crown, had 




the basis of efficiency and was also responsible for setting out regulations on 
conditions of service (Gordon, 1980; Walker, 2000; Barrie, 2012). This development 
shaped an early tripartite governance structure in Scotland, as central government 
would increasingly use the efficiency grants as “leverage” to push through force 
amalgamations, allowing for an early form of “checks and sanctions and the sharing 
of the allocation of resources” between local and central government (Davidson et al., 
2016: 93). However, these grants were rejected by burghs who preferred to remain 
outside the scope of influence of the central government (Davidson et al., 2016: 94). 
 
This “steady current of centralisation” mirrored the discourses in England and Wales 
and it was considered in the elite policy circles as “in the best interests of policing” 
(Emsley, 2008: 73) particularly because it brought uniformity of practice and 
encouraged a “centrally organised model of good police administration” (Barrie, 2012: 
477; also, Lustgarten, 1986; Walker, 2000).  Further central government legislation in 
189214 , 190015  and in 192916  brought more uniformity in police governance 
arrangements as elected town councils and county councils also became police 
authorities, comprising locally elected representatives (Walker, 2000: 155).  
 
The above historical account helps illuminate that the system of governance that came 
to be known as the ‘tripartite’ arrangement developed very early in Scotland. These 
developments coincided with the early growth of the operational independence 
doctrine, as senior police officers became important partners in the ‘tripartite’ 
relationship. The gradual trend towards centralisation also gave rise to the tussle 
between local and central political representatives for control over the police.  The 
formalisation of tripartism, following the Royal Commission on the police (1962), 
exacerbated these problems. Below, I briefly outline the rationale for the Royal 
Commission on the police (1962) and the broad contours of tripartism, as formalised 
by the Police (Scotland) Act 1967, followed by an in-depth examination of the effects 
of tripartism on the two perennial problems of police governance.  
                                                 
14 Burgh Police (Scotland) Act 1892. 
15 Town Councils (Scotland) Act 1900. 




2.2.2 - Formalisation of tripartism 
As outlined above, the governance arrangements that existed in Scotland prior to the 
Police (Scotland) Act 1967 evolved without the need for central government 
legislation and there was no clear accountability framework through which local police 
forces could be held to account, largely due to “constitutional neglect” (Walker, 2000: 
156). The proximity of local police authorities and local chief constables meant that 
this remained the primary accountability relationship in Scotland. The formalisation 
of tripartism took place, primarily due to external discourses in England and Wales, 
that led to the Royal Commission on the police.  
 
The public police in England enjoyed a considerable period of legitimacy until the 
1950s largely due to the English ‘bobby’ being perceived as an icon of English identity 
and a symbol of power and security (Reiner, 2010: 68-77, also, Loader, 1997). 
However, by the end of the 1950s, a series of incidents including the Notting Hill and 
Nottingham race riots of 1958, mismanagement and scandals within the police 
organisations, and allegations of maladministration and corruption against chief 
constables, and senior officers (Reiner, 2010: 78) led to the appointment of the Royal 
Commission with the mandate to review the constitutional position of the police and 
police governance and accountability arrangements throughout Britain (Royal 
Commission, 1962: 1). Thus, while the Commission was formed primarily because of 
the events in England and Wales, it also sought to review the Scottish policing 
landscape, particularly the role of the local police authorities.  
 
The Commission presented its final report in 1962 and found that while in Scotland 
the town and county councils acted as police authorities, the governance and 
accountability decisions were delegated to police committees who had no formal 
powers of their own nor any legal standing (Royal Commission, 1962, para 213: 68). 
At the time of the Commission, the local police authorities in Scotland solely 
comprised of elected councillors, however, the police committees had no formal 
powers, and generally reported back to the full council for approval of decisions, 
similar to a housing or an education committee (Gordon, 1980: 77).  It was suggested 
by the Commission that police committees could continue to consist of locally elected 




opposed to the whole council) to solely focus on the maintenance of the police (Royal 
Commission, 1962, para.216: 68-69) alluding to the specialist nature of the task of 
police governance – an early nod to the need for expertise and capacity as explored in 
later chapters (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). The Commission also sought to downplay 
the strong emphasis on localism in police governance and accountability and it argued 
that local influence on policing was not unique at the time as local authorities could 
also raise locally administered armies and regiments, and had considerable control 
over hospitals, prisons and other infrastructure. It was suggested that historically, local 
authorities were best placed to govern effectively in their respective areas of influence 
due to the "primitive communication network” (Royal Commission on the Police, 
1962: 6).  
 
The outcome of the findings of the Royal Commission Report (1962) was the 
formalisation of tripartism through the Police (Scotland) Act 196717. Under the new 
statutory provisions, local councils maintained the role of police authorities and 
became the primary employer of each corresponding local police force. The police 
authorities had powers to set fifty per cent of the budgets locally (s. 2 (2)), to appoint 
or dismiss chief constables with the approval of the Secretary for State (s.4 (1)), and 
to request annual reports from chief constables for the policing of their local areas 
(s.15). However, crucially from a governance and accountability point of view, local 
police authorities in Scotland had no statutory duty to “secure the maintenance of an 
adequate and efficient police force for the area”, something that their counterparts in 
England and Wales did have (Gordon, 1980: 79, emphasis added). The Secretary of 
State for Scotland became responsible for all aspects of policing involving the overall 
governance, administration and efficiency of police forces, setting regulations for 
hiring and dismissing police constables and the maintenance of discipline in police 
forces (s. 26), force amalgamations (s. 20), issuance of grants and fifty per cent funding 
to local police authorities for policing of their local areas (s.32), and formal powers to 
instruct a police authority to call on a chief constable to retire in the interests of 
efficiency (s.31 (1)). The Secretary of State could also request the Inspector of 
                                                 




Constabulary to carry out inquiries into the state and efficiency of police forces (s. 33 
(3)). Chief constables were given responsibility for the day-to-day affairs and the 
direction and control of their respective police forces (s.17 (2)). Hence, the gradual 
transfer of powers of police governance from local government to central government 
was formalised by tripartism. The formalisation of tripartism also gave rise to the two 
perennial problems of police governance, as I examine below.  
2.3 - Local versus central: The perpetual tussle  
In theory, it was envisaged that a tripartite system of governance would give due 
recognition to local and central interests and maintain the independence of chief 
constables. However, in practice, the legislation failed to “specify broad strategic roles 
for the tripartite parties” (Walker, 2000: 156) and the statutory powers afforded to 
police authorities, were "vague and self-contradictory at crucial points" (Reiner, 2010: 
227). The result in practice was a lop-sided governance structure that accentuated the 
complications in police organisational accountability. In matters concerning the use of 
formal powers, the local police authorities were often merely reduced as a bystander, 
even in areas where they had explicit powers to appoint senior officers. For instance, 
as argued by Scott and Wilkie: 
 
“It would appear that generally with appointments the way the 
tripartite system works is that the key players are central 
government officials and chief constables with the local police 
board largely providing the rubber stamps” (Scott and Wilkie, 
2001: 58).   
 
 
The imbalance of power between local and central governments in Scotland was 
largely due to the structural limitations of tripartism and this drastically affected the 
governance and accountability of the police at a local level. The Local Government 
(Scotland) Act 1973 replaced town and county councils with a two-tier model of 
regional and district councils (Walker, 2000: 156; Donnelly and Scott, 2002a: 5). The 
regional councils had responsibility for education, social work, police and fire, while 
districts took responsibility for housing, leisure and cleaning (Donnelly and Scott, 
2002a: 5). These reforms had a direct impact on the organisation of police forces and 




of the police to a regional level. Following the reforms, eight regional police forces 
were formed, six of those were coterminous with their own regional councils acting as 
police authorities and two (Lothian and Borders and Northern) were served by joint 
police boards consisting of several smaller councils (Donnelly and Scott, 2002a: 5). 
The ensuing structures meant that the Strathclyde police force served half of Scotland’s 
population while the other seven forces served some of the smallest regions. This 
arrangement lead some to argue that “the organisation of policing has tended to follow 
the organisation of local administration rather than any logic regarding the 
geographical needs or characteristics of operational policing” (Davidson et al., 2016: 
111).  
 
The strong localism that had dominated police governance discourses in Scotland (see, 
2.2.1 and 2.2.2 above) was diluted even more following further reforms to local 
government structures in 199418 . The two-tier system of local government was 
replaced with thirty-two unitary local authorities. The eight regional police forces 
remained the same but their governance structures changed from six regional police 
authorities to six joint police boards (Central Scotland, Grampian, Lothian and 
Borders, Northern, Strathclyde and Tayside) and two unitary police authorities 
(Dumfries and Galloway and Fife) (Walker, 2000; Donnelly and Scott, 2002a). These 
reforms coincided with greater central government involvement by imposing new 
reporting obligations on chief constables and directing police authorities to ensure 
effective and efficient policing of their respective areas of influence (Walker, 2000: 
164). Further, as joint police boards consisted of several local authorities, twelve in the 
case of Strathclyde, there appeared to be less cohesion in police governance structures 
at the local level and less of a defence against “encroaching central influence” (Walker, 
2000: 165). Following the market-based reforms in the 1990s (see Chapter 4), chief 
constables also became directly responsible for civilian staff and local police forces 
effectively became large corporate organisations, further reducing the role of police 
authorities to merely act as paymasters with very little influence in local policing 
policy making (Gordon, 1980:80; Walker, 2000: 165). Similar trends were apparent in 
                                                 




England and Wales, as Reiner has argued that “the police authorities paid the piper but 
did not call any tunes” (2010: 227).  
 
The next structural change that had a significant influence, not only on Scottish police 
governance arrangements but also on the Scottish political landscape, was the 
devolution of powers to the Scottish Parliament in 1998. The powers of the Secretary 
of State for Scotland within the tripartite system were transferred to the Justice 
Secretary who along with Scottish Ministers assumed responsibilities of national 
police policy, overall police budgets and force amalgamations (Donnelly and Scott, 
2010: 81). Before the 1998 Act, policing was considered to be a “small administrative 
section” by the ministers of state in the Scottish Office (Scott, 2011: 123) and the 
political influence on Scottish policing was less "overt and abrasive" (Walker, 2000: 
159). The creation of the Scottish Parliament and its close proximity compared to 
Westminster allowed Scottish politicians and MSPs to increase their influence on 
policing policy in a bid to develop professional relationships with senior police officers 
(Donnelly and Scott, 2008: 189; Scott, 2011: 124). The ambiguities surrounding the 
role and powers of police authorities were reinforced following the emergence of new 
centralised actors such as the Scottish Parliament’s Justice Committee, and the 
expansion of powers of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland 
(HMICS) and Audit Scotland following an emphasis on public services to achieve 
greater efficiency and effectiveness through the principles of ‘Best Value’ (Donnelly 
and Scott, 2000a: 9). This changed the approach to police governance and 
accountability significantly (see Chapter 4) and the strong emphasis on localism, while 
it continues to feature strongly in political discourse (Chapter 3), was diluted by the 
proliferation of other actors and stakeholders, all of whom were based centrally.  
 
The 2012 Act, the centralisation of the local police forces, and the abolishment of the 
local police boards represents the pinnacle of the centralising trend that began as early 
as 1857, with the establishment of the Inspectorate of Constabulary (see above, 2.2.1). 
However, the tussle for democratic control over the police between local and central 
political stakeholders is a perpetual one as I explore further in Chapter 3 in the context 




show that the debate is far from settled (Chapter 7). Below, I examine the second 
perennial problem in police governance, which has also continued to feature strongly 
in the police governance literature.  
2.4 - From ‘Constabulary’ to ‘Operational’ Independence  
The doctrine of constabulary independence is the most controversial and long standing 
trend in the British police governance discourse and “it remains central to 
contemporary attempts to understand – and change – the world of police governance” 
(Walker, 2000: 44). The doctrine has no statutory foundation in either England and 
Wales, or Scotland, yet it has made organisational accountability of the police, 
particularly by local police authorities, a contentious matter. At its very core, 
constabulary independence is underpinned by the argument that "the policeman [sic] 
is nobody's servant...he executes a public office under the Law and it is the 
Law...which is the policeman's master" (Sir John Anderson quoted in Marshall, 1965: 
33).  
 
The primary legitimising foundation for this doctrine is the judicial interpretation of 
the ancient office of the constable which derives its authority from English common 
law and exercises independent authority, instead of delegated powers (Lustgarten, 
1986: 25). In Scotland too, the office of the constable has existed at least since the 
Union of the Crowns in 1603 as an office holder with original powers and authority 
and thus not answerable to anyone, save the Crown (Royal Commission, 1962, 
para.28: 10).  This interpretation of the powers of a constable formed the basis of case 
law in England and Wales leading to the sanctification of the independence doctrine. 
In Fisher v Oldham Corporation19, Fisher sought damages from Oldham Council for 
actions of the Oldham police. But it was decided that in affecting arrest or detention 
of the plaintiff, the officers were fulfilling their duties as officers of the Crown and 
that Oldham Corporation was not answerable in law for the actions of individual 
officers (Marshall, 1965: 35-36).  The judicial view that police officers were not in a 
master-servant relationship with their local police authorities was further strengthened 
                                                 




in R v Metropolitan Police Commissioner20. In his judgement, Lord Denning 
emphasised that “police officers are responsible for their actions to the law and only 
to the law” (Walker, 2000: 45).   In Scotland, there had been several unsuccessful 
attempts21 to fix vicarious liability on local police authorities for the actions of police 
officers (Marshall, 1965: 39-40).  
 
While the judicial backing for constabulary independence was primarily rooted in the 
context of civil damages under tort (Delict in Scots Law), the doctrine was also 
vigorously defended and invoked by chief constables throughout Britain to protect 
police operational policies from local political interference, and quite often from 
organisational accountability. As Lustgarten argued, the judgement in Fisher allowed 
the doctrine of constabulary independence to be “extrapolated and applied to the chief 
constables in their day-to-day running of the police forces and broad operational 
policies… due to the absurdity of the constitutional understanding that the difference 
between a police constable and a chief constable was merely one of rank” (Lustgarten, 
1986: 60-61). The Royal Commission (1962) gave its backing to the judicial 
interpretation (para. 151: 50) and following the Police Act (1964) and Police 
(Scotland) Act 1967, chief constables had complete autonomy over the operational 
direction and control of their police forces. As Walker’s quote at the start of this section 
suggests, it is important that the doctrine of operational independence is dissected and 
understood in order to appreciate the complexity it adds to the implementation of 
police governance arrangements.   
2.4.1 - Independence from what? 
The doctrine of constabulary independence has been viewed as a sacred shield against 
political interference, partisanship and problems of corruption, particularly by police 
reformers in the USA (Reiner, 2010: 88). The key legitimising argument for the notion 
of constabulary independence is rooted in the view that police constables should be 
insulated from undue political interference during the course of their duty. This 
interference could permeate in different ways. Drawing on Walker (2000: 54-55) 
                                                 
20 Ex-parte Blackburn [1968] 2 QB 118. 




firstly, an individual politician could interfere in police operations for personal gains. 
For instance, due to greed, rivalry, or personal enmity a politician may seek to 
influence specific police operations or influence an arrest or detention. Secondly, an 
elected representative may seek to influence police officers for narrow political 
interests, for instance, a politician could use political leverage to stop or start 
investigations against someone, or influence the police to use their powers of arrest 
against members of rival political parties or undesired factions. Thirdly, police could 
be used to protect the interests and security of the governing regime and its policies 
for instance, through deployment at industrial disputes caused by the government’s 
broader socio-economic policies. Fourthly, political interference could be used to 
ensure the security of the underlying political order. And finally, politicians may seek 
to prioritise specific policies in local areas due to ideological political interests.  
 
Even if the arguments by Walker provide a strong justification for the constabulary 
independence doctrine, and it is accepted that specific police operations should be 
insulated from political interference, and that instructions by the supervisory bodies in 
operational matters of the police could be construed as “an interference with the course 
of justice” (Marshall, 1978: 626), this should not amount to a lack of retrospective 
accountability for those decisions. However, a historical review of policing in England 
and Wales, and in Scotland, highlights that the doctrine of constabulary independence 
has largely been invoked to distance police policy-making from local democratic 
oversight (Marshall, 1965; Gordon, 1980; Lustgarten, 1986; Walker, 2000; Donnelly 
and Scott, 2002a; Scott, 2011). In Britain, there are many instances where the police 
have been deployed in industrial disputes or political protests, particularly where 
central government’s interests are challenged – and by extension the interests of the 
ruling political party. For instance, the 1980s’ miner’s strikes (Reiner, 2010: 78-
94,228), or the more contemporary examples of the G20 summit protests in 2009 and 
the student protests in 2010 all led to the deployment of police against those protesting 
central government policies. Further, policing scholars have underlined the ‘order 
maintenance’ role of the police (Marenin, 1982) and argued that the governance of 
police becomes even more complex when the lines between order maintenance and 




Walker, 2001: 17). Lustgarten (1986: 45-48) provides the strongest critique of the 
constabulary independence doctrine, arguing that it was the political turmoil of the 
1919, and the apparent rise of bolshevism in some local authority areas, that led the 
central government to actively support and encourage the independence of chief 
constables. Lustgarten argues that “in an era of financial crisis and retrenchment, 
expanding the central bureaucracy and nationalising the police forces was not an 
option. … in political conflicts between the central government and the “socialist” 
local authorities, the chief constable served as an intermediary, which was a godsend 
to Home Office” (Lustgarten 1986: 45). Thus, the independence doctrine of the chief 
constables was “built up” by invoking the judicial principle that viewed the constable 
as an officer of the law (Lustgarten 1986: 47). As a consequence, and particularly after 
the formalisation of tripartism, the chief constables used their powers to refuse requests 
for information, if they deemed that such requests amounted to interference in police 
operations (Donnelly and Scott, 2002a: 11; Reiner, 2010: 227). The definition of 
‘operations’ used by chief constables to distance themselves from local democratic 
oversight is a very broad one, as I explore further below. 
2.4.2 - Operations vs. Policy 
Chief constables have traditionally sought to underline their operational independence, 
by demarcating the boundary between policy and operations.  However, in agreement 
with Lustgarten, I argue that this distinction between policy and operations is a false 
one (Lustgarten, 1986: 20). Who should decide whether police should focus on drug 
related offences or hate crimes? Whether more resources should be available to tackle 
missing persons or domestic violence? It is here, in determining police policies and 
priorities, that the notion of operational independence has been consistently invoked, 
subsequently limiting the influence of the local police authorities (Lustgarten, 1986; 
Reiner, 2010; Scott, 2011). As Lustgarten (1986: 19) has argued “the police do not 
encounter offences at random”. The organisation and capability of the force usually 
determines which offences are prioritised, and ultimately the operational policies 
dictate which policing strategies and tactics are employed and where limited resources 
are deployed. Organisational accountability mechanisms can affect individual policing 




operations. The following scenarios illustrate the argument that police operations and 
policies are mutually dependant: 
 
 
The above scenarios illustrate two points. Firstly, that organisational or operational 
policies, can and do, affect police operations on the ground. These operations have a 
direct impact on local communities and areas policed which leads to the second point. 
The decision of the chief constables to reduce police numbers from an area, redirecting 
and prioritising resources towards domestic violence, or to deploy extra resources to 
deal with potential hate-crimes against a particular minority group, all have a deeply 
political character (also, see Lustgarten, 1986: 17). These ‘policy’ decisions are driven 
by the political priorities of the time. Further, prioritising and allocating scarce 
resources towards one type of crime, may lead to policing that is potentially divisive 
Scenario 1 
 
Consider a situation where a chief constable decides to reduce the number of 
officers available in a specific area. Consequently, a local commander, with 
reduced resources at their disposal for deployment, prioritises cases of domestic 
abuse over incidents of public disorder. Whilst the deployment of officers, and 
prioritisation of one incident over another may be deemed as an ‘operational’ 
matter, the limited resources at the disposal of the local police unit is a direct 




Following a major terror incident, a local police commander has identified that 
members of a particular minority group are at an increased risk of hate-related 
violence. In order to counter this threat, the threshold for what constitutes an 
arrestable offence for hate-related crimes is lowered to encourage reporting. 
Further, local policing policy is adjusted to treat all incidents of verbal and physical 
abuse against members of the particular minority group as a potential hate crime. 
As a consequence of this change in policy, more police resources are deployed 
locally to deal with hate-crimes. Conversely, in a different area, a local police 
commander increases surveillance and stops and searches, disproportionately 
targeting members of a specific minority group. Both are effectively policy 
decisions, with a direct impact on deployment, police tactics, and subsequent 
operations.  
 




or contentious among some communities and localities (a point explored in greater 
detail in Chapter 4, 4.4.2). While accountability to law provides safeguards for abuses 
of power, it does not provide ample protection against policing policy that may be 
‘legal’ but may still have negative consequences on certain groups. For instance, as 
illustrated in Scenario 2 (Box 2.1, above), the decision of a local commander to 
increase stops and searches, disproportionately targeting specific minority group areas 
would be deemed as an ‘operational’ matter based on intelligence and may be entirely 
‘legal’, yet it may result in a negative impact on that particular minority group. 
Therefore, it is even more crucial for the democratic state to set out processes and 
mechanisms of police organisational accountability that can proactively scrutinise 
operational policies, or obtain answers on contentious policies, retrospectively. Even 
where specific police operations are considered, it is reasonable for the democratic 
representatives to seek answers, to ask why certain operations were conducted in one 
way and not the other, a point surmised in a review carried out by a former Inspector 
of Constabulary in Scotland: 
 
“it would indeed be wrong for a police authority or board to tell 
its chief constable today to have an individual arrested but, on the 
other hand, the same authority could legitimately ask the chief 
constable tomorrow why a man was arrested or not arrested 
today” (Jim Gallagher, 2007 quoted in Tomkins, 2009: 57). 
 
Despite the ‘contested’ nature of the operational independence doctrine, it remained a 
sacred shield for the chief constables during tripartism. It routinely complicated 
matters between local police authorities and chief constables, often resulting in 
tensions, as examined below. 
2.4.3 - Operational Independence and Tripartism 
Under the Police (Scotland) Act 1967, local police authorities had a statutory 
responsibility to maintain an adequate police force in their local area. Local police 
authorities also had powers of appointment and dismissal of chief constables, however, 
these powers were subject to the approval of the Secretary of the State. Further, in 
order to ensure effective policing of local areas, local police authorities could request 
reports from chief constables on matters affecting their regions, however, chief 




operational independence (Donnelly and Scott, 2002a; Scott, 2011). A former chief 
constable of Central Scotland Police force, Ian Oliver, argued that local police 
authorities were routinely criticised for not exercising their right and power to 
regularly ask for reports from chief constables, particularly in regards to the “allocation 
of scarce public resources” (Oliver, 1987: 48). However, the failings of the local police 
authorities in influencing where public resources were spent, were largely because 
chief constables were “sensitive to the apparent attack on their positions” and they felt 
“compelled to distance themselves from local authorities" (Oliver, 1987: 54).  
 
In addition to a lack of influence on police spending, due to the operational 
independence doctrine, local police authorities were also often reluctant to ask 
questions regarding operational policies of the forces in their local areas. According to 
Gordon (1980), whenever an opportunity presented itself for the police authorities to 
exert their power or a measure of control over the police, they failed. For instance, in 
1975 during a National Front meeting in Glasgow, over 100 anti-fascist protestors 
were arrested, Strathclyde Police were criticised extensively in the public domain for 
excessive use of force, however, the local police board did not raise the issue for further 
discussion (1980: 80) presumably because it was felt that this amounted to interference 
in ‘police operations’. Additionally, when a Special Branch officer unsuccessfully 
tried to recruit an 'informant' at the Paisley College of Technology, the matter became 
highly publicised and Special Branch's tactics were criticised by the public and the 
media. However, the convenor of the Police and Fire Committee said "she had no plans 
to raise the issue with the Chief Constable" (Gordon, 1980: 80), deferring to the 
independence of the police.  
 
By successfully demarcating the boundary between operations and policies, chief 
constables would consolidate their independence over anything they regarded as 
operational, limiting the influence of external influence and scrutiny. This arrangement 
created a very powerful position for the chief constables both "constitutionally and 
personally" with almost no political intervention or democratic accountability (Scott, 




Another contemporary trend in the sanctification of the operational independence 
doctrine has been the rise of police professionalism (Jones, 2008), and deference of 
the local police authorities in Scotland, to the knowledge and expertise of the chief 
constable on operational matters. This is explored further in Chapter 4.  
2.5 - Discussion: The ‘perennial’ problems   
In the above sections, I have outlined the two most important, and often contentious 
trends in police governance, - i.e. the operational independence doctrine and the 
perpetual struggle between local and central government for control over the police. 
Through a historical analysis of the tripartite governance arrangements in Scotland, I 
have shown that these problems occurred perennially, complicating the 
implementation of police organisational accountability mechanisms. Tripartism 
sought to balance the interests of the central government, local government and chief 
constables, however, due to a consistent centralising trend, reforms in the local 
government structures, and the emergence and solidification of the operational 
independence doctrine, the powers and abilities of local police authorities to deliver 
local democratic accountability were severely hampered.  
 
In light of these problems, it is pertinent that police governance arrangements ensure 
a balancing of competing interests between operational independence and 
organisational accountability of operational policies, and between the demands of local 
and central government. The tripartite governance arrangements largely resulted in an 
imbalance of power relations, both the operational independence of chief constables, 
and the encroachment of central government influence meant that the local police 
authorities often rubber stamped key decisions. The unravelling of the perceived 
sanctity of the constabulary independence doctrine by Lustgarten, uncontested and 
often endorsed by other policing scholars (see for instance, Reiner, 2010: 227), 
provides a strong case for democratic oversight, and accountability of police 
operational policies both proactively, and retrospectively. So long as legal provisions 
are in place that limit the interference of local and central political representatives in 




accountability to democratic institutions and having to explain instances of action and 
inaction after the fact (also, see Chapter 7).  
 
The importance of these problems, in the context of this study is signified by the fact 
that the SPA has replaced the local police authorities. Whether these two problems 
featured in the official policy agenda leading up to the reforms is examined in Chapter 
3.  
2.6 - Conclusion 
The development of the early modern police forces in Scotland was predicated in 
localism. Throughout the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century, policing 
and police governance remained a key part of local government administration. A 
gradual shift towards centralised control, in the interests of harmonisation and 
efficiency, began as early as 1857, with the establishment of the Inspectorate of 
Constabulary in Scotland. The centralising trend gathered speed following the Royal 
Commission on the police in 1962. The subsequent legislative framework, the Police 
(Scotland) Act 1967, formalised the tripartite relationship between central 
government, local police authorities and chief constables. Whilst in theory the tripartite 
governance arrangement sought to balance the interests of the local and central 
government, in practice the 1967 Act remained vague and ambiguous and the resultant 
structures were lop-sided. Further, the evolution of the constabulary independence 
doctrine into the much broader notion of ‘operational’ independence meant that chief 
constables had unrivalled control over operational decision-making and in key matters 
of policy, the local police authorities often provided the rubber stamp. Thus, both the 
operational independence doctrine, and the centralising trend, hampered the ability of 
the local police authorities to deliver effective mechanisms of police organisational 
accountability, particularly in relation to operational policies.  
 
The perennial problems outlined in this chapter predate the 2012 Act, and as I have 
argued by drawing on Walker (2000), they remain part of the regulatory puzzle of 
police governance. It is due to this reason that these problems are cast as ‘the research 




chapter I examine whether the policy agenda leading up to the 2012 Act sought to 











Chapter 3 - The Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act, 2012: ‘The 
Solution’? 
 
In this chapter, I map out the powers and responsibilities of the key actors involved in 
the post-2012 Act governance arrangements and critically assess the policy discourse 
to identify the rationale for the creation of the SPA. Further, I examine whether the 
perennial problems of police governance, outlined in chapter 2, featured in the official 
policy agenda. I argue that while austerity provided a strong impetus for the reforms, 
the official policy agenda also sought to strengthen police governance in relation to 
the allocation of resources, local service delivery, and national policing requirements. 
The policy discourse also highlighted the need for expertise in police governance, 
providing a strong rationale for the creation of the SPA. However, the official policy 
agenda neglected the need for police governance arrangements to provide stringent 
mechanisms for organisational accountability of police operational policies. Further, 
whilst the incapacity and ineffectiveness of the former local police authorities featured 
highly in the discussions for the move towards centralisation, the perennial problems 
that existed before the new arrangements have remained unresolved.  These 
‘omissions’ had consequences for the SPA and the new governance arrangements, 
particularly in the early days of their development, as examined in the later chapters 
(Chapters 7 and 8). This chapter, therefore, provides essential context for the overall 
research aims of this study by critically evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the 
new legislative framework in relation to the perennial problems identified in the 
previous chapter.    
 
Section 3.1 provides an outline of the new police governance arrangements introduced 
by the 2012 Act, mapping out the powers and roles and responsibilities of the key 
actors. The remarkable pace of the reforms themselves was preceded by a long period 
of consultations and reviews. In section 3.2, I provide a chronological summary of the 
myriad consultations, reviews, and reports that accompanied the official reform 
agenda in the run up to the 2012 Act. The policy discourse is then critically analysed 




interviews conducted as part of this study (see Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion on 
methodology) in support of my analysis.  
3.1 - The ‘new’ landscape of police governance 
The Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Bill was introduced to the Scottish Parliament 
in January 2012, was passed in June 2012 and received Royal Assent in August 2012. 
The key actors in the new police governance landscape are set out as follows (see fig. 
3.1 for a snapshot): 
 
 
3.1.1 - The Police Service of Scotland  
Police Scotland replaced the eight former regional police forces, the Scottish Crime 
and Drug Enforcement Agency (SCDEA), and the Association of Chief Police Officers 
in Scotland (ACPOS). It is led by an Executive Team of senior police officers of rank 




Assistant Chief Constable and above, and headed by the Chief Constable. There are 
thirteen22 local policing divisions across the thirty-two local authority areas, each led 
by a Local Divisional Commander. Further, there are three Regional Command Areas, 
led by an Assistant Chief Constable, corresponding to the North, West and East regions 
of Scotland. In addition, specialist services such as counter terrorism and 
investigations of major crimes are delivered by the Specialist Crime Division (SCD), 
and Operational Support Divisions provide support functions such as Road Policing, 
Air support, Dog branch, Mounted Branch and Marine Policing. The 2012 Act places 
the direction and control of all of the police organisation under the domain of the Chief 
Constable (s.17(2)(a)), who is also responsible for the day to day administration of the 
police service (s.17(2)(b)). Crucially, by virtue of s.17, police officers of any rank, 
including the civilian staff, in exercising their functions are also subject to the direction 
and control of the Chief Constable (s.21), and it is the Chief Constable who is liable 
for any unlawful conduct by a constable in respect of their functions (s.24(1)). The 
Chief Constable has to prepare an annual police plan (s.35) and have regard to any 
comments received on the draft plan by the SPA (s.35(3)).  
3.1.2 - The Scottish Police Authority  
The SPA replaced the former local police authorities, and it occupies a central role in 
the new landscape of police governance. The SPA is the legal employer of Police 
Scotland. It has statutory responsibility to maintain the police service (s.3) and it is the 
only body with formal statutory powers to hold the chief constable to account 
(s.2(1)(e)). As it is the SPA’s duty to allocate police budgets, it has to pay damages in 
case of unlawful conduct by constables under the direction of the Chief Constable 
(s.24(3)). The SPA also has powers to appoint the chief constable, deputy chief 
constables and assistant chief constables (s.7(1)). However, the appointment of the 
chief constable has to be approved by the Scottish Ministers (s.7(2)), and the 
appointments of other senior officers have to be made following consultation with the 
Chief Constable (s.7(3)). Similarly, the SPA can require a chief constable to resign or 
                                                 
22 Argyll and West Dunbartonshire, Ayrshire, Dumfries and Galloway, Edinburgh, Fife, Forth Valley, 
Greater Glasgow, Highlands and Islands, Lanarkshire, North East, Renfrewshire and Inverclyde, 




retire in the interests of efficiency or effectiveness, but it must do so following 
consultation with the Scottish Ministers (s.14 (2)(c)). The SPA also has a duty to 
prepare a strategic police plan, setting out the main objectives for the policing of 
Scotland (s.34), the chief constable’s annual police plan has to give cognisance to the 
strategic police plan (s.35(2)(b). 
3.1.3 - Scottish Government  
The Scottish Ministers have formal powers throughout the various sections of the 2012 
Act, maintaining a check on the powers of the SPA and the Chief Constable. Section 
5 of the 2012 Act, allows the Scottish Ministers to give directions to the SPA, however, 
the direction may not be about a specific operation carried out by Police Scotland 
(s.5(2)). The Scottish Ministers also have powers to determine ‘strategic police 
priorities’ (s.33(1)), which the SPA has to take into account when developing the 
strategic police plan. Schedule 1 of the 2012 Act, also lays out the powers of the 
Scottish Ministers to appoint the chair of the SPA, and to appoint between ten and 
fourteen members, as well as formal powers to remove members if certain conditions 
are satisfied.  
 
As the focus of this study is on the SPA, it’s composition, roles, responsibilities, 
functions and processes of accountability in relation to the Chief Constable and the 
Scottish Government are examined in the findings chapters (Chapters 7 - 9). However, 
the brief outline of the distribution of powers of police governance and accountability 
highlights that the 2012 Act does give some semblance to the previous ‘tripartite’ 
relationship. This relationship remains significant as far as the perennial problems 
(Chapter 2) of police governance are concerned, as the later chapters will explore. 
However, there are other actors that are equally important, who emerged as key players 
in the landscape of police governance since the devolution of the Scottish Parliament 
(Donnelly and Scott, 2002b; Scott, 2011). The 2012 Act has formalised this 
multifaceted approach to police governance, providing a legislative framework for 
what appears to be similar to the contemporary network-based governance approaches 




3.1.4 - The Scottish Parliament’s Justice Sub-Committee on Policing 
The 2012 Act (s.124(1)) requires the Scottish Parliament to make arrangements for 
keeping under review the operation of the Act. Following the passing of the 2012 Act, 
the Justice Committee comprising of a cross-party membership took responsibility of 
fulfilling the requirements of the Act, and conducted several meetings on matters 
relating to police reform and the new governance arrangements. The Parliament 
established the Justice Sub-Committee on Policing on 13th March, 2013 due to the 
“legislative workload” of the Justice Committee (Scottish Parliament, 2014a: 1). In the 
three years since the reforms, and during the period of this study (April 2013-March 
2016), the Justice Sub-Committee on Policing played a significant role in delivering 
public accountability of the police and the SPA, reporting on issues including armed 
policing, local policing, stop and search and the adequacy (or inadequacy, see Chapter 
7 and 8) of the new police governance arrangements.  
3.1.5 - Her Majesty’s Inspectorate for Constabulary in Scotland (HMICS) 
The role and powers of HMICS were retained, and extended in the 2012 Act (s.71). 
HMICS has formal powers to conduct inquiries about any matter relating to the SPA 
and Police Scotland, as directed by the Scottish Ministers (s.74).  During the three 
years since the reforms, HMICS played a crucial role in supporting the SPA in 
delivering organisational accountability of Police Scotland. As it is explored later in 
this chapter, the reviews and reports published by HMICS also played an instrumental 
role in the run-up to the reforms. During the three years since the reforms, HMICS 
carried out thematic inspections on local policing, armed policing, stop and search, 
and call handling centres, all of which were drawn on extensively in this research (see 
Chapter 6 for methodology). Whilst the statutory position of the Inspector of 
Constabulary is that of an officer of the Crown, the Act permits the Scottish Ministers 
to determine the number of inspectors of constabulary (s.71(2)) and to designate the 
Chief Inspector of Constabulary among them (s.71(3)). Further, the Scottish Ministers 




3.1.6 - Audit Scotland 
The 2012 Act (s.37) places a statutory obligation on both Police Scotland, and the SPA 
to secure ‘Best Value’, giving due regard to the principles of efficiency, effectiveness, 
economy and meeting the requirements of providing equal opportunities (s.37(4)). By 
virtue of s.37, the Auditor General for Scotland is responsible for auditing the SPA 
(s.42) and Police Scotland (s.43). The Auditor General is independent of the Scottish 
Government, and reports to the Scottish Parliament. Similar to HMICS reports, Audit 
Scotland’s inspection reports into the previous local police authorities played a crucial 
role in the lead-up to the reforms. In addition, following the reforms, particularly in 
the first three years, Audit Scotland delivered scathing reviews of the reform process, 
and the early power struggles between the SPA, the Scottish Government and Police 
Scotland (Chapter 7), proving a useful resource for this study (see Chapter 6).  
3.1.7 - Local Scrutiny Committees 
The provision of local policing is made a statutory requirement by the 2012 Act, 
requiring the chief constable to appoint a local commander for each local authority 
area (s.44). Whilst the Act did not prescribe how the local scrutiny arrangements would 
be organised, it did give powers to local authorities to determine local policing 
priorities in partnership with the local commander, and to approve the local police plan 
(s.47). Crucially, the powers of police funding, and maintenance of the local police 
forces, previously enjoyed by the local police authorities were passed to the SPA, and 
under the new governance arrangements, the role of the local authorities is to ‘monitor’ 
and ‘provide feedback’ to the local commander on the performance of local policing 
(s.45(2)). The local commander is required to involve the local authority in setting the 
local policing priorities (s.45(1)) and to participate in community planning (s.46). All 
thirty-two local authorities have made arrangements for local scrutiny, in the form of 
local scrutiny committees. The role of the local scrutiny committees alongside that of 
the SPA, in relation to local democratic accountability of the police, is crucial in 
relation to the perennial problems outlined in Chapter 2, and will be examined in 




3.1.8 - The Police Investigations and Review Commissioner (PIRC) 
PIRC is the main organisation responsible for handling complaints against individual 
police officers and it has powers to investigate the most serious incidents involving the 
police (s.62). PIRC replaced the previous Police Complaints Commissioner for 
Scotland (PCCS) and it is organisationally independent of Police Scotland and the 
SPA. It is under the jurisdiction of the Lord Advocate, who is responsible for all 
prosecutions.  The 2012 Act (s.65) gives powers to PIRC to initiate investigations in 
relation to any policing related matter, that may be of public interest. PIRC also has a 
statutory duty to keep under review the complaints handling processes of both Police 
Scotland and the SPA.  
 
A cursory look at the allocation of powers and responsibilities of the main players in 
police governance in the 2012 Act, may suggest that the perpetual debate between 
local and central control of the police has been settled, with the local emerging as the 
“undoubted loser” (Scott, 2013b: 143). The local police authorities have been 
abolished, the new local scrutiny committees do not have any powers over resource 
allocation, the paymasters often criticised for “paying the piper and not playing any 
tunes” (Reiner, 2010: 227) are paymasters no more. On the other hand, the operational 
independence doctrine, whilst left undefined by the 2012 Act, seems to remain intact 
by virtue of the powers of the chief constable, and the explicit mention that Scottish 
Ministers may not give any directions regarding specific operations. The implication 
of these debates on the SPA, are considered in depth in the findings chapters (Chapter 
7 and 8). Below, I chart the official policy discourse and summarise the various 
reviews, reports and consultations that took place prior to the 2012 Act. This roadmap, 
in conjunction with the previous chapter (section 2.2 and 2.3) completes the history of 
centralisation of the Scottish police forces that started as early as the Police (Scotland) 
Act 1857. A critical analysis of the official rationale for the reforms (see, 3.3) will 
follow after the section below.  
3.2 - The Roadmap to the 2012 Act 
Despite local beginnings (see Chapter 2), it has been argued that the centralisation of 
policing has been the most “obvious and consistent trend” in both England and Wales 




1980; Walker, 2000). The centralising trend in Scotland has continued, initially 
without a clear statutory framework (Walker, 2000; Donnelly and Scott, 2002b), and 
it has culminated in the creation of Police Scotland and the SPA. Nevertheless, the 
reform process was gradual, the rationale nuanced, and involved a considerable period 
of deliberation and consultation.  
 
The Scottish Parliamentary elections of 2007 and the formation of the Scottish 
National Party (SNP) led minority government triggered a sequence of events, 
consultations, reviews and inspections (see Box 3.1 below), that involved a broad 
range of stakeholders including the Scottish Parliament, the now defunct Association 
of Chief Police Officers in Scotland (ACPOS), members of the Scottish Police 
Authority Conveners’ Forum representing all of the local police authorities and joint 
boards, HMICS, the Audit Commissioner, local and central elected representatives, 
civil servants, and academics. Each report, committee and commission through its 
recommendations sought to address the weaknesses in the governance structures that 
existed since the last comprehensive review of policing in Britain that was conducted 
by the Royal Commission on Policing in 1962. The following sections offer a brief 
historic timeline of events and recommendations made by the various stakeholders in 









3.2.1 - The Justice Committee Report (2008)   
During the 2007 election campaign, the SNP made a pledge to recruit more police 
officers (SNP, 2007: 58). Following the formation of a SNP minority government, the 
newly formed Justice Committee commenced an inquiry with an initial remit to 
“review the use of police resources in Scotland including plans by the Scottish 
Government to provide for an additional 1000 police officers” (Justice Committee, 
2008: para. 3).  
 
The Justice Committee broadened its remit very soon and the final report published in 
2008 included recommendations on all aspects including the purpose and priorities for 
policing in Scotland and the effectiveness of the tripartite governance arrangements 
(para. 5). In particular, the Justice Committee recommended that the roles and 
responsibilities of all actors within the tripartite relationship should be clarified (para. 
349), the composition of local police authorities should be reviewed to include 
independently appointed advisors with a range of professional skills and expertise 
(para. 351), the local police authorities should ensure they have sufficient support and 
▪ May, 2007 - Scottish National Party win the Scottish Parliamentary elections and form a 
minority government 
▪ January, 2008 - Justice Committee Inquiry report into the effective use of police 
resources 
▪ January, 2009 - Independent Review of Policing in Scotland 
▪ November, 2009 - Scottish Policing Board set up following the Independent Review 
recommendations 
▪ October, 2010 - Sustainable Policing sub-group set up in anticipation of the UK 
Spending Review 
▪ February, 2011 - Scottish Government Consultation on the future of policing 
▪ March, 2011 - Sustainable policing sub-group, Phase Two Report: Options for Reform 
▪ May, 2011 - HMICS publish paper on police governance and accountability 
▪ June, 2011 - Christie Commission publish recommendations on efficient public service 
delivery  
▪ September, 2011 - Scottish Government Consultation on amalgamation of the police 
forces 
▪ September, 2011 - Scottish Government publish Police Reform Outline Business Case 
▪ January, 2012 - The Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Bill introduced in the Scottish 
Parliament 
▪ August, 2012 - The Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act received Royal Assent 
▪ April, 2013 - The single service, 'Police Scotland' and the SPA come into effect 
 




analytical capacity to independently scrutinise the performance of the police (para. 
353), and that local police authorities should make themselves more visible to local 
communities, promote dialogue with the electorate and effectively communicate local 
priorities for policing (para. 354). 
 
As part of the recommendations, the Justice Committee also called for a thorough 
independent review of Scottish policing in appreciation of the fact that there had not 
been a comprehensive review of policing and police governance arrangements in 
Scotland since the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 (para. 364).  
3.2.2 - Independent Review of Policing in Scotland (2009) 
The review conducted by the then Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary 
Paddy Tomkins took the findings and recommendations of the Justice Committee’s 
report (2008) as the point of departure and he initiated his own review into the roles 
and responsibilities of police forces in Scotland. The review was wide ranging and 
looked at all aspects of Scottish policing and one of its stated objectives were to “make 
recommendations for the organisation, governance and accountability of police forces 
in Scotland” (Tomkins, 2009: 9).  
 
The HMICS report re-emphasised the ambiguities in the existing tripartite structure of 
governance and found that the local police authorities had very little influence over 
local policing decisions that were usually made through the community planning 
partnerships and Single Outcome Agreements23  (SOAs) (para. 1.17). The local police 
authorties also lacked independent support to enable them to scrutinise and challenge 
police operational policies effectively (para. 1.18). Further, there was no statutory 
requirement for the local police authorities to consider national policing requirements 
such as counter terrorism, cybercrime and organised crime, and chief constables were 
bound by legislation “to give primacy to the decisions of local police authority” 
causing a potential conflict of interest between local and national priorities, 
                                                 
23 In 2007, the Scottish Government and Scottish local authorities (through COSLA) agreed a Concordat 
underpinning a closer working relationship between central and local government. A single outcome 
agreement (SOA) sets out priorities for local outcomes which are agreed between local public services 




particularly because ACPOs, on the other hand, had a mandate to “promote the 
common good of policing” throughout Scotland (para. 1.19). The report also 
highlighted serious gaps in governance over national policing decisions (para. 1.19) 
due to a lack of formal mechanisms to hold ACPOs to account as a collective body. 
As part of its recommendations, HMICS proposed the creation of a national steering 
group (they referred to as the Policing in Scotland Steering Group or PSSG) to oversee 
national strategy and collaborate with partners of the existing tripartite arrangement to 
respond to national policing risks (Tomkins, 2009: 51-53). In 2007, a Scottish Police 
Services Authority (SPSA) had already been established to “improve the efficiency 
and effectiveness of services which support Scottish policing” (Audit Scotland, 2010a: 
1). However, the SPSA did not have a governance role over any of the eight local 
police forces, it provided specialist support services such as forensics, fingerprint and 
DNA analysis to the police and the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service.   
 
Following the Independent Review by HMICS, the Cabinet Secretary responded by 
setting up a Scottish Policing Board (SPB) in November 2009, membership of which 
consisted of the Scottish Government, Chair of the Police Authorities Conveners’ 
Forum, three nominated Conveners of the local police authorities, ACPOS President, 
Vice President, a third Chief Constable nominated by ACPOS, and CoSLA 
representatives (Scottish Government, 2009: para. 9).  
3.2.3 - Sustainable Policing Sub-group (2010) 
In anticipation of the UK Government’s Spending Review for years 2011 to 2015, the 
SPB members, on request of the Cabinet Secretary for Justice, initiated a programme 
of work in June 2010 in order to identify a sustainable policing model for Scotland 
(Scottish Policing Board, 2010a: 1). By October 2010, a Sustainable Policing Sub-
group (SPSG) was formed with a remit to “develop rigorously appraised options for 
further cost savings to enable frontline policing outcomes to be sustained in 2013-14 
and beyond, in the face of anticipated spending reductions” (Scottish Government, 
2010a: 1).  
 
The SPSG submitted its interim report in November 2010, and among many early 




model, a regional model and a single service (SPSG, 2010a: 22-25). Three tiers of 
accountability concomitant to the three structures were also proposed. Firstly, at the 
multi-member ward level, through the community councils as the first tier to hold 
operational policing to account (3.15). Secondly, at the local authority level and 
embedded within the existing community planning partnership structures and SOAs, 
particularly through the delivery of jointly agreed outcomes (3.16). And nationally 
through a “Scottish Police Authority should a single force be created”, with existing 
bodies like the SPB to co-ordinate national priorities and strategic objectives (3.17). 
This was the first mention of a national accountability body that would work alongside 
the SPB, but operate as an independent body.  
 
The interim report was presented at the SPB meeting in December 2010 which was 
attended by the SPB members, the SPSG project team, representatives from CoSLA, 
ACPOS, HMICS, officials from the Scottish Government, some conveners of the local 
police authorities and joint boards, members of the Association of Scottish Police 
Superintendents (ASPS) and the Scottish Police Federation (SPF). Due to a range of 
options requiring further exploration, the SPB members could not reach a consensus 
and the Cabinet Secretary for Justice took forward the proposed local, regional and 
national models to the Cabinet for further consideration (Scottish Policing Board, 
2010b: 4).  
3.2.4 - Scottish Government Consultation on the future of policing (February, 2011) 
In terms of the roadmap towards a centralised police service, 2011 proved to be the 
busiest year for all stakeholders involved in the Scottish policing landscape. Following 
the early work conducted by the SPB and the subsequent SPSG, the Scottish 
Government embarked on a wide-ranging consultation process asking stakeholders to 
provide written responses to 12 questions based around “improving services and 
delivering improved outcomes; accountability and engagement, especially in relation 
to local communities; and delivering efficiencies while protecting frontline services” 
(Scottish Government, 2011a: 5). The consultation also sought views on the three 
proposed structures i.e. “significantly enhanced collaboration between the existing 




Government, 2011a: 5). The consultation received 219 responses and an independent 
research group was commissioned to “analyse and report on the responses to the 
consultation” (Bryan et al., 2011: 1). The results of this consultation are discussed 
below (see, 3.2.8). 
3.2.5 - Sustainable Policing Sub-group, Phase Two Report: Options for Reform (March, 2011) 
A month after the Scottish Government issued its consultation document, the SPSG 
reported to the SPB with its phase two report with further evidence for a viable model 
of policing going forward. In exploring the three models, the SPSG expressed their 
support for the single service:  
 
“The single force model represents the most significant change; 
however, it provides the greatest opportunity to manage change, 
drive efficiency and in delivering operations when the change is 
complete. The eight force model represents the opposite” (SPSG, 
2011b: 5, para. 15).  
 
As the SPSG’s work gained momentum in identifying the most efficient and effective 
structure for the future delivery of policing in Scotland, the Scottish Government 
reiterated its desire to improve governance and accountability of policing in Scotland 
whichever structure was adopted. There was widespread recognition within the policy 
circles that whilst the local police forces were actively contributing to the community 
planning partnerships and SOAs, “there were few formal mechanisms for holding the 
police to account at the local authority level” (Scottish Government, 2011b: 2, para. 
11).  
 
The Scottish Government also asked the SPSG to consider formal structures to 
strengthen national accountability. In the event of amalgamation, two models were 
particularly being explored; one where the Chief Constable is directly answerable to 
the relevant Minister, providing direct democratic accountability; or a second where 
the Chief Constable is answerable to a National Policing Board or Authority with 
powers to allocate funds, appoint chief officers and approve strategic plans (Scottish 
Government, 2011b: 3, para. 15). In any scenario, the desire to preserve the operational 
independence of the chief constable was reiterated. Further, whilst appreciating the 




Scottish Government also showed an interest in strengthening accountability through 
“engagement and dialogue, information provision and performance reporting and the 
use of web and social media” (Scottish Government, 2011b: 4, para. 18).  
3.2.6 - HMICS’ Discussion Paper on Governance and Accountability of Policing in Scotland (May, 
2011)  
The Scottish Government’s concerns about a lack of formal mechanisms for local and 
national accountability were endorsed once again by HMICS.  Andrew Laing and 
Emma Fossey made a timely contribution to the governance and accountability debate 
while the future of Scottish policing was being considered. In particular, their report 
showed cognisance of the weaknesses in the tripartite arrangements that the Justice 
Committee (2008) and the Independent Review (Tomkins, 2009) had alluded to 
previously and went as far as saying that the “fundamental problems raised by the 
Royal Commission in 1962 had never been addressed and the complex competencies 
required for governance and accountability of the police had never been made 
available” (Laing and Fossey, 2011: 14). Among the recommendations, it was 
proposed that any future structure of policing should “develop a fuller system of 
governance incorporating the wider skills, knowledge, competences, capabilities and 
capacity necessary to draw policing more fully to account” (Laing and Fossey, 2011: 
15). 
 
The discourses up to the May 2011 Scottish Parliamentary elections, even while the 
shadow of austerity loomed, strongly supported police reforms and the most important 
rationale for change at the time was the weak governance and accountability structure 
and the underlying ambiguities of tripartism that had not been addressed in over four 
decades. However, it was the economic debate, and the need to develop a sustainable 
policing model that ultimately became the catalyst for change.   
3.2.7 - Christie Commission (June, 2011) 
The debates and consultations around the future delivery of policing in Scotland were 
being conducted at a time when, in light of the UK Government’s spending review, 
the Scottish Government had commissioned a much broader consultation on the future 




elections were contested in 2011. Despite the impending public services review being 
undertaken by the Christie Commission, the SNP pledged to maintain the 1000 extra 
police officers that they had initially promised in 2007 whilst also recognising that the 
“existing eight local police forces are not sustainable and the number of police forces 
will be reduced” (SNP, 2011: 18), stopping short of pledging full support for a single 
service. The Scottish Labour (Scottish Labour Manifesto, 2011: 47-48) and the 
Scottish Conservatives (Scottish Conservatives Manifesto, 2011: 20) outright 
supported a single service, while the Scottish Liberal Democrats (Scottish Liberal 
Democrats Manifesto, 2011: 72) and the Scottish Greens opposed it (Scottish Greens 
Manifesto, 2011: 22). 
 
The responsibility of reforming the police in Scotland fell on the SNP following a 
majority win and despite their initial reluctance, the momentum towards a single police 
service hastened following the publication of Christie’s report. Christie made 
recommendations of greater integration between not just the police forces but in terms 
of wider public service delivery provision (2011: 43), a reduction in duplication and 
sharing of resources for greater efficiency (2011: 48) and greater accountability and 
transparency of public services (2011: 63). 
 
While the focus of the report was on all public services, Christie showed cognisance 
of the ongoing debates on police reform. Specifically, Christie recommended that any 
reform needs to ensure that “services are required to account to the people and 
communities of Scotland, both directly and through their democratically elected 
representatives” (Christie, 2011: 76, para. 8.24). However, as HMICS (Laing and 
Fossey, 2011) and the Justice Committee (2008) had previously observed, the 
weaknesses in tripartism particularly at the local authority level were not due to a lack 
of democratic control but due to a lack of expertise and capacity (also see below, 
3.3.2.c).  
3.2.8 - Scottish Government Consultation on Amalgamation (September, 2011) 
The results of the first consultation conducted by the Scottish Government in February 




possible 225 supported a single service, 45 favoured a rationalised regional model, 59 
preferred the eight local force model and 77 chose no option due to insufficient 
evidence and knowledge-base (Bryan et al., 2011: 26). 50 per cent of the respondents 
also noted that the existing governance and accountability arrangements were working 
well (Bryan et al., 2011: 15). This makes it difficult to glean whether the respondents 
had a sufficient understanding, awareness or appreciation of the weaknesses of the 
existing tripartite structure.  
 
The respondents who did not favour a single force model expressed concerns that 
centralisation would result in a “loss of local knowledge in terms of needs, geography, 
training and skills and a consequent negative impact on services; and a loss of local 
accountability and democracy” (Bryan et al., 2011: 42). Despite such unfavourable 
results, the Scottish Government formally announced its intention to create a single 
police service in September 2011 and initiated another round of consultation to inform 
the legislative framework for the reform bill.  
 
The announcement came after the SPB had responded to the concerns raised in the 
first consultation with proposals that local policing will be made a statutory 
requirement and local accountability will be strengthened by giving powers to local 
authorities to “approve the local police plan, scrutinise local policing performance and 
to hold the local senior officer to account for local policing” (SPB, 2011: 2, para. 8-9). 
The SPB also noted that any national governance arrangement may be at an increased 
risk of political influence due to its proximity to central government. However, the 
SPB argued that “in many countries such as New Zealand, and the Republic of 
Ireland24  there is a direct relationship between the government and the police service” 
but in the Scottish context, “it would be possible to establish a statutory body at arms-
length to ministers” (SPB, 2011: 2, para.10).  
 
The proposals in the second round of consultation included the creation of a centralised 
governing body of independently appointed members; the Scottish Police Authority 
                                                 
24 The Republic of Ireland has since reformed its police governance structures and the Garda Síochána 
(Policing Authority and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2015 established the Policing Authority, that 
came into effect on the 01st January 2016, as an independent body to oversee the performance of the 




(SPA). The SPA was envisaged to provide governance and accountability of the police 
without interference from Scottish Ministers and it was reiterated that the chief 
constable would be directly answerable to the SPA (Scottish Government 2011c: 13, 
para. 3.9). The proposals also recognised that the composition of the SPA would have 
to be broad and reflect a range of competencies and skills. Whilst identifying 
knowledge of local government and local policing as key areas for the future SPA 
composition, the consultation document specifically asked about what skills, 
knowledge and expertise would be required for the SPA to enable it to adequately fulfil 
its functions (Scottish Government 2011c: 14).  
 
The proposals also included measures to strengthen local policing and local 
accountability by allowing each of the 32 local authorities to monitor and scrutinise 
police performance against the Local Police Plan and to seek reports, answers and 
explanations from the Local Commander about the Plan or any other local policing 
issues (Scottish Government 2011c: 15, para 3.20). Crucially (discussed below, 3.4), 
the Scottish Government did not intend to legislate a single way for local authorities 
to formalise their proposed local scrutiny functions, it was left to the local councillors 
to determine the most appropriate mechanism and to form a relationship with their 
Local Commanders to secure delivery of local outcomes (2011c: 16, para 3.21).  
 
Along with the consultation document, the Scottish Government also issued an outline 
business case for a single service proposing that “it provides the least complex and 
most efficient option; the best opportunity to reinvest to improve local policing 
outcomes; the highest potential for long-term financial sustainability; and the best 
opportunity to co-ordinate change, optimise benefit and minimise risk” (Scottish 
Government, 2011d: 9). The preparations were underway and the intent was clear, the 
proposed single police service and a centralised governing body just needed 
Parliament’s approval.     
 
The above provides a chronological timeline of the myriad reviews, consultations and 
discussions that took place prior to the police reforms in Scotland. In the following 
section, I distil and critically analyse the official policy rationale for the reforms. In 




from the interviews conducted as part of this research (see Methodology, Chapter 6) 
with key individuals in the elite policy and policing circles involved in the reforms.   
3.3 - Reforms in context 
The themes that became a catalyst for the reforms, and for the creation of the SPA as 
an expert body, are distilled from the official policy discourse and are critically 
analysed below.  
3.3.1 - Austerity 
In the “age of ‘austerity’” (Neyroud, 2012: 315), the primary driver for the reforms 
was the concern around public service spending following the UK Government 
Spending Review, and an overall reduction in Scotland’s devolved budget (HM 
Treasury, 2010: 70). As of 2011-12, according to the Scottish Government, policing 
in Scotland cost the economy a total of £1.4 billion per annum (Scottish Government, 
2011c: 18, para. 4.1). With all estimates suggesting that the public service spending 
was not expected to return to 2010 levels for 16 years (Christie, 2011: viii), inaction 
was not an option.  
 
HMICS’ Independent Review raised concerns very early on, that local police forces, 
particularly the smaller ones, were facing financial pressures (Tomkins, 2009: 4, para. 
1.7). It was anticipated that while the larger forces such as Strathclyde would have 
been able to deliver savings through a reduction in corporate and civilian staff, smaller 
forces may be forced to reduce front line provision, a measure that was perceived to 
have drastic effects on communities in areas served by those smaller forces (Scottish 
Government, 2011a: 11, para. 23). While some local police forces were struggling to 
provide resources for front line community policing, due to the changing demands on 
policing and new threats such as terrorism, others like Grampian and Lothian and 
Borders raised specific concerns about having insufficient resources to police the oil 
industry and the Capital respectively (Justice Committee, 2008: paras. 56, 57).  
 
In order to provide the necessary savings, it was considered prudent to integrate 
specialist services and resources and to avoid duplication as proposed by Christie 




efficient with an estimated savings of £151m per annum (Scottish Government, 2011d: 
54, para. 5.32). Despite a long period of consultations, the pace of the reforms, once 
the option to move towards a single force was chosen, was remarkable. A civil servant 
involved in the reform programme told me that work was already in progress on 
managing the pressures of financial cuts on the local police forces, however, when the 
extent of the cuts became clear, there was a sense that a structural change was 
necessary: 
 
“wow, suddenly there is going to be a significant reduction in 
budget, that started to focus their minds…the whole thing was 
very quick, in a sense that, we knew that we had to keep the 
momentum up of this work and there was a pressing need to take 
it forward, so in that sense there was a pressing need to get on 
with it” - (Interview: Civil Servant). 
 
An early suggestion of a single force at an SPB meeting was rejected, however, it was 
felt very early in the discussions that centralisation would be the most cost-effective 
option: 
 
“well there was a strong sort of evidence base for that [single 
service] … at the very first meeting of the SPB, the chair of 
Strathclyde Police Authority made a point of raising the issue of a 
single force… so it was not that there weren’t people talking about 
it even back then” – (Interview: Civil Servant). 
 
In the period leading up to the reforms, whilst the consultations were taking place, the 
reform team had also taken cognisance of the reform programmes in other countries. 
A former Minister who was initially reluctant about the single force told me that: 
 
 
“we looked long and hard at this, because the first option was: do 
you go to regional services … and I always remember what 
persuaded me not to go down regional services was speaking to 
those in Finland who had been through reform. In Finland, they 
said we reformed from 30 or 40 [police forces] and we brought it 
down to 9 or 10 and they said we now have to move on [to a 
single service]. And they said if you are going to reform then do it 
once and I took that on board, I thought there was a logic there, if 
we had gone to 3 or 4 East, West, North as was kind of proposed, 




would have been significantly less. And the lesson that we learned 
from Finland, and I think that was the evidence, that we would 
have to move on to a single service pretty quickly. If you were 
gonna do [reform the police], you do it once so that was the driver 
there. – (Interview: Former Minister).  
 
 
The Finnish example by the former Minister in the above quote underlines the fact that 
the police reforms in Scotland were not taking place in a vacuum, rather several 
jurisdictions across Europe were undergoing, or had already undergone, various police 
reform programmes. In Finland, the first set of reforms had taken place in 1996, and 
coincided with the changes in the local government structures. As a result, the 
concomitant police forces were reduced from 229 police districts to ninety local police 
departments (Haraholma and Houtsonen, 2013: 59). Subsequent reforms took place in 
two phases, in 2009 and 2010, resulting in a unified police service with one of the 
stated aims as “to gain productivity savings” (Haraholma and Houtsonen, 2013: 60).  
 
Similarly, in the Netherlands, a national police service replacing the previous twenty-
five “semi-autonomous” regional police forces came into effect in January 2013 
(Terpstra, 2013: 139). Whilst austerity did not feature strongly in the police reform 
agenda in the Netherlands, there were overall concerns regarding resource and 
information sharing between the regional forces, and the need for a more harmonised 
administrative structure following a failure of a major IT project (Terpstra, 2013: 143-
144; Terpstra and Fyfe, 2015: 530).  
 
In 2012, Sweden also embarked on police reforms from 21 county police forces to a 
single national police service, and the police authorities, responsible for maintaining 
the county forces were replaced by a centralised police authority, with “cost-
effectiveness” as a key stated rationale for the reforms (Wennström, 2013: 159).  
 
In a stark contrast to the tide of centralisation in Europe, the reform programme in the 
jurisdiction closest to Scotland, also driven by austerity, followed a “divergent trend” 
(Fyfe and Henry, 2012). In England and Wales, the Police Reform and Social 




newly established role of the Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) and the Police 
and Crime Panels (Lister, 2013; Loveday, 2013; Reiner, 2013). The PCCs are elected 
officials and replace the powers and responsibilities of the local police authorities. 
Tasked with enhancing local democratic accountability of the police forces in England 
and Wales (Home Office, 2010), the role of the PCCs in the broader debates on police 
governance and democracy is examined in Chapter 4, particularly in comparison to the 
centralised, and expert base provided by the SPA.  
 
It is too early to suggest whether Police Scotland and the SPA are on course to make 
the anticipated savings but it is clear from the above analysis that the reforms were 
driven by financial pressures, and coincided with similar reform programmes across 
Europe. An Audit Scotland review of four previous mergers of public Services in 
Scotland since 2008 has previously argued that public sector mergers tend to be based 
on “broad assumptions”, the estimated costs of reforms were “likely to be under-
estimated” and the “analysis of savings and efficiencies is often inadequate” (Audit 
Scotland, 2012a: 4). Another stated rationale for the reforms was to enhance and 
strengthen police governance arrangements, as I examine below. 
3.3.2 - Enhanced Police Governance 
In the context of the reform programme, whilst it was accepted that the local police 
authorities were not effective in delivering democratic accountability of the police, the 
reasons considered did not make any mention of the problems I discussed in Chapter 
2 (also see below, 3.4). Instead the policy discourse introduced a more contemporary 
debate in police governance, highlighting the need to balance democratic 
accountability and expertise (see, Chapter 4). Since the Justice Committee hearing in 
2008 (as above, 3.2.1), it was recognised in the official policy circles that the 
governance of police in Scotland was an issue that needed to be addressed, perhaps 
more so than the reduction in budgets. I argued above (3.2.7) that following the 
Christie Commission, austerity became a catalyst for the reforms, however, a senior 
police officer, also involved in the reform agenda had no doubt that the weak 






“The point I would probably just make which is relevant to the 
question is that one of the drivers for change in the first place was 
a general view or belief that the governance arrangements for 
policing were inadequate, they were weak, and they were kind of 
toothless, and they didn’t provide the kind of clarity or assurance 
for you know government or for the public … when we went into 
reform policing was not broken, policing was firing on all 
cylinders we were delivering everything that the communities 
asked of us, we had made significant cost savings before Police 
Scotland even came into being, the individual legacy forces had 
saved £9m in the lead up to change from the cost-base and crime 
was on an all-time low, performance was very strong really across 
the board, public confidence using all the recognised measures 
was very very strong and in contrast a lot stronger than England” 
- (Interview: DCC, Police Scotland).  
 
As per the DCC’s quote above, a combination of a lack of financial oversight over 
local police resources, a lack of interest by the local police authorities in national 
policing requirements, and a lack of expertise, skills and capacities of the local police 
authorities were crucial weaknesses of the tripartite governance arrangements, as far 
as the official reform agenda was concerned.  These three points are considered in 
greater detail below.    
3.3.2.a - Financial Accountability 
The Local Government in Scotland Act 2003 introduced statutory duties on local 
authorities to secure Best Value in delivering public services by giving due regard to 
efficiency, effectiveness, economy and equality (s.1(4)), and to initiate, maintain and 
facilitate Community Planning in consultation with all public bodies responsible for 
providing services locally (s.15). The provisions applied to all functions of local 
authorities and it was here in securing Best Value and delivering on joint outcomes 
that the weaknesses of the local police authorities were magnified.  
 
Previous HMICS reviews had highlighted that local police authorities were not 
effective in providing accountability for the way police resources were spent locally 
in relation to the SOAs and community planning partnerships (Tomkins, 2009: 39-40; 
Scottish Government, 2011a: 13, para. 28). In the first Best Value audit and inspection 
of a local police authority, the Audit Commissioner and HMICS found that the Tayside 




priorities for the police service and holding the chief constable to account” (Audit 
Scotland and HMICS, 2009: 3, para. 3).  Following the audit and inspection of all eight 
local police authorities, the Audit Commission and HMICS reported that whilst the 
local police forces were playing an active role in local community planning and 
delivering local outcomes, local police authorities were “not effective in their role of 
influencing local policing and partnership priorities and then monitoring development 
and delivery” (Audit Scotland and HMICS, 2012: 6, para. 15). Further, there was a 
lack of financial oversight particularly in terms of directing police resources towards 
local priorities (Audit Scotland and HMICS, 2012: 6, para. 16). These findings were 
merely a confirmation of what previous inspections and reports had already alluded to. 
In giving evidence to the Justice Committee, HMICS had argued that “there was too 
little direct input or challenge from elected members” in relation to priority setting of 
the local forces (Justice Committee, 2008: para. 324).  
 
Despite having formal powers, I argued in Chapter 2, particularly in reference to Scott 
and Wilkie (2001:58), that when it came to key decisions, the local police authorities 
often provided the rubber stamp. This point was emphasised by a former Scottish 
Minister in relation to the powers of the local police authorities to allocate funds 
locally: 
 
“The money was basically coming from the centre anyway, it’s not 
like they previously decided how they spent it, they might think 
that but actually it’s a false argument because it wasn’t their 
money, it was coming from central grants and anyway other than 
the chief saying this is what I would like to spend it on I’ve never 
heard of a councillor saying you’re not spending on that” - 
(Interview: Former Minister). 
 
 
The above statement by the former Minister merits a deeper examination of the state 
of police funding prior to the reforms.  Under the tripartite governance arrangement, 
the allocation of funding to the local police forces was split between central 
government and local authorities at a ratio of fifty-one per cent central funding and 
forty-nine per cent local government funding. According to a Scottish Parliament 
briefing (SPICe, 2011), direct central government funding was used to fund the SPSA, 




Central government also made additional contributions to the local authorities through 
ring-fenced police grants making a total contribution of £691.9 million in 2011/2012, 
whilst the local authorities contributed £462 million (SPICe, 2011: 11-12). However, 
around 85 per cent of the local authority expenditure is funded through a Revenue 
Support Grant25 issued by the Scottish Government, with the remainder raised through 
council tax. This additional central government funding is part of the Concordat 
agreement between the Scottish Government and local authorities on joint delivery of 
services towards key local and national outcomes (Scottish Government and CoSLA, 
2007). Against the backdrop of the Concordat, the lack of oversight over the way 
police funding was contributing towards local and central priorities provides a strong 
rationale for the reforms and the creation of the SPA.   
 
In the lead-up to the reforms, the Scottish Government (2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d) 
drew heavily on these weaknesses in support of a case for the single police service. As 
noted above (3.1.7), the 2012 Act has removed powers of resource allocation from the 
local authorities but local policing (Chapter 7, 2012 Act: ss44-47), and a duty to 
participate in community planning (s46) is still a statutory requirement.  
3.3.2.b - National Policing Requirements 
Another stated rationale for the reforms was the need to develop formal structures that 
would consider national policing priorities and objectives and oversee national risks. 
National risks and policing priorities were perceived to include, but not limited to, 
“counter-terrorism, specialist firearms support, motorway policing and air support, 
child protection and monitoring sex offenders, serious fraud, armed criminals, kidnap 
and extortion, the infiltration of police organisations by organised crime, cost of 
technical aids to investigation, - e.g. in forensic science, forensic accounting and 
surveillance techniques, new techniques in dealing with large-scale disorder, and 
additional support to other services dealing with threats such as pandemic disease, food 
                                                 
25 A ‘block grant’ funding scheme consists of a Revenue Support Grant, Non Domestic Rates Income 
and Specific Grants and it is part of a joint service delivery agreement between the Scottish Government 
and local authorities established under a joint Concordat agreement in 2007 (Scottish Government and 




contamination and the effects of severe weather” (Donnelly and Scott, 2008: 191; 
Tomkins, 2009: 12, para. 2.19; Scottish Government, 2011a: 11, para. 24).  
 
The local police authorities were under no statutory obligation to give regard to any of 
those risks. The strongest call for a national strategic body came in 2009 following the 
HMICS Independent Review that recommended that “Scottish Ministers should bring 
forward draft legislation to impose a statutory duty on chief constables and police 
authorities to take Scotland’s national policing capacity and capability; its national 
resilience to catastrophic events or strategic threats from criminality; and the reduction 
of the costs that arise from unnecessary duplication of services into account in all 
decision-making” (Tomkins, 2009: 52, para. 8.3). A civil servant noted that it was the 
review carried out by Paddy Tomkins that had paved the way for the creation of the 
SPB and the SPSA, and even those developments were initially criticised for bringing 
in centralisation: 
 
“so the SPB was an attempt to say look we need something where 
people come together at a national level… so there was a definite 
sense of getting to a point where we had the SPB as something 
that whilst not being a governance structure in the formal sense of 
the word, did provide an opportunity to bring everyone together 
to work at a strategic level. Well there was quite a lot of opposition 
to that, it was seen by some as being some kind of centralisation” – 
(Interview: Civil Servant).  
 
While perhaps not immediately apparent but the need for a national level strategic 
body also raises questions in respects of an increased central government interference, 
precisely due to the changing nature of national risks. As outlined above (see, 3.1.3), 
under the new arrangements, the Scottish Ministers have powers to give directions to 
the SPA, and they have an overall responsibility to appoint and dismiss board 
members. As part of the analysis of the SPA, I will examine if the SPA has sufficient 
autonomy and capacity to operate independently of the Scottish Ministers (see, 
Chapter 5, 7 and 8). But it is important to note that while the stated rationale for 
creating a centralised police authority was to “establish a statutory body at arms-length 
to ministers” (as quoted above in 3.8; SPB, 2011: 2, para.10) the wording of the 2012 




with the latter having formal channels for exercising considerable influence into the 
day-to-day functions of the SPA.  
3.3.2.c - Expertise, Skills, and Capacities  
One of the reasons why the local police authorities were reported to be ineffective in 
delivering financial accountability of the local police forces was due to a lack of 
professional expertise at the disposal of the local councillors. Most local police 
authorities were found to have “limited dedicated professional support to carry out 
their functions effectively” (Justice Committee, 2008: para. 352). It was recommended 
by the Justice Committee that the appointment of independent members in an advisory 
capacity “could contribute particular professional skills and expertise, professional 
support and analytical capacity”, enabling the local police authorities to scrutinise the 
performance of their police forces effectively (Justice Committee, 2008: para. 351 and 
353). Concerns regarding the lack of expertise and capacity were particularly raised in 
respect of the reliance of local police authority members on the local police forces to 
provide information that was crucial for the analysis of police performance (Justice 
Committee, 2008: para. 352). At the Justice Committee session, Dr. Kenneth Scott 
suggested that: 
  
“… if a police board wants to know anything about what its local 
force is doing, it asks the chief constable to provide the relevant 
information. A problem arises in that respect, given that 
accountability needs nowadays to be much more objective. There 
is a real question about whether police boards are in a position to 
effectively hold the police to proper democratic account” - (Justice 
Committee, 2008: para. 327).  
 
Audit Scotland and HMICS, in 2009 also remarked that the “local police authority 
members needed more support to improve their knowledge and understanding of their 
role as board members in order to fulfil their core activities, including setting direction 
and priorities and scrutinising police performance” (Audit Scotland, 2009: 3, para. 5). 
An inspection of the Strathclyde Police Authority, that maintained the largest police 
force in the country also found that members had “limited training, varying levels of 
understanding of their roles and responsibilities and a generally passive, rather than 





The continuing emphasis of the official policy discourse on the need for expertise in 
police governance raises an important trend in the broader context of police 
governance and accountability. The creation of the SPA, as a centralised body with a 
professional base, has introduced a new nexus between the role of experts and 
traditional forms of democratic governance. This development sets the foundation for 
the debates on expertise and democracy, explored in detail in Chapter 4 (see 4.2.5), 
and the subsequent analysis of the SPA in Chapters 7, 8 and 9.  
3.4 - Discussion: Police Organisational Accountability - Missed Opportunities? 
It has been argued that the 2012 Act has created “effective accountabilities” of the 
police through the requirement to achieve ‘Best Value’ (Scott, 2013b: 145), therein 
lies the problem. In the run-up to the reforms, the organisational accountability of 
operational policies may have been overlooked. Financial accountability of the police 
organisation has long been an uncontested method of managing and delivering police 
organisational accountability, particularly by central government (Reiner and Spencer, 
1993; also, see Chapter 4). It comes as no surprise that, against the backdrop of 
austerity, much of the emphasis during the policy discourse remained on the need to 
improve financial accountability of the police. Whilst I accept that financial 
accountability is a key aspect of police governance, as I argued in Chapter 2, 
organisational accountability of the police is concerned with more than financial 
oversight. In cognisance of the broad role of the police organisation (Chapter 2, 2.1), 
and the inherent political backdrop against which policing policies are developed (as I 
argued in 2.4.2), the processes and mechanisms of organisational accountability also 
need to provide oversight of police operational policies. This is imperative particularly 
where policing policies are ‘legal’ yet contentious, and may potentially have a negative 
impact on certain communities. There was a sense, as exemplified by the earlier quote 
by a DCC above (see, 3.3.2), that operational policing and the accountability of 
operational policies were not a cause for concern. This was reiterated by a civil servant 






“There had not been any issues that had come to light before then, 
under the prior structure, about operational policing, not that I can 
recall as we speak. So, in a sense … operational policing, policing 
delivery, was working very well and these reforms, were not 
about fixing a problem in operational policing, except for, and 
again very explicit about that, and this is going back to Paddy’s 
review, that there needed to be better co-ordination of delivery of 
national policing” – (Interview: Civil Servant).  
 
Whilst it may be true that the police forces in Scotland have generally avoided the 
heated scandals that their counterparts in England have been embroiled in, several 
controversies related to operational policing did exist prior to the reforms (such as the 
Paisley College Incident, Chapter 2, 2.5.2; Gordon, 1980: 80; or the criticisms 
involving the murder inquiry of Surjit Singh Chokar, see Fyfe and Henry, 2012: 175), 
and indeed several surfaced after the reforms (Chapter 7). However, despite the 
controversies, there is some credence in the view that, in comparison to England and 
Wales, the Scottish police governance discourse has historically lacked “any 
semblance of accountability” (Lennon and Murray, 2016: 11). Further, despite all the 
criticisms of the local police authorities, and the lack of local democratic oversight 
over policing, the official policy discourse failed to highlight the extent to which the 
operational independence doctrine (Chapter 2, 2.4), and the structural limitations of 
tripartism (Chapter 2, 2.3) had contributed to those shortcomings. As I argued in 
Chapter 2, the weaknesses in the tripartite governance arrangements were a product of 
these perennial problems that solidified during decades of tripartism. These problems 
hampered the ability of local police authorities to deliver effective mechanisms of 
organisational accountability of their local police forces (Chapter 2, 2.5). However, 
whilst the official reform agenda heavily criticised the local police authorities, it did 
so for different reasons, as outlined above, and did not raise the spectre of any 
weaknesses in police organisational accountability mechanisms.  
 
The lack of attention on the operational independence doctrine in the reform agenda is 
particularly astounding, given the coverage this doctrine has traditionally received in 
the police governance literature (Chapter 2, 2.4; Lustgarten, 1986; Walker, 2000; 
Donnelly and Scott, 2002a; Jones, 2008). This is not to say that those discussions 




governance and accountability explicitly stated that the existing legislation was 
“frustratingly opaque on the matter of independence” (Laing and Fossey, 2011: 9) and 
called for a “better balance” that established clear boundaries between operational 
independence and the duties of those who sought to hold the chief constables to 
account for their operational decision-making (Laing and Fossey, 2011: 10). The 2012 
Act does not define operational independence, and instead replicates the ambiguities 
that existed in the previous legislative framework (examined further in Chapter 7). 
When I asked those involved in the reform programme about a lack of clarity on the 
operational independence doctrine, their replies reflected the complexity that has 
surrounded this notion, it was felt that a contemporary interpretation should be left to 
negotiated agreement between the actors in the new governance landscape:   
 
You could write books and theses on it. At the end of the day, the 
chief [constable] has to call all the shots. Equally we live in a world 
where things are very interactive. Where does the line cross, 
depends on the society, the history, the era in terms of what is 
happening in the community… it has to come down to common 
sense and there will always be grey areas. Do you want to litigate 
over it? No. I think that’s where it’s a job for the Parliament, it’s a 
job for the Ministers, it’s a job for the Chief, it’s a job for the 
Authority [the SPA] – (Interview: Former Minister). 
 
 
The non-prescriptive nature of the 2012 Act was reiterated by a civil servant: 
 
“There wasn’t something that in the end, certainly from a 
legislative perspective, would seem to be a neat solution. It was 
very difficult to find something where you could legislate because 
again there were different arguments… from a government 
perspective, the tools the government has got is legislation and 
then the setting up of the SPA. There was a public appointments 
process the government ran or oversaw, after that it's down to 
those parties to work out” – (Interview: Civil Servant). 
 
I argued in Chapter 2, that due to the operational independence doctrine, the local 
police authorities were often reduced as a spectator, a toothless partner in the tripartite 
relationship. Further, during consultations it was observed that the removal of powers 
of resource allocation from the local authorities, and an emphasis on national policing 




Concerns were raised that centralisation of police governance arrangements would 
result in a “continual tension to secure a right balance between national and local 
accountability” (Bryan et al. 2011: 16, para. 3.4).  As I show in the later chapters (see, 
Chapter 7, 7.2.2), the “potential tension around the balance between a ‘bottom up’ and 
a ‘top down’ approach to setting local priorities and objectives” (Fyfe, 2014: 10), has 
already manifested in “structural disconnects” between national and local policing 
policies and local democratic accountability (Henry et al., 2016: 9-13). 
 
The analysis above highlights that at the time the 2012 Act was passed and came into 
effect, the two perennial problems of police governance, i.e. the operational 
independence doctrine and the perpetual tension between local and central democratic 
control of the police, were far from settled. This omission manifested in difficulties for 
the SPA when it came into effect. It appears that the SPA did not just inherit the powers 
of the local police authorities but also its problems. I discuss this further in Chapter 7. 
In addition, the Scottish discourse on police reform has introduced a contemporary 
debate between democratic control of the police and the role of experts. The conceptual 
debates on democracy, police governance and accountability, and knowledge-based 
expert governance are examined further in Chapter 4.  
3.5 - Conclusion 
This chapter, through a chronological narrative of the official policy agenda, captured 
the key discourses that became the catalysts for change and helps to develop a nuanced 
understanding of some of the rationale behind the current structures of police 
governance and accountability, particularly the creation of the SPA as an expert body. 
It was argued that the reforms took place against a backdrop of austerity, and were 
driven by the official view that the financial accountability of the local police forces 
was inadequate and that national policing requirements needed greater attention. 
Following a period of consultations, it was decided that a structural change was 
necessary, ensuing a remarkably quick transition to a single police service. However, 
I argued that the policy agenda did not take into consideration that organisational 
accountability of the police also required oversight of operational policing and it did 




police authorities, not enough attention was given to the operational independence 
doctrine, and it was left for the SPA to resolve these issues through negotiated 
agreement.   
 
In Chapter 2, by drawing on the police governance literature, I argued that the notion 
of operational independence and the perpetual struggle between the local and the 
central are perennial problems that form part of the regulatory puzzle of police 
governance. In this chapter, I have shown that the official reform agenda, and the 
subsequent legislative framework did not seek to resolve these problems that have 
historically hampered police organisational accountability. My findings, in later 
chapters show that these omissions manifested in an abrasive fashion, hampering the 
ability of the SPA to deliver effective mechanisms of accountability, as it developed 
as an organisation (Chapter 7 and 8). As part of my contribution to the study on police 
governance, I will put forward an original conceptual framework as a prescriptive 
solution to these problems (Chapter 5). The analysis of the SPA and the new 
governance arrangements as they have continued to evolve and develop, through my 
framework, suggests that the SPA may have finally started to resolve these problems 









PART II – EXPERTISE IN POLICE GOVERNANCE: A 
CONCEPTUAL SHIFT  
Chapter 4 - ‘New’ governance, Accountability and Epistocracy   
 
One of the drivers for the reforms was that the previous local police authorities lacked 
expertise, and skills to effectively deliver police governance (Chapter 3, 3.3.2.c). This 
provided the rationale for the creation of the SPA, as a body composed of members, 
appointed on the basis of expertise and competencies, rather than elected councillors 
(Scottish Government 2011c: 14). The developments in the Scottish police governance 
landscape, replacing ‘democratic’ local police authorities with a centralised body of 
‘experts’, have introduced a new nexus between expertise and democratic governance 
of the police.  
 
In this chapter, I firstly provide conceptual clarifications for the terms ‘governance’ 
and ‘accountability’, as in the context of police ‘governance’, these terms are used 
interchangeably. Due to the focus of this research on police organisational 
accountability, I draw on the canon of literature in public administration that treats 
accountability as a mechanism rather than a virtue (Bovens, 2007, 2010; Schillemans, 
2011). Following conceptual clarifications, I chart the developments in police 
governance and accountability mechanisms in Scotland and argue that these 
mechanisms have followed a similar trajectory to the wider discourses elsewhere in 
public administration in Britain; from hierarchical bureaucratic mechanisms through 
market-based approaches (Marshall, 1965; 1978; Reiner and Spencer, 1993; Walker, 
2000; Donnelly and Scott, 2002b) to the more complex network-based governance 
(Rhodes, 1996; Bevir, 2010, 2012), formalised in the 2012 Act (see Chapter 3, 3.1) 
 
I then draw on the notion of epistocracy (Estlund, 2003, 2008; Holst, 2011, 2012, 
2014) to provide a theoretical foundation for conceptualising knowledge-based 
governance. I argue that the conceptual model for the SPA, as a body of experts, 
resembles the myriad expert groups within the European Union (EU) and the elite 




(Loader, 2006) and public service administration (Rhodes, 1996; McAra, 2008). I 
propose that an epistocracy in police governance can not only be justified, but may in 
fact be desirable. The premise of my argument is twofold. Firstly, the rise in police 
professionalism has contributed to the solidification of the operational independence 
doctrine (Jones, 2008), therefore, a governance body with a more professional expert 
base may be best suited to counterbalancing police expertise. Secondly, in addition to 
the practical limitations of traditional forms of democratic arrangements (such as 
tripartism, see Chapter 2 and 3), there are inherent risks of direct democratic control 
over the police such as majoritarianism and partisanship. An epistocracy may 
circumvent the risk of majoritarianism by vetoing contentious policing policies, and it 
may be best placed to act as an intermediary, a conduit, between the local and the 
central political actors, and the police.  
 
I conclude my justification for an epistocracy by responding to criticisms that the rise 
of experts and network-based governance approach signify a democratic deficit (Bevir, 
2010: 95-96) and a “hollowing out of the state” (Rhodes, 1996: 661). I suggest that an 
epistocracy situated within a democratic order does not inherently signify a democratic 
deficit. At least in the context of police governance and organisational accountability, 
it may be more useful to reframe the weaknesses in governance structures as 
accountability deficits, rather than democratic deficits, which is a conceptually vague 
term. I develop this line of argumentation further in Chapter 5, as I put forward a 
conceptual framework for how an epistocracy could be institutionalised within a 
democratic order, in the context of police governance.  
4.1 - ‘Governance’ and ‘Accountability’: Conceptual Clarifications 
Through the lens of political theory and public administration, ‘governance’ refers to 
“the process of governing” and it is not synonymous with ‘government’, which might 
refer to state institutions (Rhodes, 1996: 652; Bevir, 2010: 1). Governance can involve 
a network of actors both private and public, it can be hierarchical and non-hierarchical, 
it can take on various methods including negotiation, bargaining, and participation, 
and often the choice between various methods of governance depends on the purpose 




2012). Governance strategies in public administration throughout the various national 
and international spheres have followed a similar trajectory: from bureaucratic 
hierarchy through markets to network-based approaches (Bevir, 2012: 101; also, 
Rhodes, 1996). The conceptual and practical shift from modes of ‘government’ to 
‘governance’ has largely coincided with “a crisis of faith in bureaucracy and 
widespread rise in markets and networks as instruments of public governance” (Bevir, 
2012: 59). The emergence and proliferation of interstate policy actors and expert 
groups particularly within the European Union (EU) (Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2010; 
Weale, 2011; Holst; 2014; Cross, 2015) has also accelerated the complexity of network 
governance with multiple political and non-political expert stakeholders in charge of 
public policy making. Further, the narrow focus of early twentieth century civil 
servants on bureaucratic and hierarchical “management through fixed rules has been 
superseded by decision-making that is far more complex and iterative” (Rosenvallon, 
2011: 66).  
 
While governance is increasingly viewed in broad terms, contemporary writers in 
public service administration insist on a sufficiently focused definition of 
accountability, particularly for the study of accountability relationships between non-
hierarchical organisations (Bovens, 2007, 2010; Schillemans, 2011; Yang, 2014). The 
reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, with the rise of ‘new’ governance, power and 
authority is distributed at a horizontal level. Within this complex landscape, lines of 
responsibility, power, and accountability of various public actors are blurred and 
policy implementation often requires negotiated agreement and flexible co-operation 
(Yang, 2014: 161; also, Bovens, 2007; Schillemans 2011; Rosenvallon, 2011). In 
hierarchical accountability arrangements, the principal-agent relationship is clearly set 
out; principal has formal authority to “set expectations of standards, administer 
incentives, and coerce individual behaviour through powers and capabilities of 
sanction, discipline, and providing redress” (Olsen, 2015: 428). However, coercion, 
sanction and redress is more difficult to achieve in a network governance approach 
where accountability is  “an emergent property … changing and shifting as actors act 
and interact” (Yang, 2014: 161). Secondly, and closely intertwined with the first 




as a “chameleon” term (Day and Klein, 1987: 32) that often serves as a “conceptual 
umbrella for other distinct concepts” such as answerability, responsiveness, openness, 
integrity, transparency and even democracy (Bovens, 2007: 449).  Accountability can 
both be a mechanism concerned with social arrangements, processes, interactions and 
structures, or a virtue of “being accountable” concerned with the behaviour of public 
actors (Bovens, 2010: 947-948).  
 
Bovens argues that “some dimensions, such as transparency, are instrumental for 
accountability, but not constitutive of accountability” (2007: 450). Similarly, 
accountability is distinct from ‘responsibility’ because it “requires justifications”, and 
imposes “sanctions”, whereas responsibility may refer to “personal culpability, 
morality and professional ethics” (Mulgan, 2000: 558). The literature on police 
‘governance’ and ‘accountability’ has often employed these terms interchangeably 
(examined below, 4.2), often referring to the same principles of organisational 
accountability (for instance, Marshall, 1965; Lustgarten, 1986; Walker, 2000). On the 
other hand, chief constables have often protected their own professional and personal 
integrity by invoking that they are accountable to their “own conscience” (Day and 
Klein, 1987: 105-106), referring to the virtue of being accountable (Bovens, 2010). 
This distinction is particularly important when considering mechanisms of police 
organisational accountability within the contours of police governance. In giving 
evidence to the Justice Committee hearings in 2008, Sir Ronnie Flanagan, a former 
HM’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary in England and Wales, distinguished between 
responsiveness, answerability and accountability. He argued that: 
 
“I see responsiveness as referring to behaviour (actions and their 
conduct); answerability as the process through which those held 
to account are required to explain (and justify) their actions; and 
accountability can be seen as a formal set of institutionalised 
relationships that should help to bring about appropriate 
responsiveness, and answerability.” - (Justice Committee, 2008, 
para: 245).  
 
As I have argued earlier, individual accountability and organisational accountability 
are analytically distinct categories (Chapter 2, 2.1). Individual accountability to law 




organisational accountability of police operational policies (Chapter 2, 2.4). Whilst the 
Scottish police reform agenda focused on enhancing police ‘governance’ and 
‘financial accountability’ (Chapter 3, 3.4), the need to provide effective mechanisms 
of organisational accountability, particularly in relation to police operational policies 
was neglected.  
 
For the analysis of the SPA’s approach to delivering organisational accountability, in 
the new governance landscape, this thesis adopts a “restricted definition” of 
accountability focusing on the mechanisms and processes with which actors and 
organisations in the public sector are held to account (Schillemans, 2011: 389; also, 
Bovens, 2007, 2010). Particularly in the absence of a clear principal-agent relationship, 
I focus on horizontal accountability mechanisms “where the accountee is not 
hierarchically superior to the accountor” (Schillemans, 2011: 390). Accountability as 
a mechanism is defined as “a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the 
actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose 
questions and pass judgment, and the actor may face consequences” (Bovens, 2007: 
467). This definition will be revisited, dissected and adapted for the conceptual and 
analytical framework in Chapter 5. I now briefly examine the mechanisms of 
organisational accountability that have historically been implemented within the 
broader umbrella term of police ‘governance’ and draw comparisons with broader 
developments in public service administration.  
4.2 - Developments in Police Governance and Accountability mechanisms 
In policing literature, the notions of ‘governance’ and ‘accountability’ have been 
deployed and utilised interchangeably, both often referring to the same principles. 
Lustgarten (1986) and Walker (2000) framed police governance within the contours 
of constitutional law. Both deemed accountability as “too narrow” and focused on 
exploring the paradoxical relationship between the democratic state and the police, and 
the enabling and constraining functions of law in relation to police powers (Lustgarten, 
1986: 1; Walker, 2000: vii). Marshall (1965; 1978), and later Reiner (Reiner and 
Spencer, 1993; Reiner, 2010), examined the various regulatory strategies implemented 




their police forces, implicitly focusing on organisational accountability. These 
regulatory strategies followed a similar trajectory to the developments elsewhere in 
public administration and evolved from hierarchical bureaucratic structures, through 
market-based reforms and the New Public Management (NPM), to the current police 
governance landscape that resembles a network governance approach (see fig. 3.1, 
Chapter 3, 3.1). These developments are summarised below.   
4.2.1 - Hierarchical and bureaucratic accountability  
Marshall conceptualised the power relations in the early police governance and 
accountability structures, as "subordinate and obedient" (Marshall, 1978: 633). This 
approach, described as the “directive” model elsewhere (Morgan, 1985 in Walker, 
2000: 34), allowed local and central political actors to give directions to the police in 
terms of broad policing policies and priorities. Lustgarten has argued in reference to 
the early modern police forces that at least in the burghs “the subordination of the 
police to elected representatives was part of common understanding” (1986: 39). The 
original notion of constabulary independence prevented interference in the day-to-day 
operations, however, hierarchical power relations gave more control to the local and 
central politicians to govern the police. As Reiner argues that under the ‘subordinate 
and obedient’ model, there was a persistent view that like other public services, 
policing policy “should be formulated and regulated by democratic authorities” 
(Reiner, 2013: 169).   Under the old bureaucratic arrangements in the public sector, 
policies were evaluated routinely, processes of organisational accountability were 
more fluid rather than retrospective, and the overarching focus of such strategies 
remained on procedures and top-down steering rather than performance reviews after 
the fact (Bevir, 2010: 36-37). As outlined in Chapter 3 (3.1.2), the 2012 Act requires 
the SPA to set strategic objectives for the policing of Scotland, which the chief 
constable’s annual police plan has to take into consideration. The SPA’s strategic 
police plan itself has to take cognisance of the strategic priorities set out by Scottish 
Ministers (3.1.3) and the policing principles defined in statute (s.32, 2012 Act). This 
gives a formal route to both the Scottish Government, and the SPA to set directions 
for policing policy and opens up scope for bureaucratic control that prevailed in the 




governance landscape are more complex, and far from hierarchical. This dimension of 
police governance enables a potential for ‘proactive scrutiny’ during the policy-
making phase, and it is analysed in relation to the SPA in Chapter 9.  
4.2.2 - Retrospective and explanatory accountability 
Following formalisation of tripartism and in the interests of striking a balance between 
powers of central government, local authorities and chief constables, the directive 
approach gave way to a more "explanatory and co-operative" model (Marshall, 1978: 
633). An essential requirement under this form of accountability was the duty on chief 
constables to produce and present annual reports to local police authorities and central 
government, and to provide information regarding policing of local areas, as and when 
required. This approach fits into the strict definition of accountability as a mechanism 
outlined earlier as it made it possible for democratic institutions to deliver 
organisational accountability by monitoring police performance and scrutinising it in 
public forums such as the local police authority meetings. While the chief constables 
had autonomy over operational policies and decision making, there was an expectation 
that explanatory accounts will be provided both in terms of operational policies but 
also regarding police performance in relation to local and central objectives. Moreover, 
this model encouraged consultation and resolution through dialogue over contentious 
issues but ultimately lacked potency due to the persistent imbalance in power relations 
during tripartism, and the lack of influence of local police authorities (reasons for 
which have been outlined earlier, see Chapter 2 and 3). While chief constables 
understood there was an obligation to deliver annual reports and ‘explain’ the 
performance and activities of their local forces to the police authorities, there were “no 
formal sanctions” if their explanations failed to convince the elected officials (Day and 
Klein, 1987: 108; also, Scott and Wilkie, 2001; Donnelly and Scott, 2002a; Scott, 
2011). This form of ‘explanatory and co-operative’ accountability relationship 
strengthened the operational independence doctrine, increasingly giving rise to a 
culture where chief constables were required to give an account of their performance 
annually, but there was no “enforceable obligation on them to listen to the reply!” 
(Reiner, 2013: 169; also, Lustgarten, 1986; Reiner, 2010; Scott, 2011). Under the 2012 




SPA, and the Scottish Parliament maintains the ‘explanatory and co-operative’ style 
of retrospective accountability of police performance, the efficacy of which are 
examined in Chapters 7, 8 and 9.  
4.2.3 - Performance and target-based accountability 
The rise of the New Public Management (NPM), described as a “top-down affair in 
Britain” (Bevir, 2012: 60), paved the way for both central and local government to 
monitor police performance through greater emphasis on efficiency and effectiveness 
and key performance indicators. Market-based principles introduced and implemented 
in the 1980s and 1990s gave rise to "contractual and calculative" mechanisms of 
organisational accountability introducing target-setting, performance related pay and 
short term contracts (Reiner, 1993: 19; Reiner, 2010). Wholesale market-based 
principles were introduced, first in England and Wales, following the Sheehy Inquiry 
into police responsibilities and rewards through the Police and Magistrates Court Act 
(PMCA) 1994 (Walker, 2000; Jones, 2008). In Scotland, the changes introduced by 
the PMCA were only applied partially (Donnelly and Scott, 2002a: 9; also, Walker, 
2000). This was predominantly because of a different legal system (Walker, 2000: 
159), and due to selective implementation of certain policies by the elite policy 
networks within the Scottish Office (McAra, 2005).  Moreover, the local police 
authorities, along with chief constables, opposed the wholesale implementation of 
market-based reforms, considering it as an attempt for greater centralised control 
(Walker, 2000: 161-162). Some changes that did make it through included the 
dismantling of bureaucracy and placing civilian police staff under the direction and 
control of chief constables, and performance-based national objectives (Donnelly and 
Scott, 2002b). These changes were brought about without a formal legislative 
framework in Scotland, in the absence of which the role of HMICS was crucial as the 
Scottish Executive relied on force inspections to monitor the performance of local 
police forces in relation to key national targets (Donnelly and Scott, 2002b: 57).  The 
‘contractual and calculative’ approach created pressures on police organisations for 
efficiency in a market-based competitive environment. The rationale for the NPM, in 
general, was not only to encourage public services to innovate, but it also gave them 




control (Rhodes, 1996: 665; Bevir, 2012: 60). The emphasis on efficiency also 
markedly enhanced the autonomy, supremacy, and technical expertise of chief 
constables (also, see below 4.4.1) as they were considered best placed to deliver 
policing services effectively, by providing the most up to date equipment, 
technological aid, and appointing the most skilled officers for the most reasonable cost 
(Lustgarten, 1986: 76). While the ‘explanatory’ accountability under tripartism did not 
interfere with the operational decision making of chief constables, the ‘contractual and 
calculative’ model did allow for the establishment of nationally set key performance 
indicators that had the capacity to "constrain" the autonomy of senior officers (Jones, 
2008: 703). It was argued that the increased powers of central government through the 
introduction of performance based pay and rewards "nibbled at the edges" of police 
operational independence (Donnelly and Scott, 2010: 84) and measures such as key 
performance indicators rendered the notion of operational independence as somewhat 
"illusory" (Reiner, 2010: 233). In fact, this apparent diminishing of the operational 
independence doctrine was only true as far as the relationship between central 
government and chief constables was concerned. So far as the local police authorities 
were concerned, chief constables remained the more powerful partner (Chapter, 2, 
2.4.3 and Chapter 3, 3.4). Nevertheless, the emphasis on greater efficiency and 
contractual modes of accountability brought with it the element of sanction through 
the “power of the purse strings” (Donnelly and Scott, 2010: 82) allowing the Scottish 
Ministers and local police authorities to influence police priorities and general 
direction in line with public and political objectives. However, as I argued in Chapter 
3, local police authorities rarely used their powers of sanction and were routinely found 
to be ineffective in terms of delivering financial accountability and oversight of the 
use of resources on local and national priorities. The NPM model of delivering police 
organisational accountability was effective only in the sense that central government 
had increased powers to “steer” policing policy (Reiner, 2010: 235).  
 
Whilst financial accountability and performance management of the police is not the 
focus of this study, it remains vitally important in the context of the new police 
governance arrangements in Scotland (Chapter 3, 3.3.2.a). Audit Scotland became a 




devolution of the Scottish Parliament. It regularly carried out reviews of local police 
forces and local police authorities under the auditing system known as "Best Value" 
to ensure policing was carried out efficiently and effectively within a clear set of 
standards, and with due emphasis on costs versus quality of service (Donnelly and 
Scott, 2010: 93). Under the new arrangements, there is a statutory duty on both Police 
Scotland, and the SPA to achieve Best Value and Audit Scotland is empowered to 
conduct inspections of both organisations and report back to the Scottish Parliament 
(Chapter 3, 3.1.6). The continuing emphasis on financial accountability is part of a 
multifaceted approach to police governance and accountability, as examined below.  
4.2.4 - Network-based governance and horizontal accountability 
As argued above (see, 4.1), network-based governance approaches have created 
complex relationships between various actors and under such arrangements the lines 
of power and responsibility are often diffused. Further, in the absence of a hierarchical 
principal-agent relationship, horizontal accountability is often achieved through 
formalised mechanisms between various stakeholders of equal standing (Schillemans, 
2011). The police governance and accountability mechanisms in post-devolution 
Scotland resemble the network-based governance approach and horizontal 
accountability mechanisms.  
 
The practical shift towards ‘new’ governance followed the devolution of the Scottish 
Parliament. It is argued that the proliferation of networks was often actively promoted 
by political institutions to “overcome the deficiencies of both old bureaucratic 
structures and new market-related processes” (Bevir, 2012: 67). Following devolution, 
the Cabinet Secretary for Justice became the central government representative within 
the tripartite structure, and whilst the Scottish Ministers became increasingly involved 
in policing (Scott, 2011), other semi-autonomous actors emerged, further weakening 
the influence of the local police authorities (Donnelly and Scott, 2002b).  This 
development was reminiscent of the proliferation of networks elsewhere in Britain. 
Even prior to the Scottish devolution, Rhodes argued that “British government creates 




and encourages public-private partnerships, so networks become increasingly 
prominent among British governing structures” (1996: 658).  
 
Consistent with the network-based approach to police governance in Scotland, 
following devolution, new partnerships emerged such as the establishment of a 
Scottish Policing Performance Framework (SPPF) that involved political and non-
political stakeholders including the Justice Secretary, Audit Scotland, HMICS and the 
now redundant Association of Chief Police Officers Scotland and the Scottish Police 
Authorities' Convenors Forum (Donnelly and Scott, 2010: 94). The SPPF enabled a 
basis of performance measurement through which police performance could be 
monitored and improved, providing opportunities for horizontal accountability to 
professional peers. New forms of "multi-tier" policing and the establishment of the 
Scottish Policing Standards Agency (Donnelly and Scott, 2010: 100) also enhanced 
avenues of horizontal accountability of chief constables, placing an emphasis on 
negotiated agreement and dialogue with stakeholders from within the policing 
landscape, as well as those representing national and local political institutions. 
However, these new modes of achieving organisational accountability, while 
enhancing oversight of police operational policies through various actors, and 
introducing new methods of measuring police effectiveness, failed to set out sanctions 
in cases where national targets were not being met (Laing and Fossey, 2011: 8; also, 
Donnelly and Scott, 2010).   
 
The network-based governance approach has been formalised by the 2012 Act. As 
outlined in Chapter 3 (see, 3.1), each actor fulfils a different role, providing a different 
dimension of police accountability within the broad contours of police ‘governance’. 
The Scottish Government, the Scottish Parliament and the local scrutiny committees 
provide democratic oversight and avenues for retrospective and explanatory 
accountability. Audit Scotland and the Scottish Parliament’s Public Accounts 
Committee26 are key actors in providing financial accountability of Police Scotland 
and the SPA.  HMICS can carry out thematic inspections in relation to any matter of 
                                                 
26 Following the 2016 Scottish Parliamentary elections, this committee has been re-formed as the Public 




interest and importance, as directed by the Scottish Ministers, consolidating the 
performance-based accountability mechanisms. PIRC has a role to handle complaints 
against individual officers, investigate serious incidents, and review the complaints 
handling procedures of Police Scotland and the SPA. The SPA, however, is placed at 
the centre of this complex governance landscape. In addition to its broad maintenance 
and governance role, it is the only actor in the new governance landscape, with an 
explicit legislative duty to hold the chief constable to account for the policing of 
Scotland. Whilst this may denote a hierarchical relationship, the SPA does not have 
any formal powers of sanction and the 2012 Act left the implementation of the SPA’s 
precise accountability relationship to be negotiated between the stakeholders. The 
resultant arrangements are indicative of horizontal accountability relationships. The 
developments leading-up to the implementation of these arrangements, and their 
efficacy in relation to the perennial problems of police governance are examined in 
Chapters 7, 8 and 9.  
 
The creation of the SPA as a body composed of independent members with 
professional expertise, rather than democratically elected representatives has 
introduced a new trend in police governance and accountability which is examined 
below. 
4.2.5 - Expert-based governance and accountability 
One of the stated rationales for the creation of the SPA, as explored in Chapter 3, was 
that it would provide expertise, skills and capacities that the previous local police 
authorities lacked (see, 3.3.2.c). The local police authorities comprised entirely of 
elected councillors. Successive HMICS reviews have highlighted that the composition 
of the local police authorities contributed to ineffective governance and accountability 
mechanisms because of a lack of independent members with professional expertise 
(Justice Committee, 2008; Tomkins, 2009; Laing and Fossey, 2011).  It was 
particularly noted by Laing and Fossey (2011: 7) that in the police authorities in 
England and Wales, the inclusion of independent members with professional 
experience and expertise had led to “effective decision-making”. Laing and Fossey 




authorities in Scotland was the “lack of development around wider ‘governance 
competencies’, rather than simply the need for democratic control” (2011: 7).  The 
SPA was conceived by the Scottish Government (2011c: 14, para. 3.13) to bring the 
“right skills, experience, and expertise to collectively govern the [police] service and 
hold the Chief Constable to account”. This vision for the SPA has introduced a new 
nexus between expertise and democracy in the traditional debates on police 
governance and accountability.  
 
The above sections provided an overview of how police governance and accountability 
mechanisms have evolved and followed a similar trajectory to the broader 
developments elsewhere in public administration.  The chapter now focuses its 
attention on the SPA’s conceptual model as an expert body, and draws on the notion 
of epistocracy (see below, 4.3) to provide a conceptual justification for an expert-based 
approach to police governance and accountability.  
4.3 - Conceptualising epistocracy   
Epistocracy, defined as rule of the knowers, is adapted from the Greek word epistêmê 
meaning knowledge (Estlund, 2003: 53) and it is deeply embedded within the Platonic 
view that the wiser among us ought to have a greater share of political authority. Plato, 
in Politeia, proposed that philosophers should be kings, and political greatness and 
wisdom should combine. Today, Plato’s notion of philosopher kings represented by a 
privileged class of men and women, he referred to as guardians, bred, raised, and 
educated together, to rule over the rest of the citizenry (The Republic, Chapter V) 
would be considered as nothing other than despotic. However, as Estlund notes, in 
modern political discourse, liberal political philosopher John Stuart Mill was also 
deeply influenced by Platonic thought (Estlund, 2003: 54). Mill was a proponent of 
those with better education having more than one vote and argued, “when two persons 
who have a joint interest in any business differ in opinion, does justice require that 
both opinions should be held of exactly equal value? … One of the two, as the wiser 
or better man [sic], has a claim to superior weight” (Mill, [1861] 2015: 54-55). In 
exploring this notion further in political philosophy, Estlund asks “if some are wiser 




these wise folks not rule: why not epistocracy?” (Estlund, 2003: 54).  By his own 
admission, Estlund coined the term “for convenience” (2008: 277-278) as he set out to 
test whether knowledge-based rule could plausibly be conceived as an alternative to 
democracy.  
 
In testing the plausibility of epistocracy as an alternative to democracy, Estlund argues 
that there are certain true normative standards by which political decisions ought to be 
judged, and only a small group of knowers or epistocrats, would have knowledge of 
those standards. Through this claim to superior knowledge, the epistocrats should be 
able to exert political authority over a majority that does not possess this knowledge 
(Estlund, 2008: 30). Estlund then goes on to reject the epistocratic argument on the 
basis that such an arrangement would lack the necessary authority and legitimacy 
because it would not pass the qualified acceptability requirement (Estlund, 2003, 
2008). Estlund argues that “privileging the wise would require not only their being so 
wise as to be better rulers, but also, and more demandingly, that their wisdom be 
something that can be agreed to by all reasonable citizens” (Estlund, 2003: 58). As 
claims to expertise are often followed by contestations and counterclaims, and due to 
a lack of a universal definition of who constitutes as a political expert, Estlund could 
not plausibly justify epistocracy as an alternative to democracy (Estlund, 2008). It is 
worth clarifying that whilst Estlund refers to a lack of consensus on who the political 
experts are, other experts such as doctors, scientists, surgeons etc. are less contested 
and already have established criteria of expertise (2008: 40). Further, Estlund did not 
reject the normative qualities of knowledge-based governance and instead proposed 
democratic authority based on “epistemic proceduralism” that involves the acquiring 
of knowledge in the decision-making process, he argues that under such conditions “so 
long as proper decisions and guarantees were respected, even erroneous decisions will 
often have authority and legitimacy” (Estlund, 2008: 110).  
 
The above discussion by Estlund serves as a point of departure for a shift towards 
conceptualising epistocracy as knowledge-based governance. Rather than engaging in 
an expansive philosophical discussion about whether epistocracy can be justified as an 




narrowly focused on the role of knowledge and expertise in public administration, and 
more specifically tied into the role of experts in achieving robust police governance 
and accountability. The influence of experts in public administration and policymaking 
was traditionally monopolised by the elite bureaucratic networks exercising central 
government control through hierarchical modes of governance (Bevir, 2012: 57). It 
was certainly true for criminal justice policy, in the mid-twentieth century the so-called 
“Platonic guardians”, that predominantly came through the ranks of ‘Oxbridge’, were 
committed to producing expert knowledge and were instrumental in actively 
formulating crime and penal policy in England and Wales (Loader, 2006: 563). Pre-
devolution Scotland was also not entirely insulated from the influence of experts. The 
Scottish Office comprised its own network of expert policy makers, which included 
social workers, members of the judiciary and academics, responsible for the 
implementation of crime and justice policies (McAra, 2008: 494). The centralised 
expert bureaucracies represented an ideal separation of administrative and professional 
experts and political players. However, through the 1960s and 70s, trust in impartial 
experts eroded as bureaucrats were increasingly viewed as “self-interested actors intent 
on advancing their own careers” (Bevir, 2012: 58-59). With the rise of ‘new’ 
governance and network-based approaches, there has been a proliferation of expert 
policy networks spanning the boundaries of the public, private and voluntary sectors 
(Rhodes, 1996: 659; also, Bevir, 2010, 2012; Holst, 2012, 2014).   
 
Adapting the notion of epistocracy from political philosophy and utilising it in the 
context of network governance within the EU, Holst argues that “epistocracy is not 
inherently bad, in fact knowledge-based governance can be desirable if it is 
institutionalised adequately and legitimately” as another dimension in the new modes 
of governance (Holst, 2012: 53). While epistocracy as a term does not have 
mainstream purchase, for instance it does not appear in any dictionary, it has broad 
application in relation to conceptualising knowledge-based governance. The 
conceptualisation of the SPA as an epistocracy is in keeping with Holst’s usage rather 
than Estlund’s. Holst’s application of epistocracy is not limited to scientific or 
academic knowledge, neither is it a substitute for technical knowledge or technocracy. 




technical knowledge” and the justification for epistocracy depends on the specific 
characteristics of an epistocratic arrangement (Holst, 2012: 52). In other words, an 
epistocratic governance arrangement can be formalised and shaped in relation to the 
specific knowledge demands of a given field.  
 
The example of EU institutions serves to show that epistocracy can be formalised in 
terms of institutions, policies and law particularly where conditions of recruitment 
explicitly prescribe specific education, skills, competencies or experience (Holst, 
2012: 44). According to Holst, the EU is a “unique and highly contested experiment 
in transnational governance with a myriad epistocratic features, and thus provides a 
reservoir of examples and illustrations of the forms epistocracy may take in modern 
democratic societies” (2012: 42). The rise of network governance has coincided with 
an increase in independent regulatory authorities bringing in greater expertise and 
competence in order to regulate complex organisations and competing interests 
(Rosenvallon, 2011: 79).  Along with the independent regulatory authorities, new 
modes of governance have also given rise to specialised, expert based Comitology; 
where policy making and implementation is delegated to expert commissions and 
committees within the EU, the self-regulation of specialist industries by internal 
industry actors and stakeholders, and non-binding voluntary partnerships and 
coordination (Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2010: 129). Then there are more powerful, 
autonomous, expert interstate actors that operate independently and exercise 
considerable powers over the EU member states, the European Central Bank and the 
European Court of Justice are just two examples (Holst, 2014: 2). Further, there are 
expert policy networks, characterised as epistemic communities or knowledge-based 
networks within the EU. These epistemic communities consist of “networks of experts 
who persuade others of their shared norms and policy goals by virtue of their 
professional knowledge” (Cross, 2015: 91). This “division of labour” between experts 
and non-experts, between political and non-political institutions, between independent 
autonomous regulatory authorities and state actors, points towards a “seemingly 





Based on the above discussion, due to its broad application, the notion of epistocracy 
allows for a conceptual framework that can be helpful in understanding and 
empirically analysing knowledge-based governance arrangements such as the SPA 
(see Chapter 5). However, before I consider devising a framework for how epistocracy 
could be institutionalised in the context of police governance, I first put forward a 
conceptual justification for an epistocracy, below and explain why it may be more 
desirable than existing forms of democratic governance.  
4.4 - Justifying epistocracy  
I draw on the notion of epistocracy not just to provide a conceptual and analytical 
framework for the analysis of the SPA, I go further than this and propose that if 
institutionalised properly (see Chapter 5) an epistocracy in police governance may not 
only be justified, but may in fact be more desirable than the existing ‘tried and tested’ 
methods of democratic governance, such as tripartism. The premise of my argument 
rests on two strands. Firstly, the rise in police professionalism has further increased 
the operational independence of chief constables. I argue that a governance body with 
a professional expert-base and access to independent knowledge and information may 
be better suited to counterbalance police expertise. Secondly, the historical analysis of 
the tripartite arrangements (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3) has highlighted that traditional 
forms of democratic governance have not resolved the perpetual tussle between local 
and central governments for democratic control over the police. In addition to these 
practical problems underpinned by tripartism, there are inherent conceptual risks with 
direct forms of democratic governance such as majoritarianism and partisanship. I 
examine these arguments in greater detail below. 
4.4.1 - Police Professionalism 
As Reiner has argued, during the height of police legitimacy in England and Wales, 
accountability was achieved through the “mystical process of identification with the 
British people” (Reiner, 2010: 74). If such a state did exist, the emergence of “detached 
professionalism” led to the erosion of the idea that the police was “intimately 
connected with the local community” (Walker, 1996: 61). The police have historically 
regarded themselves as a highly-professionalised expert body with technical 




doctors, teachers and lawyers (Lustgarten, 1986: 170; also, Fyfe, 2013). These claims 
to professionalism also enhanced the operational independence of senior officers, often 
serving as an occupational shield against public or political accountability (Lustgarten, 
1986; Jones, 2008; Scott, 2011). However, previous research on police accountability 
and the role of local police authorities has challenged this notion of police 
professionalism. It has been argued that professional bodies set the objectives and rules 
which govern the performance of individual members, therefore, on a strict 
construction of the term, the police lack any distinguishing characteristics of a 
profession (Day and Klein, 1987: 67). Until recently, the claims to police 
professionalism were contested, particularly because of a lack of “code of police ethics 
and life-long learning and reaccreditation” (Fyfe, 2013: 408). Nevertheless, there has 
been a consistent trend towards police professionalism in England and Wales, and in 
Scotland (Jones, 2008; Donnelly and Scott, 2005,2010; Fyfe, 2013).  
 
In Scotland, the “intellectual shift” in placing the day-to-day affairs of the local police 
forces under the supervision of the chief superintendents due to their “knowledge and 
expertise” coincided with the development of the local police forces, well before the 
formalisation of tripartism (Barrie, 2012: 478-479). Further, developments in 
performance-based governance mechanisms and the market-based reforms introduced 
by the PMCA 1994 (as above, 4.2.3) also resulted in police forces, both in England 
and Wales, and Scotland, becoming corporate entities, affording greater professional 
autonomy to chief constables and bringing in external expertise in the form of civilian 
staff (Jones, 2008; Donnelly and Scott, 2010).  
 
Recent developments in police professionalism in England and Wales have led to the 
establishment of the College of Policing (Fyfe, 2013). The College of Policing 
provides opportunities for new and existing police officers to develop their skills and 
competencies through various learning initiatives and sets professional standards 
based on evidence and research. As part of its National Police Vision 2016, the College 
also offers leadership programmes that lead to fast-track direct entry at the 
Superintendent and Inspector levels (College of Policing, 2016). In Scotland, the 




leadership and management courses in collaboration with the Scottish Credit and 
Qualifications Framework. There has also been an increase in collaborative research 
networks providing enhanced opportunities for the police to engage with academics. 
For instance, Police Scotland is an active contributor and stakeholder at the Scottish 
Institute for Policing Research, which serves as a platform for knowledge exchange 
not just between academics and the police but also between Police Scotland and other 
international forces. The N8 Policing Research Partnership is a network of eight 
research intensive universities in the North of England and focuses on research, 
collaboration and knowledge exchange in key areas of policing such as prevention and 
community policing.     
 
Whilst these recent developments in police professionalism, outlined above, have 
placed an emphasis on knowledge exchange, and learning and development, the 
traditional claims to police professionalism were based on “ownership of an area of 
expertise and knowledge” (Fyfe, 2013: 408). Such ownership translates into the 
“defining of the nature of problems” and “controlling of access to potential solutions” 
(Evett, 2013: 788).  For instance, particularly in relation to assessments of risk and 
security, the demands of preventative policing, led by expert evidence and intelligence, 
and the pressures on the police organisation, both internally and externally, to record 
and provide information has meant that outside actors also perceive police 
organisations as “experts” and “knowledge brokers” (Ericson, 1994: 151).  
 
There is also an increase in the sharing of intelligence and expertise between the public 
police and other national and international security organisations. Throughout the EU, 
there has been a growing emphasis on a comprehensive security strategy informed by 
expert knowledge and evidence resulting in a blurring of institutional and legal 
boundaries, raising serious concerns about direct forms of democratic governance and 
accountability of security agencies including the public police (Loader, 2002; Eriksen, 
2011).  
 
In an environment where policing and security at home and abroad is constantly 




policing does not appear as a “closed and self–corroborating bureaucratic system, 
opaque and unresponsive to its wider public environment” (Loader and Walker, 2001: 
27). Whilst the police may make strong claims about their own technical expertise 
there is no specific “technical” knowledge or expertise that would serve as a pre-
requisite for policing. Police policies and operations can, and do, have great 
implications on the rights of citizens (Loader, 2002), it is essential that any governance 
and accountability arrangement is able to understand, question and counterbalance 
police expertise and subsequently provide assurances to the democratic state and the 
electorate that policing policies are not based on skewed information or self-referential 
expertise. In other arenas, such as schools, the “unbridled professional dominance” has 
successfully been challenged and counterbalanced by the inclusion of parents as school 
governors (Lustgarten, 1986: 170). It has been noted more recently that police 
professionalism has been redefined from the notions of the police as professional crime 
fighters to a new professionalism centred more on increased accountability and 
legitimacy (Fyfe, 2013). However, as Fyfe contends that a combination of political 
and economic influences, particularly the demands on police organisations to deliver 
policing services on reduced budgets is once again pulling policing in the direction of 
the “old” professionalism, demarcating the lines between professional crime fighters 
and the public (Fyfe, 2013: 418). 
 
Despite the contested nature of the claims to police professionalism, the occupational 
expertise and experience of the senior officers, by virtue of the broad role and function 
of the police organisations (Chapter 2, 2.1), cannot be disputed. It is imperative that 
the governance and accountability bodies, charged with scrutinising policing policies, 
and setting policing priorities, are also equipped with professional expertise, capacities 
and skills to counterbalance police expertise. Rosenvallon argues that a legislature 
creates independent regulatory authorities "in order to restore credibility by shedding 
certain of its own powers or to shift responsibility for policy areas in which it lacks the 
necessary competence" (Rosenvallon, 2011: 9). An epistocracy, with the right 
composition, may be better equipped to achieve this than a group of elected 
councillors, some of whom may be appointed to a local police authority even if they 




Chapter 5, where I put forward my proposal for how an epistocracy could be 
institutionalised.  I now turn to the second argument on which my justification of 
epistocracy is based upon.  
4.4.2 - The inherent problems with democracy and police governance  
While several policing scholars have made influential contributions to define the 
relationship of democracy and policing (Marenin, 1982; Jones et al., 1996; Manning, 
2010; Aitchison and Blaustein, 2013), there is insufficient engagement with how 
democratic principles translate into actual processes and mechanisms of police 
governance and accountability. Some have explicitly set out to avoid being too 
prescriptive and framed policing and democracy, particularly the role of the 
democratic state in promoting policing as a public good, in ideal terms (Loader and 
Walker, 2007: 216), while others have viewed democracy as a set of ideals that the 
police need to achieve, encapsulate and maintain rather than the narrower concept of 
democracy as a political method or a set of political institutions (Jones et al., 1996: 
183). For instance, Jones, Newburn and Smith (1994, 1996) list these democratic 
principles, in order of importance, as 1. Equity, 2. Delivery of service, 3. 
Responsiveness, 4. Distribution of power, 5. Information, 6. Redress, 7. Participation. 
Marenin (1998: 169) identified six principles of democratic policing as: effectiveness, 
efficiency, accessibility, accountability, congruence, and general order. Aitchison and 
Blaustein (2013: 500) have conceptualised democratic governance of police through 
the overarching notion of responsiveness, provided that equity and a minimum level 
of service delivery is in place.  
 
Most of these studies, however, have avoided explicit engagement with the precise 
method of democratic governance and accountability; i.e. how the powers should be 
distributed between local and central actors?  What mechanisms, structures and 
processes of democratic accountability may look like in practice? Or indeed, what 
should the status of operational independence of chief constables be in a democratic 
governance arrangement? Reiner has argued that the issue of how democratic 
governance manifests in practice remains “vigorously disputed” (Reiner, 2013: 169).  




prize and it is possible that as democracy is enhanced at one level, it reduces at the 
other" (2000: 34). The perpetual debate between the local and the central during the 
tripartite relationship, and the resultant weak governance and accountability structures 
has shown that direct forms of democratic governance are not without problems 
(Chapter 2 and 3). The local police authorities, in the face of increasing centralisation 
and emergence of the NPM and network-based governance approaches, were long 
perceived as the symbol of local democratic accountability. However, during 
tripartism in Scotland, the eight local police authorities, organised over the 
geographical boundaries of 32 unitary authorities, were perceived as too remote from 
local communities (Pugh, 2014). Further, the local police authorities were not 
democratic, in a strict sense. For example, as noted by the Scottish Government, 
“policing for Dumfries and Galloway’s population of 148,190 was overseen by a 
Council Committee of 10 members, whilst policing for Glasgow’s population of 
592,820 was overseen by a Joint Board of 34 members, of whom only eight 
represented Glasgow” (Scottish Government, 2011d: 16, para. 2.19). None of the local 
councillors were directly elected to the local police authorities for the specific purpose 
or a with direct mandate of delivering police accountability.  
 
In addition to the practical limitations of democratic governance, as outlined above, 
direct forms of democratic control over the police may also lead to unintended 
consequences, as examined below.   
4.4.2.a - Majoritarianism 
The early twentieth century bureaucratic liberal agenda denounced rule of the many 
due to the fear that it would lead to the “tyranny of the majority”, yet the majority is 
the legal basis of any democracy and provides instrumental legitimacy to a 
democratically elected government (Rosenvallon, 2011: 71). It has long been 
recognised that direct forms of police governance do not guarantee democratic 
policing (Jones et al., 1996: 189).  In diverse communities, policing policies can often 
produce undesired results and a “persecution of powerless minorities" (Jones, 2008: 
695). Policing scholars have routinely drawn attention towards the “unbridled 




173; also, Lee, 1981).  It was the “non-interventionist approach” by the ‘democratic’ 
governance regimes that historically led to the marginalisation of victims of racial 
harassment, sexual assaults and young people, as these groups were often characterised 
as “undeserving or oversensitive” (Walker, 1996: 60). Whilst, in the post-Macpherson 
era of police governance in Britain, legal regulation and democratic ideals of fairness, 
equity and procedural justice provide safeguards against crude majoritarianism, direct 
political control over policing resources can have the capacity for minority needs to be 
side-lined in favour of populist rhetoric to appease the majority voters.  For instance, 
in England and Wales, there were concerns that the PCCs may overlook minority 
groups as they engage in a “political struggle over police resources in order to shore-
up support among the broader constituent of eligible voters residing within their 
electoral areas” (Lister and Rowe, 2015: 371). While in the first four years of the PCCs 
there was no “spurt of populist or extremist policy” (Loader and Muir, 2016: 2), an 
empirical study on three PCCs and roads policing policy found that the PCCs had 
shown a “consistent preoccupation with the views (or assumed views) of their 
electorates” (Wells, 2016: 287). In her concluding remarks, Wells argues that  
 
“in the era of the PCC, roads policing is a potentially cautionary 
tale. The use of a single, directly elected, individual to represent 
the views of the public on crime generates a situation where the 
problematic (and at times fatal) behaviour of that public may cease 
to receive the attention it deserves, while stereotyped and less 
ontologically unsettling ‘others’ will continue to be on the 
receiving end of punitive populist pronouncements about ‘real 
crime’ from powerful individuals flexing their muscles in ways 
that make re-election more likely” - (Wells, 2016: 288).  
    
As argued by Loader and Walker, “not just in authoritarian regimes, but also in liberal 
democracies policing remains tied to dominant interests (organized around axes of 
class, gender, race and age) and integral to the reproduction of unjust economic and 
social relations” (2007: 79). Thus, the threat of majoritarianism is an ever-present risk 
with direct forms of democratic governance. However, an epistocracy situated within 
a democratic order, at the very least, could potentially veto any policy deemed to be 




4.4.2.b - Partisanship 
There is also a danger that direct democratic forms of control may erode the quality of 
the actual processes and mechanisms of police governance and accountability due to 
the threats of partisanship. Partisanship, according to Loader and Walker (2007), can 
manifest in two significant ways. Firstly, the democratic state itself is partisan, as it 
has the powers and the instruments, in the form of the police, at its disposal to 
consolidate its interests (2007: 73), or as in majoritarianism above, the interests of the 
majority it serves.  Secondly, the threat of political partisanship persists under direct 
forms of democratic governance (Walker, 2000; Loader and Walker, 2007). These 
interests could range from local politicians exerting influence over policing operations 
for personal ends, or through serving interests of a particular political party to a broader 
form of influence that would entail politicians seeking to prioritise policing for 
particular ideological commitments (Walker, 2000: 54-56; Loader and Walker, 2007).  
 
The consolidation of the original doctrine of constabulary independence coincided 
with the view that operational policing should be independent from the narrow 
interests of the political ruling class (as discussed in Chapter 2, 2.4.1). However, 
drawing once again on the example of the PCCs in England and Wales, twenty-nine of 
the forty-one PCCs elected in the inaugural elections in 2012 were affiliated to one of 
the mainstream political parties and only twelve were ‘independents’ (Lister, 2012: 
242). After the May 2016 PCC elections, this figure decreased even further with only 
three independent PCCs, while thirty-five belonged to either the Conservative or 
Labour Party (Davies, 2016: 4).   
 
The affiliation of the PCCs with mainstream political parties, coupled with the overall 
low turn-out – 15 per cent in 2012, and 26 per cent in 2016 (Davies, 2016: 4), raises 
significant questions around partisanship. Further, because of the low turn-out, the 
vocal and well-organised local pressure groups can have more of an influence on 
allocation of resources and police priorities, as in the case of the PCCs and roads 
policing (Wells, 2016), discussed above. The debates around policing policies can also 
centre along the lines of party political rhetoric rather than representing the actual 




following the 2012 elections, the majority of Conservative candidates advocated 
‘crime-fighting’ (75.0%), in their election statements, which coincided with the stance 
by the then Home Secretary Theresa May in the lead-up to the reforms (Home Office, 
2010). Similarly, a majority of Labour candidates propagated ‘disorder reduction’ 
(76.9%) echoing the Labour party’s continued drive against anti-social behaviour. 
Chief Constables have long raised concerns over political-infighting and point-scoring 
at local police authority meetings (Reiner, 1991: 251). An epistocracy of professional 
members, appointed on the basis of professional backgrounds, skills and 
competencies, rather than party-political affiliations would be best-suited to scrutinise 
policing policies rather than political point-scoring.  
 
In light of the practical and conceptual difficulties of democracy and police governance 
outlined above, an epistocracy may not only be justified but it may even be desirable, 
particularly if it can circumvent the concerns highlighted above and promote key 
democratic ideals (see above, 4.4.2). I summarise and conclude my justification for 
epistocracy below.  
4.5 - Discussion: Why not epistocracy in police governance? 
While Estlund (2003, 2008) posed the question in political philosophy to explore 
whether epistocracy could plausibly be justified as an alternative to democracy, I argue 
that an epistocracy within a democratic order could not only be justified, in normative 
terms, but may actually be conducive to enhancing the principles of democracy and 
resolving the traditional difficulties and perennial problems in police governance and 
accountability.  
 
However, a justification of epistocracy becomes contentious when considering who 
can be regarded as an expert. While Estlund’s rejection of epistocracy within political 
philosophy was on the basis that political expertise or wisdom of epistocrats will not 
be universally acceptable to all qualified points of view (Estlund, 2003, 2008), Holst 
avoids pinning the notion of epistocracy to a specific definition or interpretation of 
knowledge.  She argues, “knowledge is that which is regarded as knowledge in a wider 
sociological sense” (2012: 52). She accepts that particular emphasis is placed on 




context dependant (Holst, 2012: 41). I concur with Holst’s broad application, the 
membership and composition of epistocracy, in the context of police governance, 
would depend on the skills and competencies identified by those charged with making 
the appointments (see Chapter 5). Another criticism in relation to the composition of 
epistocracy is the demographic objection (Estlund, 2008; Forcehimes, 2010; Brennan, 
2016). Estlund argues that "even if it is accepted that the experts will carry with them 
a certain degree of goodwill towards all people, they are inevitably biased by their 
race, social class and gender" (Estlund, 2008: 215). It is also likely that experts within 
the policy-making circles will not be entirely disinterested neutral actors as was the 
case of liberal elites in England and Wales (Loader, 2006). Following, Holst and 
Mollander (2014) I argue that any objections to epistocracy regarding the composition, 
demography, and organisational structure must be re-defined into the problem of an 
institutional design. This will be considered in relation to my proposed framework in 
Chapter 5.  
 
I now turn to another pertinent criticism of epistocracy, particularly in the context of 
the EU, the expert dependency often leads to criticisms of ‘democratic deficits’ (Bevir, 
2010: 110-111; Moodie and Holst, 2014: 293-294). Further, critics of network-based 
governance approach also point to a democratic deficit left by the proliferation of 
actors in the ‘new’ forms of governance (Rhodes, 1996; Bevir, 2010).  
 
A democratic deficit arises when public office holders are not directly answerable to 
the electorate (Bevir, 2010: 110-111). Rhodes (1996: 661) argues that the rise in new 
forms of governance in Britain represented a “hollowing out the state” as the role and 
functions of local and central government diminished. According to Rhodes, 
hollowing out of state manifests in three ways: fragmentation leads to reduced control 
over implementation by state institutions, Steering (the process of setting norms) 
complex sets of organisations becomes difficult, and hollowing out erodes direct 
democratic accountability, blurring the lines of responsibility of different actors 
(Rhodes, 1996:662). In contemporary political context, the EU expert groups are 
particularly criticised for exacerbating the democratic deficits, due to being closed, 




concerns have been raised in the context of the new police governance arrangements 
in Scotland. Particularly in relation to the organisational accountability of operational 
policies, it has been argued that the reforms have left a “democratic deficit in Scottish 
policing” (Murray, 2015b).  
 
However, as Holst and Mollander (2014) have argued, an epistocracy situated within 
a democratic order will operate within the confines of its delegated powers and it will 
be accountable to the democratic state. Taking the example of the SPA, for instance, 
in relation to the post-2012 arrangements outlined in Chapter 3 (3.1), the SPA sits 
between the police and the Scottish Government with delegated powers and 
responsibilities of police governance and accountability. The SPA is answerable to the 
Scottish Ministers and the Chair of the SPA can be called to account by the Scottish 
Parliament. In addition, there is considerable scope for the Scottish Government to 
‘steer’ from the centre by determining broad policing principles and priorities (as 
outlined in Chapter 3, 3.1.3). Further, in the post-2012 Act network-based governance 
arrangements, the Scottish Government, the Scottish Parliament, and the local 
authorities are key stakeholders, allowing for greater scope of horizontal checks and 
balances and democratic oversight (discussed above, see 4.2.4).  
 
The more pertinent question would be to consider whether by virtue of its composition, 
could an epistocracy be deemed as anti-democratic? However, is it merely enough for 
any semblance of democratic governance that local and central political actors should 
have direct control over the police? I propose that, an epistocracy can be 
institutionalised and the principles of democratic governance (Jones et al., 1996) can 
be weaved into its institutional design and its approach to delivering police governance 
and mechanisms of organisational accountability (Bovens, 2010). I undertake this task 
in Chapter 5. However, if an epistocracy is then unable to deliver effective mechanisms 
of police governance, then the criticisms of ‘democratic deficits’ particularly in this 
context need to be recast as accountability deficits. Accountability deficits simply refer 
to a lack of robust accountability arrangements (Bovens, 2007: 462).  For instance, the 
weaknesses in the previous police governance structures, the lop-sidedness and the 




authorities, and the perennial problems (Chapter 2 and 3) all manifested in 
accountability deficits rather than democratic deficits.  
 
The discussions above, and throughout this chapter, serve to highlight that the SPA’s 
conceptual vision indicate a turn towards an expert dimension within the broader 
landscape of police governance. The notion of epistocracy, due to its broad application, 
can be used to conceptualise the SPA’s model as an expert body. In addition, I have 
proposed, by underlining the problems and limitations of the previous ‘democratic’ 
governance arrangements, and the inherent unintended consequences of direct 
democratic control, that an epistocracy in the context of police governance may not 
only be justified, but may in fact be desirable. An epistocracy of independent members, 
with the right mix of knowledge, skills and competencies may be better placed to 
understand, challenge, and counterbalance police expertise to ensure policing policies 
are not based on self-referential knowledge. Such an arrangement would also limit the 
ability of the senior police officers to use their operational independence and the veil 
of professionalism as a shield against oversight and accountability by legitimate 
bodies. Further, an epistocracy can tackle the risks of majoritarianism by drawing on 
expert knowledge and evidence to veto, or reverse, policing policies that may be 
deemed as contentious. As I argued in Chapter 2 (2.5), robust organisational 
accountability mechanisms are needed to challenge police operational policies that 
may be ‘legal’ but nevertheless contentious. An epistocracy can also serve as an 
intermediary, a conduit, between the local and the central democratic representatives, 
and between political actors and the police, minimising the risks of partisanship based 
on narrow party-political lines.  
 
If an epistocracy can achieve all of the above, and promote and enhance certain 
democratic ideals, would it not at least be a more desirable arrangement in comparison 
to the previously tried and tested methods of democratic governance? In a normative 
sense, based on my arguments above, it would. In the next chapter, I will put forward 
a conceptual framework, outlining the key components and characteristics for an 
epistocracy to be institutionalised in the context of police governance. As part of my 




and the demographic objection. Further, as I argued in this chapter, the literature on 
democracy and policing, whilst promoting ideals and principles of democracy, has 
remained cautious on how those principles should be implemented into mechanisms 
and processes of governance and accountability (see above, 4.4.2).  By drawing on the 
definition of accountability as a mechanism (Bovens, 2010), I will outline the key 
components that an institutional epistocracy needs to formulate a holistic approach to 
police governance and accountability, and how the key principles of democratic 
governance (Jones et al., 1996) can be weaved into its institutional design.  
4.6 - Conclusion 
This chapter provided conceptual clarifications for the concepts of ‘governance’, 
‘accountability’, and ‘epistocracy’. I argued that a restricted definition of 
accountability as a mechanism is needed due to the particular focus of this study on 
police organisational accountability of operational policies, within the broad contours 
of police governance. I also examined key historical developments in police 
governance, specifically focusing on the mechanisms of organisational accountability 
in relation to the wider discourses in public service administration. I argued that police 
organisational accountability mechanisms followed a similar trajectory, from 
hierarchical bureaucratic mechanisms, through explanatory and performance-based 
measures under the NPM, to a broad and multifaceted network-based approach, which 
has been formalised by the 2012 Act.  The conceptual model of the SPA, as an expert 
body of independent members resembles an epistocracy and other similar expert 
institutions and regulatory authorities across the EU. In providing a justification for an 
epistocracy, I argued that direct forms of democratic governance pose conceptual and 
practical challenges such as the threat of majoritarianism and partisanship. In the 
context of those limitations, an epistocracy within a democratic order may not only be 
justifiable but in fact it may be more desirable than the previously tried and tested 
methods of democratic governance. However, an epistocracy is subjected to criticisms 
and contentions regarding its claim to expertise, its narrow demographic composition, 
and its anti-democratic character. These criticisms need to be re-cast as problems of 









Chapter 5 - An ‘epistocratic and deliberative’ approach to police 
governance: A conceptual and analytical framework 
 
If the previous chapters presented a diagnosis of the problems of police governance 
and organisational accountability, this chapter could be construed as the prescription. 
Following on from the discussions in the previous chapter, I propose a framework for 
how an epistocracy could be institutionalised in the context of police governance. 
Specifically, I draw on Holst and Mollander’s (2014: 13-36) notion of epistocracy by 
democratic delegation, Boven’s restricted definition of accountability as a mechanism 
(2010), and the principles of democratic governance proposed by Jones, Newburn and 
Smith (1996) to sketch out the key components of the framework, i.e. Broad 
Composition, Power, Autonomy, and Deliberation as a necessary democratic check on 
an epistocratic arrangement.  
 
I argue that a broad composition addresses the criticisms of epistocracy in relation to 
its claims to knowledge, and demography (Chapter 4, 4.5). Power, and autonomy 
contribute to the overall capacity of an epistocratic arrangement to develop a holistic 
approach to police governance and accountability. The inclusion of deliberation within 
the institutional design of an epistocracy allows it to operationalise accountability 
mechanisms (Bovens, 2010), whilst also encapsulating certain key principles of 
democratic governance (Jones et al., 1996). I argue that this ‘epistocratic and 
deliberative’ framework reconciles expertise and democracy and provides for a holistic 
approach to police governance and accountability, whilst resolving the perennial 
problems of police governance outlined in Chapter 2.  
 
The framework will be utilised for the thematic analysis of the SPA, however, it is 
pertinent to note that the framework developed over a period of time, and the process 
was a bit more fluid and iterative. Whilst the framework has a foundation in the 
literature as mentioned above, the data generated during the fieldwork helped develop 
and unpack the various components and the subsequent analysis of the SPA 





5.1 - Institutionalising epistocracy 
In this section and the next (5.2), I outline the key components of my proposed 
epistocratic framework. I will then consolidate them and engage with each component 
in detail in section 5.3 below.  
 
Taking the notion of epistocracy as a blank canvass, the first pre-conceived foundation 
characteristic for the proposed framework is knowledge which is the inherent quality 
of epistocracy (Estlund, 2003, 2008; Holst, 2012, 2014; Lippert-Rasmussen, 2012; 
Brennan, 2016). One of the strongest challenges to an epistocracy is the lack of 
consensus on who is considered as an expert. I responded to this criticism in Chapter 
4 (4.5) by drawing on Holst (2011,2012) who avoids pinning a specific definition of 
knowledge and expertise to an epistocracy. All knowledge-based governance 
arrangements will differ from each other, and the specific expertise, competencies and 
skills would depend on the relevant knowledge demands of a given field. An 
epistocracy involves all variations of knowledge, including technical knowledge 
(Holst, 2012: 52; also, Chapter 4, 4.3). Due to its broad application, the notion of 
epistocracy can be utilised for the analysis of any knowledge-based governance 
arrangement. The criticisms and questions regarding an epistocracy’s claims to 
knowledge and expertise will need to be re-cast as the problem of institutional design 
(Holst and Mollander, 2014; also, Chapter 4, 4.5). Therefore, I argue, in an institutional 
epistocracy, its knowledge credentials would be reflected in its composition. The 
epistocrats will be appointed on the basis of their skills and competencies based on the 
specific knowledge demands of a given field. Their epistocratic credentials will not 
only be reflected in the knowledge, skills, and competencies they already possess but 
also in their abilities and capacity to interpret and draw on external knowledge and 
evidence. 
 
In addition to criticisms related to epistocracy’s claims to knowledge, it is also 
subjected to a demographic objection (Estlund, 2008; Forcehimes, 2010; also, Chapter 
4, 4.5). I counter this criticism by proposing that members will need to be appointed 




the first key component for an epistocracy to be institutionalised is broad composition 
that encapsulates knowledge, and a broad demography.   
 
Further, according to Holst and Mollander (2014: 16) an epistocracy can be 
institutionalised within a democratic order through delegated powers. This will create 
a division of labour between experts and democrats, where experts will carry out their 
duties within the prescribed legislative framework and perform specific functions, as 
required by the democratic state. Thus, the second core component for an epistocracy 
to be institutionalised is power, as I explain below (see 5.3.2).  
 
Moving forward, I argued that an epistocracy could not only be justified, but may in 
fact be desirable if it can promote and enhance key principles of democratic 
governance (Chapter 4, 4.5). I draw on the principles of democratic governance 
proposed by Jones, Newburn and Smith (1996), primarily because they offer the most 
comprehensive list that speak directly to issues of police governance, albeit in 
conceptual terms. The principles proposed by Jones et al., are Equity, Delivery of 
Service, Distribution of power, Responsiveness, Information, Redress, and 
Participation (1996: 190-193). I have rearranged the order slightly so I can address 
these in turn as I develop my proposed framework.  
 
Equity and delivery of service are concerned with the behaviour of the police. 
Nevertheless, the underlying purpose of the proposed governance and accountability 
framework would be to promote fair and equitable policing policies and to ensure 
minimum service delivery. I alluded to this in Chapter 2 in my discussions on the 
importance of organisational accountability (Chapter 2, 2.1 and 2.5). From an 
operational policy perspective, it would indeed be the task of the proposed governance 
arrangement to implement robust mechanisms of accountability to scrutinise policing 
policies both proactively and retrospectively to ensure policing conforms to these core 
democratic values. As this framework focuses on the mechanisms and processes of 
police governance and accountability, it would be outside the scope of this study to 
analyse whether policing policies and behaviour conforms to these two principles. 




framework, I argue that these two principles provide for an underlying purpose that 
robust police governance and accountability mechanisms should aim to achieve.  
 
Distribution of power can more readily be tied into the institutional design of the 
proposed framework. Jones et al., argue that “the idea that power should not be too 
much concentrated among a few individuals or groups is one that runs through 
democratic theory … there is agreement across the political spectrum that power 
should be more evenly distributed” (1996: 191-192). As I have identified above, the 
proposed arrangement will need delegated powers, however, the scope of those powers 
will be defined by the incumbent government. Further, the composition of an 
institutional epistocracy would also be determined by the democratic state on the basis 
of pre-defined criteria (discussed below, see knowledge, 5.3.1.a). Whilst an 
institutional epistocracy with powers of police governance and accountability will act 
as a check against the powers of the police, it is imperative that its members are 
sufficiently non-partisan and independent of the incumbent government. An 
empowered, suitably independent, and non-partisan epistocratic arrangement can 
balance the interests of local government and central government, and act as an 
intermediary between the police, and the politicians, resolving the perpetual tussle 
between the local and the central. Thus, the third key characteristic for an institutional 
epistocracy is autonomy. The inclusion of autonomy as a key characteristic of the 
framework benefitted from some early engagement with the data collected during the 
fieldwork. As I alluded to earlier, the framework developed over a period of time and 
during the data collection stage, in several interviews, the SPA board members raised 
the issue of “Ministerial involvement”, exemplifying how the focus on the SPA, its 
potential and its development, helped consolidate and confirm this particular 
component of the framework (also, see Chapter 6, 6.5).     
 
To summarise the argument thus far, for an epistocratic arrangement to be 
institutionalised in the context of police governance and accountability, it will need to 
have a broad composition underpinning knowledge and expertise, power and 
autonomy. These components will determine the overall capacity of the proposed 





The remaining principles of democratic governance i.e. responsiveness, information, 
redress and participation can be encapsulated and operationalised in the mechanisms 
and processes of accountability, underpinned by deliberation. I explain this further 
below.  
5.2 - Merging ‘principles’ of democracy with accountability ‘mechanisms’ 
I argued in Chapter 4 (4.1) that due to the specific focus of this study on organisational 
accountability of police operational policies, a strict focus on accountability 
mechanisms is needed. Accountability as a mechanism is defined as:  
 
“a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor 
has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the 
forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may 
face consequences”. (Bovens, 2010: 951)  
 
In the context of my proposed framework, I argue that an institutional epistocracy 
needs to incorporate this definition fully into its approach to police governance and 
accountability. As per the definition above, the accountability forum would be the 
proposed institutional epistocracy, the actor would, for instance, be a chief constable 
or senior officers of the police. Whilst the obligation on the actor to explain their 
conduct, and the ability of the forum to pass judgement may signify a principal-agent 
relationship, such an arrangement can also be operationalised in a network-based 
governance setting where lines of hierarchy are blurred. In the absence of a hierarchical 
relationship, it is imperative that the powers of the proposed institutional epistocracy 
are clearly laid out.  
 
Further, Bovens (2010: 952) argues that this definition of accountability as a 
mechanism is limited to retrospective accountability. I argue that this definition can be 
expanded, adapted and applied to proactive scrutiny of police operational policies as 
they are being developed. Such an approach would allow the proposed accountability 
forum to assess and ensure that policing policies are fair and equitable. Below, I show 
how the three phases of accountability as proposed by Bovens (2010) can incorporate 




principles of democratic governance, outlined above, can be implemented into 
practice. 
 
i. Information Phase: For an accountability relation to be established, it is 
pertinent that the actor feels an obligation to provide information to the forum 
about his/her conduct (Bovens, 2010: 952).  
 
Information is an essential component for the purposes of governance and 
accountability. Jones et al., argue that provision of “good information is crucial for the 
achievement of all of the other democratic objectives” (1996: 92). The Global 
Accountability Framework associates transparency with the provision of good 
information as it involves “the provision of accessible and timely information to 
stakeholders and the opening up of organisational procedures, structures, and 
processes to their assessments” (Bovens, 2010: 959). However, there are permanent 
limits to the police sharing information with accountability forums and the public 
(Harkin, 2015). Some information required by the accountability forum could be of 
sensitive nature relating to specific persons, or about ongoing police operations that 
could compromise police work.  Nevertheless, the ‘explanatory and co-operative’ 
mechanisms of accountability during tripartism (Chapter 4, 4.2.2), placed a 
responsibility on chief constables to submit annual reports and information regarding 
the policing of local areas to the local police authorities, and chief constables 
responded by presenting annual reports. This phase of accountability process has 
largely remained uncontentious. Matters become more contentious where information 
requested by accountability forums is not provided, not because it contains sensitive 
material, but because chief constables shield it under the guise of operational 
independence or the veil of professionalism (Marshall, 1965; Lustgarten, 1986; 
Walker, 2000; Reiner, 2010; Scott, 2011). When such a situation arises, who is to say 
whether the information should be made available to the public or not? Should this be 
left to the senior police officers themselves? What would be the purpose of the 
accountability forum if senior police officers decide which information is presented, 




constables should feel an obligation to present information to the accountability forum. 
This denotes an element of power, as I have argued above.  
 
An institutional epistocracy with clearly defined powers should be able to request 
information regarding any aspect of policing both retrospectively about conduct, and 
proactively about potential policies. For instance, if a chief constable makes a policy 
decision to reduce the number of police officers or to close police stations in a 
particular area, then it would be entirely appropriate for this information to be 
presented to the accountability forum before the decision is implemented, as opposed 
to a retrospective explanation. As I have argued in Chapter 2 (2.4.2), police policies 
can, and do, impact operations and may sometimes lead to negative consequences for 
the public.  If the requested information is so sensitive that it cannot be shared with 
members of the accountability forum on ethical or legal grounds (Harkin, 2015), then 
the forum should be able to ask the chief constable or senior officers to justify that 
claim. This leads to the next phase of accountability.  
 
ii. Debating Phase: Once the information has been presented to the forum, the 
forum must be able to ask questions, request further information or seek 
clarifications (Bovens, 2010: 952).  
 
This is where accountability takes place in practice. Previous empirical research on 
accountability of public bodies in England and Wales emphasised that “dialogue” and 
“deliberations” are “core aspects of accountability” (Day and Klein, 1987: 5). Mulgan 
has supported this view arguing that accountability is “a dialectical activity, requiring 
officials to answer, explain and justify, while those holding them to account engage 
in questioning, assessing and criticizing. It thus involves open discussion and debate 
about matters of public interest and so becomes equated with the principles of 
deliberative democracy” (2000: 569, emphasis my own).  
 
Following Mulgan, I propose that deliberation underpinned by reasoning and 
justification would be a crucial component for the proposed epistocratic arrangement. 




officers will need to justify and give reasons, either in the public domain or in private 
to the accountability forum. Deliberation phase in retrospect may be equivalent to 
explaining conduct, however, if meetings take place often, in formal and informal 
settings, then senior police officers may become more inclined to deliberate about 
future courses of action, making proactive scrutiny business as usual. Research on 
collective action in network governance arrangements has highlighted that frequent 
ongoing communication, and face-to-face meetings can enhance trust between actors. 
For instance, Romzek, Leroux and Blackmar have argued that “informal 
accountability emerges from the unofficial expectations and discretionary behaviours 
that result from repeated interactions among network members in recognition of their 
interdependence in pursuit of their shared goal” (2012: 443). However, it has been 
recognised by researchers that informal accountability mechanisms can often lead to 
unfettered discretion and the lines of accountability and responsibility are often blurred 
particularly when things go wrong (Crawford and Jones, 1995). It is pertinent, 
therefore, that stringent mechanisms of horizontal accountability between the various 
stakeholders are in place to ensure appropriate checks and balances.  
 
A shared goal in the context of police governance and accountability could be fair and 
equitable policing policies. The pursuit of shared goals through deliberation can enable 
greater co-ordination between the police and the public, with the proposed epistocratic 
arrangement acting as an intermediary, or a conduit. Deliberation can thus encapsulate 
another key democratic principle of responsiveness, ensuring that policing policies are 
responsive to the reasonable demands of the public (Jones et al., 1996; Aitchison and 
Blaustein, 2013).  
 
Whilst participation is also another key principle for democratic governance, Jones et 
al., have deliberately placed it last because they argue “getting together groups of 
people to discuss policing policy is an uphill struggle” (1996: 193). The scope of public 
participation in an epistocratic governance arrangement where members are appointed, 
rather than elected, is seemingly limited. However, deliberation can also encapsulate 
this crucial democratic principle. There is a growing body of research that has shown 




engaging with the public on specific policy issues (Escobar, 2014a, 2014b; Roberts 
and Escobar, 2014). Such forums of deliberation should encourage inclusion of 
disadvantaged groups and silent voices (Loader and Walker, 2007: 223). Whilst an 
epistocratic governance arrangement will have limited capacity to interact with all 
communities on every single policing policy, it could engage with members of the 
public on specific issues. Knowledge gained from such interactions can be useful when 
determining public impact of policing policies, and can be invoked in proactive or 
retrospective deliberations.    
 
Finally, it is pertinent that the members of an epistocratic arrangement are able to 
understand the information presented by the police, in order to ask questions regarding 
that information, and present competing evidence during the deliberations. In this 
phase, the epistocratic credentials of the proposed framework are crucial. Along with 
deliberation, this phase of accountability could become an exchange of knowledge and 
expertise, and claims and counter-claims to evidence, ensuring that police policies are 
not just based on self-referential expertise. By drawing on evidence, knowledge and 
expertise, the proposed epistocratic arrangement can limit the operational 
independence of the senior officers. 
 
iii. Consequence Phase: “the forum may pass judgement on the conduct of the 
actor” (Bovens, 2010: 952). 
 
Perhaps the most contentious and often contested component of an accountability 
process, but one that is a central element of accountability mechanisms, is the element 
of sanction or reward. Bovens chooses the word consequence because it has a neutral 
connotation as opposed to sanction which is negatively biased (Bovens, 2010: 952).  
Further, Jones et al. include redress as an essential democratic criteria and support 
powers of sanction against incompetent administration (1996: 192). Redress also 
means that complaints against the police are investigated and affected parties receive 
compensation. Further, effective mechanisms of redress should lead to a reversal of 
contentious policing policies (Jones et al., 1996: 192). Marenin (1998: 170) also 




that “the police are actors but their power is delegated, it can be recalled and its use 
judged by others”. In the previous tripartite governance arrangements, the local police 
authorities were responsible for nearly half of the police budgets and had the “power 
of the purse strings” (Donnelly and Scott, 2010: 82). This power could have translated 
into the threat of sanction, however, there are no examples of whether this was ever 
exercised by a local police authority to gain compliance from their respective chief 
constables.  
 
In the context of the proposed epistocratic arrangement, the consequences need not be 
formal such as fines, disciplinary measures, legal sanctions etc., they can be informal. 
Particularly in relation to the police that relies on public consent for its legitimacy 
(Reiner, 2010) a threat of reputational damage and negative publicity can also equate 
to sanction.  It has been argued that “whilst negative publicity may be the weakest 
possible sanction, yet research indicates that executives of public organisations are 
highly alert to perceived negative publicity” (Schillemans, 2011: 391). It is crucial, 
therefore, that the processes and mechanisms of accountability involve an element of 
explanation and consequences. In the absence of formal mechanisms of sanction, the 
proposed epistocratic arrangement would need to negotiate informal sanctions and it 
needs to have the power and an overall capacity to do so.  
 
In the above discussions (5.1 and 5.2), I have proposed how an epistocracy could be 
institutionalised and how it could encapsulate key principles of democratic governance 
within the mechanisms of accountability. I consolidate and qualify my arguments 
further below.   
5.3 - An ‘epistocratic and deliberative’ approach to police governance 
Based on the above discussions, the four key characteristics for an institutional 










Table 5.1 - An 'epistocratic and deliberative’ approach to police governance - Conceptual Framework  
 
Numbers in brackets denote source: (i) Institutional Epistocracy (Holst, 2011,2012; Holst and 
Mollander, 2014), (ii) Accountability as a mechanism (Bovens, 2010), (iii) Principles of democratic 
governance (Jones et al., 1996) 
 
5.3.1 - Broad Composition  
As I have argued above (5.1), knowledge is the defining characteristic of epistocracy. 
For an epistocracy to be institutionalised in the context of police governance and 
accountability, this characteristic will be reflected in its composition. Further, the 
composition needs to be sufficiently broad to ensure it is reflective of the broader social 
demography. But what knowledge composition would be appropriate for the purposes 
of police governance? Further, what would an ideal demographic composition look 
like? I examine this below.  
5.3.1.a - Knowledge  
In relation to the knowledge composition of the proposed epistocratic arrangement, 
based on Holst’s usage of the term, a broad application would suffice (2011, 2012). 
Drawing once again on the example of knowledge-based governance arrangements 
 
Reconciling Democracy and epistocracy: 
Key components for an ‘epistocratic and deliberative’ approach to police governance 
 

































Information Phase (ii) 
 










within the EU, non-scientific knowledge has been argued to be just as influential as 
scientific knowledge; “diplomats, judges, defence experts, high-ranking military 
officials, bankers, and international lawyers, among others, all have just as much of a 
claim to authoritative knowledge as scientists” (Cross, 2015: 92). In the security policy 
field, there has been an increase in security experts that the EU routinely calls upon 
for advice. The comprehensive security initiatives comprise a “mixture of expert 
officials and competences from the fields of intelligence, military, judicial, policing, 
as well as regional, local, political and economic expertise” (Eriksen, 2011: 1171).  
 
Claims to knowledge and expertise do not necessarily mean specialisation in a specific 
field but rather it is possible for experts to have general insights and awareness of 
social problems and available research (Collins and Evans, 2007: 77). It is recognised 
that knowledge itself may be socially constructed, but epistemic communities must 
nonetheless have a means of objectively recognising the validity of knowledge (Cross, 
2015: 91). The key element for an epistocracy would be for epistocrats to have an 
ability to interact and communicate across fields and disciplines and with a range of 
stakeholders. This is essential because the reliance on experts is not limited to technical 
or factual issues, it is often the case that policies developed following expert advice 
and consultation have the capacity to influence moral and ethical dimensions (Holst, 
2012: 47). Holst points out that within the EU, representatives from NGOs are 
routinely included in certain policy circles because they are deemed to carry “morally 
relevant knowledge and experiences as affected parties” or political philosophers are 
included in committees due to their ability to conceptualise and analyse normative 
problems (Holst, 2012: 49). It is pertinent that an epistocratic governance and 
accountability arrangement reflects a range of expertise and knowledge and does not 
only consist of technocrats or academic elites.  
 
Even within the scope of police governance and accountability, various contexts and 
purposes will demand various types of knowledge and expertise. As argued by 
HMICS, there is “no definitive list of competencies” to ensure adequate governance 
over policing (Laing and Fossey, 2011: 15). Since there is no consensus on what 




proposed by HMICS, a range of "professional and organisational skills, technical and 
professional knowledge, legal and policy expertise, business acumen and directorship 
experience" (Laing and Fossey, 2011: 5-6). I expand this list and propose, that as 
epistocracy includes all variations of knowledge, knowledge of local areas, of policing, 
experience of partnership working, negotiation and bargaining should also not be 
excluded.  
 
There is no prescriptive knowledge composition. It is reiterated, however, that 
members of the proposed epistocratic arrangement should ideally represent a range of 
backgrounds and not just consist of academic elites. It could also include practitioners, 
members of the civil society, and independent analysts, bringing in knowledge of 
policing, of local areas and needs, of laws related to human rights and equality.  
 
An example of a broad knowledge composition would be of the Northern Ireland 
Policing Board that consists of nine independent members and ten elected 
representatives. The independent members represent a broad range of expertise, 
competencies and educational backgrounds. Members have voluntary and community 
sector background, school teaching experience, there are graduates in criminology and 
Human Rights Law, independent consultants as well as independent researchers, and 
a Professor of International Law (NIPB, 2017). However, knowledge composition of 
an epistocracy is one component of the framework. Whether a particular composition 
is right for the purposes of police governance needs to be ascertained in relation to the 
other components such as power and autonomy that contribute to the overall capacity 
of the proposed epistocratic arrangement. Further, as argued above, whatever the 
knowledge composition may look like, the epistocrats will also need to have the ability 
and capacity to interpret and draw on external knowledge and evidence (Collins and 
Evans, 2007; Cross, 2015). This could be achieved through horizontal deliberation 
with external stakeholders such as academics, independent analysts and practitioners 




5.3.1.b - Demography 
Once the knowledge demands of an epistocratic arrangement are determined, 
epistocrats will need to be appointed from a broad demographic. This is a key 
legitimising component for the proposed epistocratic arrangement. Drawing on 
Estlund once again, he argues that "even if it is accepted that the experts will carry 
with them a certain degree of goodwill towards all people, they are inevitably biased 
by their race, social class and gender" (Estlund, 2008: 215). Also, more often than not, 
epistocrats would have acquired formal education such as a degree which is “privilege 
of certain races and classes, even genders” (Estlund, 2003:62). For an epistocratic 
arrangement to be representative of wider society, it is essential that members are 
appointed from a diverse cultural, social and gender demography.  
 
This is arguably easier to achieve because members will be appointed rather than 
elected through direct electoral processes. In the recent elections of the PCCs in 
England and Wales, “more former police officers (32) stood in the elections in 
comparison to women (29) and there were more white men called Kevin (6) than there 
were Black Minority and Ethnic (BME) candidates (3)” (Muir, 2016). It is imperative 
that the membership reflects the broader social demography. Irrespective of the 
jurisdiction and the context, MacPherson’s seminal recommendation, following the 
Stephen Lawrence inquiry, is relevant here: 
 
“That the Home Secretary and Police Authorities should seek to 
ensure that the membership of police authorities reflects so far as 
possible the cultural and ethnic mix of the communities which 
those authorities serve” - (Macpherson, 1999: Chapter 47, para.7) 
 
Applying the recommendation to my proposed arrangement in fairly idealised terms, 
the composition of an epistocratic arrangement should reflect the broader social 
composition of the society.  
 
Further, in relation to the criticisms of experts acting in their own interests 
(Forcehimes, 2010), the group of experts in an epistocratic governance arrangement 




mandate and an obligation to govern, taking out the element of personal desire to 
govern in a despotic sense and minimising the risk of elitism (Dougherty, 2010: 79). 
Also, members will be held to account by democratic bodies so the elitist and 
exclusionist objections purely on the basis of their expertise and knowledge need not 
be viewed in a negative sense, as these are the inherent qualities of an epistocratic 
arrangement (Lippert-Rasmussen, 2012).  
 
I accept that epistocrats may not be completely disinterested, non-partisan actors and 
personal desire to govern or to be in a position of power could manifest in different 
ways. For instance, certain members may be attracted to apply because of reasons such 
as remuneration, perks, and other financial benefits. This might have an adverse effect 
on their impartiality and the way they exercise their responsibilities particularly 
because they would be concerned about reappointments. However, I suggest that the 
adverse effects of experts acting in their own interests could be mitigated so long as 
there are proper rules and regulations around how experts are appointed and 
remunerated, and so long as robust mechanisms of horizontal accountability to 
professional peers, and vertical accountability to the democratic state are in place 
(Holst and Mollander, 2014).  
5.3.2 - Power  
As I argued above (5.1), for an epistocracy to be situated within a democratic order, it 
will need clearly defined powers establishing an accountability relationship between 
the police and the proposed arrangement. In the absence of a clearly defined 
hierarchical relationship, and particularly in a network-governance approach, an 
epistocratic institution will need to negotiate its role within the confines of its 
legislative powers. Drawing on Zimmerling’s treatment of power and influence 
(2005), I argue that power can manifest in two significant ways; formal powers 
enshrined in law, and informal powers that are negotiated between actors during their 
interactions. Scholars have long tried to distinguish the precise meanings of the words 
power, influence, control and authority, and some have used these terms 
interchangeably (Zimmerling, 2005: 2-4). For the purposes of this framework, I use 




power can manifest in many ways, I reserve the use of the term ‘influence’ for informal 
power, resulting from negotiated agreement. As the first phase of an accountability 
relation requires that the account giver feels obligated to present information, it is 
imperative that powers of an epistocratic governance arrangement are clearly 
enshrined in statutory terms; “unclear power relations create a space for competing 
interpretations” (Olsen, 2015: 427).  
 
For an accountability relationship to be established, the key question should be “does 
the accountability forum have enough inquisitive powers … are the available sanctions 
strong enough to have preventive effects?” (Bovens, 2007: 465). Even where formal 
legal powers do not signify a principal-agent relationship, informal influence may 
result in a ‘shadow of hierarchy’ and it remains an important bargaining tool in any 
non-hierarchical governance landscape (Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2008; Weale, 2011). 
The power to allocate funding, and monitoring of budgets, and resources could 
potentially be used as a bargaining tool for changes in police policy and practice, 
something that the previous local police authorities repeatedly failed to do (Chapter 2 
and Chapter 3). Researchers have also found that in a multi-agency approach to policy 
negotiations, institutions often concerned with “getting things done” find creative 
ways to “manage tensions and conflicts” (Crawford and Jones, 1995:21). As it has 
been discussed earlier, in relation to horizontal accountability, the threat of negative 
publicity particularly for the public police that relies on policing by consent can also 
tilt the power relations in favour of the accountability forum (see above, 5.2).  Further, 
as I will argue below (5.3.4), the inclusion of deliberative principles would allow the 
proposed epistocratic arrangement to establish its sphere of influence and manage 
potential conflicts and tensions arising from misinterpretations of power.  
 
Power will manifest in many ways. It will be reflected in the actual mechanisms of 
accountability, it will also be evident through the element of consequences and 
sanction at the disposal of the accountability forum, and it will be reflected in how the 
allocation of funding, and threat of reputational damage is used as a bargaining tool 
during the accountability processes, particularly where the outcome is related to a 




5.3.3 - Autonomy  
Along with power, it is imperative that the proposed epistocratic arrangement is 
reasonably independent of central and local government. One of the most crucial 
aspects of police accountability mechanisms is to ensure that policing does not serve 
partisan interests (Jones et al., 1996; Walker, 2000). However, direct forms of 
democratic governance do carry an underlying risk of partisanship, as I have argued 
earlier in Chapter 4 (see 4.4.2.b). Jones et al., have placed distribution of power as an 
important democratic principle arguing that “many criticisms of the arrangements for 
police governance have identified the concentration of power in some sense as the 
problem” (1996: 192, their own emphasis).  
 
Within a network governance approach, networks are self-organising and while this 
dilutes democratic oversight and blurs the lines of responsibility, self-governing and 
self-organising networks are often autonomous (Rhodes, 1996: 659). Whilst the 
proposed epistocratic arrangement will not be self-governing and self-organising in a 
strict sense, as it will have delegated powers and its members will be appointed by the 
state, it should, nevertheless, be visibly distant from local and central political actors, 
denoting impartiality and non-partisanship.  
 
Independent, arms-length regulatory agencies have delegated powers due to their 
expertise in the fields where political actors lack the necessary competence 
(Rosenvallon, 2011: 9). However, if experts are deemed as partisan, a crisis of 
legitimacy can occur (Rosenvallon, 2011: 80). The proliferation of networks within 
the new governance approach is often attributed to central government consolidating 
its own control through agencies, often bypassing local authorities (Rhodes, 1996). As 
I have argued earlier, the previous tripartite arrangements were decidedly lopsided 
towards the central government and chief constables (Chapter 2 and 3). The imbalance 
in power relations contributed to the accountability deficits that this framework aims 
to resolve. It is crucial that an epistocratic arrangement is not just seen as an extension 
of central government, at the expense of local authorities. Epistocracy by democratic 
delegation means that directly elected political actors will appoint experts (Holst and 




potentially lead to a loss of professional autonomy rendering the whole governance 
arrangement ineffective, with power shifting back to central government and the 
police.  
 
Further, the proposed epistocratic arrangement will also need to be independent of the 
police itself. There is an established concept of regulatory capture in corporate 
governance that highlights how private firms often ‘capture’ the regulatory agencies, 
leading to ineffective governance and accountability and a loss of public trust 
(Carpenter and Moss, 2014: 1-22). Regulatory Capture could be defined more broadly 
as a “a process by which regulation...is consistently or repeatedly directed away from 
the public interest and toward the interests of the regulated industry by the intent and 
action of the industry itself” (Kwak, 2014: 73). It is also reflected in “a regulatory 
agency's collusion with the firms it is ostensibly regulating, to the detriment of the 
public interest” (Zinn, 2002: 107). The effectiveness of the proposed framework rests 
on autonomy, within the broad confines of its role and powers. As I mentioned above, 
in reference to Rosenvallon (2011), if an epistocratic arrangement is perceived to be 
colluding with the police, or serving central government interests at the expense of the 
local government, or the public, then such an arrangement will lose its legitimacy and 
purpose.  
5.3.4 - Deliberation 
Whilst the composition, power and autonomy would relate to the overall capacity of 
an epistocratic arrangement to carry out its functions, deliberation refers to the way it 
delivers police governance and operationalises the mechanisms of accountability. 
Deliberation gives an epistocracy, a democratic character, particularly because it 
encapsulates key principles of democratic governance, as argued above (5.2).  
 
The idea of deliberation, used as an essential characteristic for the proposed 
epistocratic governance arrangement, is adapted from discussions in political 
philosophy on deliberative democracy (Dryzek, 2000; Gutmann and Thompson, 2004; 
Fishkin, 2009). However, the application of deliberation in this context manages to 




to wider public policy making (Fishkin, 2009; Lafont, 2015) and the criticisms of 
deliberative democracy in general (for instance, Kuper, 2004: 61-74).  Instead, as 
argued above, in reference to Mulgan (2000), the defining characteristics of 
deliberative democracy such as justification, and reasoning are extracted and tied into 
the processes and mechanisms of accountability.  
 
Deliberative democracy is defined by the “need to justify decisions made by citizens 
and their representatives” and its first and most important characteristic is its “reason-
giving” requirement (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004: 3, emphasis my own). 
Justification and reason-giving is also at the core of an accountability relationship (Day 
and Klein, 1987; Mulgan, 2000; Bovens, 2007, 2010). Particularly in the debating 
phase, instead of merely providing the required information, or explaining conduct in 
retrospect, senior police officers would be required to engage in meaningful 
deliberation with the accountability forum about future course of action and police 
policy. In such an environment, deliberations would result in “persuasion rather than 
coercion” (Dryzek, 2000: 1, emphasis my own).  
 
The proposed epistocratic arrangement will need to weave in principles of deliberation 
into its approach to delivering police accountability. Particularly in relation to 
organisational accountability mechanisms, as I argued above, the proposed 
arrangement will need to proactively scrutinise operational policies. Through 
deliberation, the accountability relationship with the police could be developed in such 
a way that the debating phase can be pursued through formal structures of retrospective 
account-giving, or through meetings and informal scrutiny (Romzek et al., 2012; 
Romzek, 2014).  
 
The inclusion of deliberation also acts as a democratic check on the proposed 
epistocratic arrangement. Particularly in a network-based governance approach, an 
epistocracy will be one stakeholder, there will be the police themselves, local and 
central political actors, as well as other auditing and regulatory bodies, etc. In such a 
landscape, deliberation between the different actors will ensure horizontal 




and horizontal responsiveness (Kuper, 2004).   Further, deliberative principles that 
incorporate elements of justification and reasoning can also enhance ways of learning 
and improvement, allowing agencies “to reflect upon their policies and procedures and 
to improve upon them” (Bovens, 2007: 466). This would not only apply to the police 
as ‘account-givers’ but also to the epistocratic arrangement as an accountability forum.  
 
Deliberation can encapsulate participation and make an epistocratic arrangement, and 
the police, more responsive to the reasonable demands of the public. Deliberation is 
distinguished from other forms of interaction in network-based governance such as 
consultation, engagement, and negotiation. Research has shown that in traditional 
consultation, public bodies interact with the public on a pre-defined agenda, to fulfil 
an official requirement, the outcomes of the consultations in such circumstances are 
often unchangeable, leading to no deviation in policy (Escobar, 2014b: 97). Further, 
“traditional consultation often lacks clear impact on, and connection to, decision 
making processes” (Escobar, 2014a: 26). An epistocratic arrangement could engage 
with the public on specific issues. However, in order not to succumb to the pitfalls of 
partisanship and majoritarianism, the proposed epistocratic arrangement will need to 
act as an intermediary between the police and the public. By virtue of available 
knowledge, or evidence, an epistocratic arrangement may refuse certain public 
demands, however, principles of reason-giving and justification would also apply here. 
For instance, if there is public pressure to open more 24/7 police stations in a particular 
area, an epistocratic arrangement could intervene on behalf of the police and refuse 
such demands, for reasons that may potentially involve a lack of resources.   
 
Finally, the inclusion of deliberation to the framework also serves to strengthen the 
other components. For instance, in relation to knowledge, whatever the composition of 
the proposed epistocratic governance arrangement may look like, it would be 
impossible for epistocrats to have knowledge of everything, of every locality, every 
single community, and every aspect of policing. Deliberative procedures with an 
"epistemic element" involving many experts with different expertise and skills, will 
ensure that best decisions are achieved (Forcehimes, 2010: 75; Landemore, 2013a: 




deliberation with professional peers, members of the proposed arrangement could 
draw on external expertise in order to fill the knowledge gaps in its own composition. 
Deliberative principles would also allow the proposed epistocratic arrangement to 
negotiate the lines of power and influence, particularly if its formal powers are not 
clearly defined or subject to competing interpretations. However, this may result in 
informal and piecemeal arrangements, blurring the lines of responsibility and 
accountability of decision-makers (Crawford and Jones, 1995), therefore, robust 
mechanisms of horizontal accountability (Schillemans, 2011) between other key 
stakeholders and to democratic representatives (Holst and Mollander, 2014) would 
help ensure that epistocrats can also be held to account for potential misuses of power, 
ineffective governance and malpractice.  
 
The above discussions provide a conceptual framework, outlining how an epistocracy 
could be institutionalised in the context of police governance and how it could 
implement effective mechanisms of proactive scrutiny and retrospective 
accountability whilst promoting principles of democratic governance. I argue that, 
assuming all the components are in place, the proposed arrangement could potentially 
resolve the perennial problems of police governance, outlined in Chapter 2.  
5.4 - Discussion: The framework and the ‘perennial’ problems of police governance 
In Chapter 2, I argued that the notion of operational independence of senior officers, 
and the perpetual tussle between the local and the central for democratic control of the 
police are ‘perennial’ problems that successive police governance arrangements have 
not been able to resolve. As part of my contribution to the study of police governance, 
the conceptual framework proposed above aims to resolve these problems.  
 
In regards to the operational independence doctrine, this notion has evolved over time 
to reflect the professional autonomy of senior police officers (Jones, 2008; also, 
Chapter 2; Chapter 4, 4.4.1). Traditional claims to police professionalism have often 
rested on the technical expertise of the police (Fyfe, 2013). The proposed epistocratic 
arrangement, through its ability to draw on expertise and knowledge can bypass the 




3), particularly in relation to questioning and debating police information. Through 
knowledge and expertise, epistocrats can counterbalance police professional expertise. 
Knowledge plays a crucial role in contentious policy arenas.  Boswell (2009) has 
argued that policy makers routinely call upon expert knowledge and evidence to 
legitimise and substantiate their decisions to both internal audiences and external 
actors (Boswell, 2009: 7). Through claims to their own sophisticated expertise, police 
legitimise their actions and control information (Harkin, 2015), often claiming to 
represent the public voice. In the absence of public input, the claims of representing 
the public view and protecting the public are simply “rhetoric, and at best vapid and 
unrealistic” (Kitcher, 2006: 1220). As expressed earlier, the EU security agenda is 
“crowded with expertise and counter-expertise” (Eriksen, 2011: 1176) which begs the 
question as to why the public police that is highly reliant on public consent and 
resources from the public purse continues to shield itself from processes of public 
accountability by drawing on professional expertise.  
 
A suitably empowered epistocratic arrangement will compel the police organisation to 
take part in deliberations, instead of shielding operational policies from external 
scrutiny. Without this underlying power and shadow of hierarchy, deliberations are 
likely to always end with senior police officers justifying their decisions with reasons 
such as ‘this is in the domain of our operational independence’. Through power, and 
drawing on external evidence and expertise, an epistocratic arrangement will induce 
better reasoning and justifications from the police organisation. As noted earlier, the 
powers of the previous local police authorities, were "vague and self-contradictory at 
crucial points" (Reiner, 2010: 227; Chapter 2). This not only translated in weak and 
ineffective mechanisms of organisational accountability, but consolidated the 
operational independence of chief constables (Chapter 2). Through demanding reasons 
and justifications for police operational policies, the proposed epistocratic governance 
arrangement can counter, and even circumvent, the notion of operational independence 
altogether. This does not mean that epistocrats would be able to influence specific 
police operations. Police officers, by virtue of their common law powers, have 
discretion in their day-today policing role. But the aspect of operational independence 




policies from scrutiny, would be bypassed through proactive scrutiny. Meaningful 
deliberations between the police and the proposed epistocratic arrangement, at various 
stages of policy development, can ensure that policing is delivered fairly and equitably 
across the broad.  
 
The definition and the status of the operational independence doctrine and what it 
precisely means in a network-based governance landscape will need to be addressed. 
I undertake this task in the context of the SPA and the post-2012 governance 
arrangements in Chapter 7.  
 
In relation to the perpetual tussle between the local and the central, an empowered, 
suitably independent, and non-partisan epistocratic arrangement can balance the 
interests of local government and central government, and act as an intermediary 
between the police, and the politicians. The strongest criticism of the previous local 
police authorities, in the policy discourse leading up to the 2012 Act, was that they 
were ineffective in directing the police resources towards local priorities, and they 
were under no legal obligation to consider national objectives (Chapter 3, 3.3.2). The 
proposed epistocratic arrangement will need to ensure that policing policies take 
cognisance of local priorities as well as national objectives. This could be achieved 
through horizontal deliberations with central and local government stakeholders. 
However, the principles of justification and reasoning would often need to be invoked 
at these forums to ensure policing policies are insulated from majoritarian or partisan 
interests. It would be crucial for epistocrats to draw on available knowledge and 
evidence to politely refuse the demands of the local and central politicians, if they are 
deemed as unreasonable, or unachievable due to limited resources. At the very least, 
an epistocratic arrangement, through deliberative mechanisms of proactive scrutiny 
and retrospective accountability, ensure that policing policies are not unfairly affecting 
certain local areas, or communities, whilst ensuring the broader national objectives are 
being met.   
 
In conceptual terms, the proposed epistocratic and deliberative approach to police 




however, the analysis of the SPA, through the framework, will provide an empirical 
basis for the above discussions. I now outline how this framework will be utilised in 
relation to the evaluation of the SPA.   
5.5 - The framework and the SPA 
I drew on the notion of epistocracy in cognisance of the conceptual model and vision 
for the SPA, a body with a professional base, its members appointed on the basis of 
specific skills and competencies (Chapter 4, 4.3). The above sections provided a 
framework for how an epistocracy could be institutionalised, and how it could 
encapsulate the principles of democratic governance into its processes of 
accountability, whilst resolving the perennial problems of police governance, in 
conceptual terms.  
 
The SPA’s model and vision as a body composed of professional members, provides 
an expert, or epistocratic dimension to the broader landscape of police governance and 
accountability.  Whilst the framework is grounded in literature (as outlined in sections 
5.1-5.3), its development was fluid and iterative and the data collection aided the 
refinement of the various components outlined above (see Table 5.1). This has allowed 
for the framework to be utilised as a thematic toolkit to examine the SPA, its potential 
as an expert body, and its approach to police governance and accountability, as it 
developed as an organisation. In Chapters 8 and 9, I will specifically present my 
evaluation of the SPA in relation to the framework. Focusing on the first three years 
since its inception, the analysis will examine the SPA’s composition to ascertain what 
knowledge and expertise its members possess, as well as, analysing whether its 
membership reflects a broad demography. In relation to power and autonomy, I will 
assess if the SPA had the capacity to establish its role as an accountability forum, 
without impositions and interference. The findings will also contribute further ‘lessons 
for the framework’ and highlight issues specifically related to the SPA and the new 
governance arrangements, contributing further empirical insights for the framework. 
Further, I will examine whether deliberative principles were implicit in the SPA’s 




this has resulted in effective mechanisms of proactive scrutiny. The specific questions 
that the analysis will focus on is outlined in Chapter 6 (see, 6.5.1). 
5.6 - Conclusion 
This chapter provided a prescriptive conceptual framework to resolve the underlying 
perennial problems of police governance. I showed, in conceptual terms, how an 
epistocracy could be institutionalised in the context of police governance and 
accountability, and how through mechanisms of accountability, underpinning 
deliberative principles, it could encapsulate key ideals of democratic governance.  
 
I argued that the knowledge credentials of an institutional epistocracy would be 
reflected in its composition of experts representing a range of skills, competencies, and 
expertise. The members would be drawn from a diverse range of backgrounds to 
ensure an epistocratic arrangement is representative of the broader social demography. 
Further, the proposed epistocratic arrangement will need clearly defined powers so it 
can establish an accountability relationship with the police. It is particularly important 
for accountability mechanisms to include an element of sanction or consequences. In 
the absence of clearly defined powers, the proposed arrangement should be able to use 
powers of resource allocation or the threat of reputational damage as a bargaining tool 
to induce a change in police behaviour and a reversal of contentious policing policies. 
The proposed arrangement will also need to be sufficiently independent of the police, 
and local and central political stakeholders. Any perceptions of collusion, and a lack 
of independence would render such an arrangement ineffective and it would lose its 
legitimacy and purpose. Through deliberative principles, underpinned by justification 
and reasoning, the proposed arrangement could establish processes of proactive 
scrutiny, ensuring that police operational policies are fair and equitable. The 
deliberative principles would also allow epistocrats to draw on external expertise, and 
act as an intermediary between the police and the politicians.  
 
The framework has been developed with an explicit focus on the SPA, its model as an 
expert body, and its potential to deliver police governance and accountability. The 




framework outlined in this chapter. In the next chapter, I outline my methodology and 




PART III – RESEARCH DESIGN 
Chapter 6 - Exploring the landscape of police governance and 
accountability 
 
In this chapter, I outline my research design, methods and the rationale for my 
analytical approach.   
6.1 - Research Questions  
When I started this study in September 2013, the new governance arrangements had 
only been in place for five months. The SPA was a fledgling organisation, and its 
organisational structure was still being negotiated. There was very little public facing 
information about the SPA and the new governance arrangements, this became a key 
factor in determining the research questions and the overall research strategy. The 
primary aims of this research are:  
 
i. Explore and analyse the role of the SPA in managing and delivering police 
organisational accountability in the new governance landscape. And, 
ii. To what extent, if at all, has the creation of the SPA, as an expert body, 
resolved, or exacerbated, the perennial problems of police governance? 
 
The first research aim was to address the gap in knowledge, ensuing from the 2012 
Act. Due to this gap in knowledge, the research was underpinned by an exploratory 
approach and a flexible research design that “allows the concepts to emerge naturally 
as they manifest” without prespecification (Robson, 2002 in Semmens, 2011: 58). The 
second research aim specifically emerged from the literature review, a natural starting 
point to gain orientation of the field (Francis, 2011: 21). The literature (Lustgarten, 
1986; Walker, 2000; Donnelly and Scott, 2002a,2002b; Jones, 2008; Reiner, 2010) 
highlighted the underlying ‘problems’ of police governance and accountability, that 
had persisted during the previous governance arrangements (Chapter 2). These 




on police organisational accountability and contributing to the development of the 
framework for analysis (Chapter 5). The subsequent data collection, and analysis was 
fluid and iterative. Both research aims, in conjunction, allowed for a rich descriptive 
account of the SPA’s role, from policy to implementation, and a critical assessment in 
relation to the perennial problems. Further, through the analytical framework (Chapter 
5, 5.5), I examined the SPA’s institutional design, and its approach to implementing 
mechanisms of accountability in its formative years.   
 
While the literature on police governance provided a strong foundation for the 
development of the research questions, my analytical approach diverges from the 
previous studies, that predominantly examined police governance arrangements 
through the perspective of constitutional law (Lustgarten, 1986; Walker, 2000). By 
incorporating qualitative methods, my research goes beyond the analysis of the 
governance arrangements, and focuses on the perceptions of those involved in 
operationalising those arrangements.  
6.2 - Data Collection 
This study takes into account all material up to March 2016, although in some places, 
where relevant, I have incorporated some later developments and these are signified 
by appropriate references. The SPA came into effect on the 01st of April 2013 and the 
SPA chair submitted the review of police governance to the Cabinet Secretary for 
Justice on the 23rd of March 2016. This development provided a natural cut-off point 
for data collection, allowing the subsequent writing and analysis to produce a coherent 
narrative of the SPA’s evolution from inception to the first official governance review. 
The specific method of data collection is set out below.    
6.2.1 - Policy Documents and Public Meetings 
The official policy documents and the minutes of official meetings represented the 
largest, most readily available, and easily accessible sources of information regarding 
the reforms and the post-2012 Act arrangements. These were in the form of official 
government consultations prior to the reforms, minutes of parliamentary hearings and 
Justice Committee reports, official inspection and audit reports by HMICS and Audit 




organised chronologically and separated in two categories; pre-reform and post-reform 
(see, Appendix A).  
 
The documents prior to the reforms largely consisted of Justice Committee hearings, 
Scottish Government consultations, HMICS reviews of policing, and Audit Scotland 
inspection reports on the local police boards. The analysis of these documents formed 
part of the policy review in Chapter 3, in order to understand the nuances behind the 
rationale for the reforms, and also to examine if any of the problems identified in the 
police governance literature (Chapter 2) were manifest in the official policy agenda 
for the 2012 Act. This initial process also allowed me to map the key actors and 
stakeholders in the Scottish police governance landscape for later interviews (see 
below, 6.2.2), and to draw parallels between the issues identified in the literature 
review, and the issues that dominated the policy circles. My analysis of the policy 
documents was very much in line with what Morrison (2012: 15) describes as 
“content” and “consequences”, rather than the sociocultural “processes of change”, 
due to limited time and the confines of my specific focus on the processes and 
mechanisms of accountability in practice. 
 
The documents after the reforms specifically included selected minutes of meetings of 
the Justice Committee and the Justice Sub-Committee on Policing, HMICS and Audit 
Scotland inspection and audit reports of Police Scotland and the SPA, official 
documents by the SPA, Police Scotland and the Scottish Government related to the 
governance and accountability processes, Police Scotland consultation reports on 
select issues, reports by CoSLA,  SPA and HMICS scrutiny reviews on stop and search 
and the standing firearms authority, and the governance review led by the SPA chair. 
Some of these documents raised issues that could be covered during the second phase 
of the data collection, whilst others served to triangulate the findings from the 
interviews. In particular, the minutes of the parliamentary committee meetings, and 
inspection reports by HMICS and Audit Scotland allowed me to compare perceptions 
and views of those I had interviewed (see below, 6.2.2) with the official institutional 





Whilst I drew extensively from the minutes of the hearings held by the Justice Sub-
Committee on Policing, previous academic research on police governance in Scotland 
incorporated visits to public meetings of local police boards as part of the data 
collection process (Etherson, 2013). I did not include a systematic review of the SPA’s 
Public Board Meetings (PBMs) for several reasons. Firstly, and primarily, because of 
the broad maintenance role that the SPA has as the corporate employer of Police 
Scotland. A broad range of issues related to the governance and finance of Police 
Scotland and the SPA are conducted in the PBMs, and it is not specifically a forum for 
public accountability of police operational policies, which is the focus of my study. As 
a result, the PBMs can last several hours, this was also raised during my interviews 
(see below), as one MSP remarked: 
 
“The meetings go on for far too long, I tend to go in and after 5 
hours I gave up through boredom and exhaustion” - (Interview: 
MSP, Lab)    
 
Further, in the first two years (2013 and 2014) PBMs were held in different regions 
across Scotland. Attending these meetings as an observer would have been time-
consuming and costly. Although, all of the meetings were streamed online, and 
minutes were also available online to be downloaded and viewed at the researcher’s 
convenience, a systematic analysis of these would have generated a large amount of 
data that would not have been relevant for my specific research focus. It has been 
argued “research design is an exercise in compromise, whereby the researcher seeks 
to trade off the strengths and weaknesses of different methods” (Davies and Francis, 
2011: 282).  Therefore, I remained open to the possibility of some relevant data 
emerging from the PBMs and decided on a trade-off by focusing on the PBMs held 
specifically to discuss operational policies, issues such as stop and search and the 
standing firearms authority. I also drew from the minutes of a selection of PBMs held 
on pertinent issues. These PBMs were identified during the interviews, informal 
conversations with stakeholders, SPA’s own official web site and publications, and 
through the evidence given at the hearings of the Justice Sub-Committee on Policing. 




I ensured coverage of a broad range of data emanating from different sources and key 
institutions embedded in the broader landscape of police governance. 
6.2.2 - Elite Interviews 
A substantial part of the data collection process included semi-structured interviews 
with a cross-section of actors across the police governance landscape. As part of this 
phase, I conducted thirteen interviews with individuals representing the key 
institutions (for a breakdown, see Appendix B). Ten additional interviews were 
conducted across three local authorities for a separate, funded research project on local 
governance arrangements (see below, 6.2.3). Some of the data generated from these 
interviews was used in this PhD to complement existing data, but the bulk of the 
findings were drawn from the initial round of interviews specifically carried out for 
this study.   
 
Targeted interviews with a carefully chosen sample of respondents can generate rich, 
insightful data (Francis, 2011: 25).  As my focus was on the SPA, six of those 
interviewed were from within the organisation including two executive officers of the 
SPA’s Senior Management Group, and four non-executive board members, of whom 
two had prior experience of the previous arrangements and two had no prior policing 
or local government background. I also interviewed a former Minister and two 
opposition MSPs representing the two second largest parties in the Scottish Parliament 
at the time (prior to the 2016 Scottish Parliamentary elections), two senior officers of 
Police Scotland, one senior official from HMICS, and a civil servant who played a key 
role in the lead-up to the reforms. Most of the interviews were conducted between 
March 2015 and February 2016, one interview was conducted in May 2016 due to 
availability of the respondent.  
 
The individuals identified for the interviews, represented the elite group of 
practitioners who were responsible for the implementation, interpretation and 
operationalisation of the new governance arrangements. During the fieldwork, I found 
that there was close proximity between the actors representing the various institutions.  




collaboratively with practitioners and other researchers have had to tread carefully 
when identifying key individuals for their research (Morrison, 2012).  By examining 
the organisational structures of Police Scotland and the SPA on their respective web 
sites, navigating the policing and policy networks (see below, 6.3) and highlighting 
the key actors during the policy analysis, I deployed a combination of purposive 
sampling and snowball technique to identify participants.  The MSPs were specifically 
identified through the policy analysis as their statements and engagements 
demonstrated an interest in policing, and police governance, making them suitable 
participants. 
 
The interviews lasted between an hour to an hour and a half and were conducted at 
locations in Edinburgh and Glasgow, convenient to both the researcher and the 
participants. Along with a list of pre-specified questions tailored for each respondent 
(Appendix D for a sample interview schedule), participants were also asked about their 
views, perceptions and experience of dealing with the events that represented crises of 
accountability (see below, 6.4.5), an approach similar to a Critical Incident Technique 
(CIT). A CIT is a qualitative interview technique which “facilitates the investigation 
of significant occurrences (events, incidents, processes, or issues, the way they are 
managed, and the outcomes in terms of perceived effects” (Chell, 1998: 56). A CIT 
interview allows the respondents to review and reflect upon a number of key issues 
and events and focusing on these issues during the interviews allows the respondents 
to reflect not only on the incidents but the lessons learned. CIT also enables “focused 
discussion on critical issues as well as facilitating identification of critical issues which 
are of importance to the respondent” (Chell, 1998: 68). It is to be noted here that Chell 
(1998) carried out semi-structured interviews, followed by a separate CIT interview 
for a select group of interviewees. I combined the CIT within the semi-structured 
interviews as the events that reflected ‘accountability crises’ were already well 
documented, and in the public domain. Participants were asked explicitly, and through 
probing, about any other events or incidents, unsurprisingly, due to the sensitive nature 
of the research, the participants did not raise any incidents which were not already in 
the public domain. However, some respondents did raise issues that might be construed 





As observed by Morrison (2012: 18-19), politicians were much more open about their 
views but, as expected, their views were broadly in harmony with their official party 
line. I found that members of the SPA and officers from Police Scotland, as well as 
other interviewees were also generally open and supportive of the research, and 
engaged with the questions in detail. However, interviews tend to result in a “response 
bias” where respondents’ view represent their specific agendas, or they give responses 
that the researcher wants to hear (Francis, 2011: 25). I remained alive to this 
throughout the fieldwork and undertook the analysis with critical reflection. Other 
sources of data, detailed throughout this section were drawn upon in support of my 
findings and great care was taken to ensure I was not forwarding a specific agenda. In 
particular, the public meetings and parliamentary hearings provided an excellent 
resource to compare what some of my respondents had told me in the interviews and 
their official narratives in a public forum. Such comparisons have been found 
beneficial in similar research in terms of triangulating, and corroborating the overall 
findings (Morrison, 2012; Etherson, 2013).  
6.2.3 - Partners in Scrutiny – Research on Local Scrutiny Arrangements 
In September, 2015, I participated as a co-investigator in a small research project 
headed by Dr. Alistair Henry and alongside Dr. Andy Aydın-Aitchison. The research 
was funded by the Scottish Institute for Policing Research and aimed to map the local 
police scrutiny arrangements across Scotland, and to carry out an in-depth study of the 
local scrutiny arrangements in three local sites. An Advisory Board consisting of 
members of the SPA, HMICS, Police Scotland, a local councillor and an independent 
academic from the University of Edinburgh was formed to support the research team 
in order to provide comments on the draft proposal and feedback on the finding reports, 
as well as assisting with access arrangements. The research was carried out between 1 
October 2015 and 26 January 2016, with the first briefing paper published in February 
2016. I undertook the fieldwork and visited the three sites and carried out ten 
interviews as part of the study. Participants included convenors of the local scrutiny 
committees, lead officers of the local scrutiny committees, local Divisional and Area 




2016). All of the participants were given consent forms for this research and additional 
consent was gained in writing for the data in the form of anonymised quotes to be used 
in my PhD study.  Clearance for the use of the data in both research projects and further 
scholarly articles was gained through the completion of a University of Edinburgh Law 
School Level 2 ethical clearance form. The data and findings from this research project 
(Henry et al., 2016) is referenced appropriately, as published work.  
 
While most of the interview questions were relevant for the partners in scrutiny 
research project, I tailored some questions specifically for my PhD, focusing on the 
role of the SPA in police accountability particularly on matters of local concern. This 
data was treated as my other interviews and anonymised quotes were used where 
applicable.   
6.3 - Politics of policing research in Scotland: Negotiating Access and Ethical 
considerations  
 
When I arrived in a participants’ office, his colleague who I had interviewed moments 
before was also in attendance, as an observer. Before the interview started, the 
participant informally reminded me that the topic of my research was “extremely 
sensitive and political”. In response, I assured him (something I had already explained 
to the participant I had interviewed before) that my research was self-funded and fully 
independent, I did not represent any political party in Scotland and my interest in the 
new arrangements was purely academic. (Field notes, March 2015) 
 
The above excerpt from my field notes is to emphasise that this research took place in 
a politically sensitive and highly contentious time for Scottish policing that was 
compounded by an increased media and political interest in the post-reform policing 
landscape (Terpstra and Fyfe, 2015; Murray and Harkin, 2016; Murray, 2017). In 
circumstances that may be considered less contentious, “gaining access to an 
organisation requires skills, patience and perseverance” (Chell, 1998: 57). However, 
this research was taking place just as Kath Murray’s PhD study had exposed Police 
Scotland’s contentious use of stop and search policy (Murray, 2014a) and shortly 
thereafter the Highlands Council led by the Liberal Democrats were mounting a 




backdrop of austerity following the Christie Commission report (2011) and resistance 
from several local authorities against centralisation of the police (Chapter 2 and 3) 
provided for a turbulent first three years for the new policing and police governance 
arrangements.  
 
Against this backdrop, gaining access to the potential interviewees posed distinct 
challenges, not least because research of this nature can “uncover unwelcome truths 
for some groups that are very welcome truths for others” (Hughes, 2011: 309). A 
previous PhD study into the local police boards also had to navigate through comments 
like “a Government research programme that is closely related to matter of political 
controversy” (Etherson, 2013: xxxiv). In the following sections, I set out how I 
negotiated access and the ethical considerations involved in research of this nature.  
6.3.1 - Networking as a Scribe 
An initial request to conduct an institutional ethnography of the SPA was politely 
refused due to the level of access such an approach would have required, at a time 
when the SPA’s organisational structure was still developing and the internal and 
external roles and responsibilities were still under negotiation. I revised the research 
design to include semi-structured interviews with key members of the SPA, and other 
stakeholders in the police governance landscape (as above, 6.2.2). Recognising that I 
would need to get a feel of the landscape, and build trust and rapport with potential 
participants, my supervisor Dr. Alistair Henry arranged for me to work as a scribe at 
ThinkTanks organised by the Scottish Institute for Policing Research jointly with the 
Scottish Police Authority and Police Scotland. The Chatham House rule meetings 
served as avenues for knowledge exchange, and informed debate between practitioners 
and researchers on the challenges to Scottish policing. I could not use any of the issues 
discussed as data for my PhD, however, as a paid scribe my task was to take notes and 
prepare a report thereafter (see Appendix F for the terms of reference). Crucially, 
however, I was able to network with attendees, identify potential interview candidates 
and tell them about my research. I met several participants who I interviewed as part 




November, 2014 and the second one in March, 2015 by which time I had sent out the 
first interview requests. 
 
I wrote to all participants by sending an initial email requesting an interview (see 
Appendix C for sample interview request letter) and sent a one-page information sheet 
outlining my research, emphasising that it was an independent academic study. I also 
attached an interview consent form and reiterated that the research was being 
conducted in accordance with the ESRC’s ethical guidelines with due regard to the 
anonymity and confidentiality of participants (Appendix E for information sheet and 
consent form). Despite a sensitive political climate, gaining access to Police Scotland’s 
senior officers proved to be the easiest which is consistent with previous research being 
conducted on criminal justice policy making in Scotland. Morrison found that the 
“criminal justice practitioners were the group which were most happy to grant 
interviews” (2012: 18).  
 
Gaining access to the SPA was a different story altogether. The interview requests to 
both Police Scotland and the SPA were sent out in January 2015. While I had already 
received a reply and had my first interview with Police Scotland in the diary, I still 
awaited a response from the SPA. I finally received a response from one of the 
executive officers of the SPA in March 2015, and after an initial meeting over a coffee 
where I explained my research to her in detail reiterating that this was an independent 
academic study, she agreed to an interview. Following this, I was able to interview 
other executive and non-executive board members of the SPA as and when they 
became available. Access to other interviewees was much more straightforward and I 
promptly received a reply with a suggested date for a meeting.  
 
Throughout my fieldwork and during the write-up, I regularly attended events 
organised by SIPR, and continued working as a scribe at Executive Sessions, 
established Chatham House rule meetings similar to the earlier ThinkTanks. At these 
events, I would often meet participants who I had interviewed or spoken to informally 
about my research, they would ask about my progress and offer their perceptions and 




me. SIPR’s platform proved to be extremely helpful for me to navigate the policing 
policy circle and to build trust and rapport during a tumultuous and politically 
challenging time for both Police Scotland and the SPA.  
6.3.2 - Research Ethics  
Prior to the fieldwork and attending the ThinkTanks, University of Edinburgh School 
of Law level 2 ethical clearance was obtained. All interview participants were given 
an information sheet and informed consent was obtained via a consent form before the 
interviews (Appendix E).  While all interviews were conducted after a degree of 
anonymity and confidentiality was assured, it is to be noted that in a small country like 
Scotland, most actors involved in policy making know each other (Morrison, 2012). 
This has also been recognised by those involved in policing research; “to those outside 
the police world… relationships may appear just too cosy and almost incestuous at 
times” (Scott and Wilkie, 2001: 64). It was often the case, particularly with the SPA 
that some members knew that I had interviewed their colleagues but I did not reveal 
any participant’s identity. I assured all interviewees that their details will be kept 
confidential and the data will be used as anonymised quotes. However, as Morrison 
(2012: 19) has noted that despite all reasonable steps to ensure anonymity, sometimes 
job roles and titles can make it fairly obvious who the participants might be. This was 
clearly explained to each interviewee. Some participants would ask me to pause the 
voice recorder during the interview if they wanted to raise a sensitive issue ‘off the 
record’, to which I would promptly agree. The transcripts of recorded interviews were 
kept in password protected folders and no one had access to any of the interview data.  
 
The issue of confidentiality and anonymity was particularly pertinent in the context of 
a highly sensitive topic of this nature.  In the case of the non-executive board members 
of the SPA, it was evident that they were particularly concerned about negative 
publicity and possible reputational damage both to the organisation and to themselves. 
Some participants expressed that any politically contentious comments about the 
current arrangements, if attributed to them, could have negative consequences.  Yet 
some participants spoke about some very sensitive issues freely both on and off the 




they wanted me to hear. I treated the data with a degree of critical reflection but in 
such a politically contentious climate it is often difficult to separate facts from 
perceptions, as I explained above, other sources of information proved useful for 
further corroboration or identifying contradictions in narratives. In cases where 
respondents were not forthcoming, appeared cagey or focused too much on a single 
issue, I had to continue to “establish rapport, trust and an open exchange through 
sensitive probing” to ensure understanding and to prevent the interview from 
becoming a “monologue” (Chell, 1998: 70). I ensured no one else had access to 
sensitive data and that names of individuals were not published or revealed. All quotes 
were anonymised and only non-specific job titles were used for attribution.  
 
I now outline the rationale and a justification for my chosen analytical approach and 
methodology.  
6.4 - Analytical Approach and Methodology: Qualitative research 
 Following Yang (2014: 161), I concur that qualitative methods are most conducive to 
“tracking and mapping the changes and dynamics across time” when studying 
emergent processes of accountability. I adopted a qualitative approach due to the 
paucity of information available about the SPA and how the new arrangements were 
being negotiated in practice. Yang (2014) mounts a defence of qualitative research on 
accountability in public administration and his argument rests on five reasons, these 
are taken in turn below and considered in relation to my research strategy.   
6.4.1 - Understanding Accountability 
Firstly, Yang (2014: 161) argues that accountability is “ill-defined and not well 
understood”. As set out in Chapter 4, ‘governance’ and ‘accountability’ are deployed 
interchangeably in police ‘governance’ literature. The 2012 Act does not define 
accountability, nor does it specify how the SPA should deliver it. Yang’s defence of 
qualitative research is on the basis that through qualitative inquiry, the meaning of 
accountability can be understood and conceptualised following inductive methods. 
However, having a pre-determined framework setting out what accountability means 
from the outset, allowed me to undertake a more deductive approach to analysis (see 




opposed to financial accountability, or individual accountability to law, the reasons for 
which have been explored elsewhere (Chapter 2 and 3), a focused definition of 
accountability as a mechanism (Chapter 4) allowed for a deeper exploration of the 
‘how’ question, and an assessment of the actual processes and mechanisms of 
accountability, in relation to the underlying problems of police governance. Rather 
than engaging in circular conversations about what accountability means, the focus of 
my research remained on exploring and understanding the processes and mechanisms 
of organisational accountability, which was made possible through qualitative inquiry.   
6.4.2 - Accountability in practice  
Secondly, accountability structures and processes are “constantly changing and 
shifting as actors act and interact” (2014: 161). Yang argues:  
 
“Sometimes the changing accountability relationship reflects a cat 
and mouse game between principals and agents. When the 
principal designs an accountability system, the agent does not 
simply comply but learns how to game it. Observing the agent’s 
gaming, the principal will revise the system, leading to further 
gaming. Thus, understanding an accountability system requires 
one to track the mutual adaptation process.” (2014:161) 
 
The problems and the shortcomings of the previous tripartite governance arrangements 
are well-documented in the literature (also, Chapter 2 and 3). The new governance 
arrangements, particularly a single police service and a centralised oversight body 
represent a paradigm shift. Developing Yang’s reference to gaming, in the context of 
the new governance arrangements, not only the rules of the game have changed, the 
playing field has shifted from local government structures to a centralised arena. There 
are new actors too, albeit a number of individuals in the SPA and Police Scotland 
hierarchy had extensive experience of the previous arrangements.  
 
Recent studies have highlighted unintended consequences arising from 
implementation gaps following a new policy, and it is often the case that the 
subsequent structures do not mirror intended policy (Souhami, 2014; Terpstra and 
Fyfe, 2015). In the context of the 2012 Act, the new governance arrangements were 




the early analyses of the 2012 Act by policing scholars Fyfe and Henry (2012) and 
Scott (2013a,2013b). Understanding how the powers and policies set out in the 2012 
Act translated into actual practice, required a qualitative approach. Further, in a 
network governance approach, lines of responsibility are blurred. With several non-
hierarchical actors, placed on a horizontal spectrum, as in the post-2012 police 
governance landscape, it is difficult to ascertain the power relations, which can be 
“complex and uncertain” (Yang, 2012: 256), particularly in terms of who is 
responsible, and in turn, accountable for what. In regards to the previous tripartite 
arrangements, it was argued that  
 
“the real power in Scottish policing is probably revealed where 
those elements in the tripartite system interact. How the system 
actually works, as opposed to what the constitutional formalities 
say, is the crucial - and unseen – factor” (Scott and Wilkie, 2001: 
58).  
 
Therefore, a qualitative approach was necessary to understand the emerging processes 
of accountability and how the SPA’s legislative functions were interpreted and 
operationalised.  
6.4.3 - Accessing Perceptions 
Thirdly, Yang argues that: “while accountability is sometimes understood as a virtue 
or an institutional arrangement, its manifestation or implementation cannot be 
separated from actors’ values, perceptions, interpretations, and strategic responses.” 
(2014: 162) 
 
Despite the scarcity of academic scholarship on the new institutional arrangements, 
the nature and scale of the reforms meant that most of the information was available 
in the form of official policy documents, consultation reports, minutes from public 
meetings, and the 2012 Act itself. The process of reform had also garnered 
considerable interest from local and central politicians, and received extensive 
coverage in the Scottish press. All of these sources of information contributed to the 
data collection (as above, 6.2). However, accessing the perceptions of those involved 
in the reform process and the new governance arrangements was a crucial factor in my 




the “heating up of policing discourse” (Murray and Harkin, 2016: 2), those were the 
silent voices that I wanted to give a voice to. It was particularly important to understand 
how the practitioners themselves perceived their respective roles and responsibilities, 
and the challenges and obstacles they faced.  
 
Whilst the focus of my research is on the practical processes and mechanisms of 
accountability, it was important to get a sense of the rationale behind the reforms, other 
research on criminal justice policy-making in Scotland followed a similar qualitative 
approach (Morrison, 2012). A qualitative approach, and elite interviews allowed me 
to access the perceptions of those involved in the new governance arrangements and 
ask them about their views specifically regarding the perennial problems of police 
governance. For instance, the notion of operational independence of the chief 
constable has been repeatedly identified by police governance literature as one of the 
perennial problems of police governance (Chapter 2). The status of this notion in 
constitutional law has received thorough attention in some of the most seminal 
contributions on police governance (such as Lustgarten, 1986; Walker, 2000). Much 
of the earlier writings on this issue have either focused on the constitutional law 
perspective, or the perspective of the chief constables. It was crucial for this research 
to capture the perceptions of, not only the senior police officers of Police Scotland, but 
also the wider network of stakeholders involved in police governance, specifically the 
members of the SPA about how they perceived the notion of operational independence 
(see, Chapter 7) 
6.4.4 - Accessing Elite networks 
Fourthly, Yang argues that “accountability information is often sensitive and can only 
be collected from individuals or groups that have a special role in society such as public 
figures and leading professionals who are directly involved in accountability 
relationships” (Yang, 2014: 162). Accessing this information requires access to those 
individuals and professionals involved in accountability relationships, and a degree of 





Before the 2012 Act, there were eight local police forces and as many local police 
boards, however, the reforms have led to a convergence of those making policing 
policy, and holding the police to account into small elite networks such the corporate 
executive of Police Scotland, and the executive officers and non-executive board 
members of the SPA. Those who introduced the reforms, i.e. MSPS, and Civil Servants 
also represent already established policy elite (Morrison, 2012). The questions that my 
research poses required access to information that only these elite actors possessed. 
6.4.5 - Identifying crises of accountability  
Finally, “insights about accountability are often gained from accountability crises, 
which are special and naturally occurring events that usually cannot be replicated” 
(Yang, 2014: 162). Yang’s final point about accountability crises was helpful in 
determining the analytical strategy for this research. It has been argued that “like riding 
a bike, policing is the sort of activity that is thought about mainly when the wheel 
comes off. When things are running smoothly it tends to be a socially invisible, 
undiscussed routine” (Reiner, 2000: 9).  As the post-2012 Act arrangements came into 
effect, a catalogue of incidents and scandals marred the first two years of Police 
Scotland and the SPA. The revelations of excessive use of non-statutory stop and 
search powers against minors (Murray, 2014a, 2014b) and the deployment of armed 
officers on routine patrols in the Northern areas of Scotland (Henry et al., 2016) 
signified those crises of accountability that Yang (2014) alluded to.  
 
Both of these issues also served to justify my focus on organisational accountability. 
As the later analysis will show, despite complying with legal obligations, both 
operational policies were deeply controversial and contentious, and reminiscent of the 
state of affairs that the tripartite arrangements were often criticised for. Other ‘crises’ 
of accountability also emerged during the study particularly around the decisions made 
centrally by Police Scotland that had negative consequences for the local communities 
such as the withdrawal of traffic wardens support and the raids on sex-for-sale saunas 
in Edinburgh (see Chapter 7). These ‘crises’ put the spotlight firmly on the role of the 
SPA. The timing of my fieldwork coincided with these events, as they were 




account as case studies to assess the SPA’s approach to police governance and 
accountability.  
 
All of the above arguments posed by Yang (2014), provide a strong justification for 
qualitative inquiry in the study of accountability and, as I have argued above, fit in 
well with the aims of my research. Below, I outline my specific approach to data 
analysis.  
6.5 - Analysis  
I conducted thematic analysis and used qualitative analysis software to aid the process. 
In thematic analysis, it is often the case that a researcher makes conscious decisions to 
ensure the “theoretical framework and methods match what the researcher wants to 
know” (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 80).  The initial literature review identified key 
themes in the police governance literature, - i.e. operational independence and the 
tensions between the local and the central (Chapter 2). These two themes were cast as 
‘perennial’ problems and as argued above (6.1) contributed to ‘the research problem’. 
These two trends became key themes for the entire analytical process. Whilst it has 
been argued that “the keyness of the themes is not necessarily dependent on 
quantifiable measures” (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 82), these two themes were prevalent 
in all of the studies on police governance in Britain. (For instance, Marshall, 1965; 
Lustgarten, 1986; Reiner and Spencer, 1993; Walker, 2000; Donnelly and Scott, 
2002a,2002b; Jones, 2008; Scott, 2011; Reiner, 2010, 2013).  
 
A qualitative data analysis software NVivo was used to organise these two themes, 
along with others that emerged through the literature review (see fig. 6.1).  
 
 






In fig. 6.1, the numbers in the last two columns represent prevalence in sources, and 
the number of times each theme was mentioned, however, NVivo was not used solely 
as a method for thematic analysis. As Gibbs has noted “a major function of the 
software is to help organize the analysis” (2013:277, emphasis my own). Whilst I used 
NVivo to organise electronic sources such as journal articles and policy documents, I 
used other more traditional methods of thematic analysis in conjunction with NVivo, 
such as manual labelling, and coding. Due to the pre-identified themes and trends, and 
the specific focus of this study on police organisational accountability (see above, 6.4), 
a deductive approach to analysis was my primary modus operandi. Braun and Clarke 
have argued that “researchers cannot free themselves of their theoretical and 
epistemological commitments, and data are not coded in an epistemological vacuum”, 
however, this may produce analysis that is “less a rich description of the data” but a 
more “detailed analysis of some aspect of the data” (2006: 84). 
 
All interviews were fully transcribed and the quotes most relevant to the pre-defined 
themes were coded as such. However, during this stage of the analysis, the demarcation 
between ‘deductive’ and ‘inductive’ analysis became blurred. Some new themes 
became prevalent during the analysis, that did not fit into the existing pre-defined 
themes. For instance, in fig. 6.2 below, whilst ‘operational independence’ and ‘local v 
central tensions’ were pre-defined themes, other more specific themes emerged such 
as ‘Ministerial Involvement’ and ‘Turf Wars’. These were often raised explicitly by 
the interviewees.   
 




In order to ensure that these key themes were not just the perceptions of my 
interviewees, I drew on other data such as policy documents and official sources such 
as Audit Scotland’s inspection reports. This ensured greater validity as I was able to 
corroborate what my interviewees were saying with the discourses at the time.  
 
The development of the conceptual and analytical framework outlined in Chapter 5, 
was also fluid and iterative and took place over a period of time. The initial themes for 
the key characteristics of the proposed epistocratic arrangement were drawn from the 
literature as I argued in Chapter 5 (5.4), however, the ongoing analysis of the 
interviews helped mould and shape the framework (see fig. 6.3 below).  
 
 
The issue of ‘Ministerial Involvement’ for instance, was raised by several interviewees 
particularly from the SPA (discussed in Chapter 8), this helped consolidate and 
confirm ‘Autonomy’ as a key characteristic for the proposed framework, which had 
already emerged from the notion of ‘distribution of power’ as a key principle of 
democratic governance (Chapter 5, 5.1). Similarly, during my interviews and the 
ongoing analysis of the SPA, it became clear that deliberative principles had become 
implicit in the SPA’s approach to police governance and accountability (Chapter 9), 
confirming and consolidating the pre-defined characteristic of ‘Deliberation’ in the 
framework.  
Figure 6.3 - Left: Development stages of the conceptual and analytical framework,  





Inherently, the conceptual framework for an ‘epistocratic and deliberative’ approach 
to police governance outlined in Chapter 5, is inspired by the vision and the conceptual 
model of the SPA. In conceptual terms, the framework has a strong theoretical 
foundation and may be adapted and applied in different contexts. However, in the 
context of police governance and accountability, the analysis of the SPA provides a 
strong empirical basis for the framework.  
6.5.1 - Presentation of the findings 
Whilst the analysis was iterative, the findings will be presented in two structured ways. 
Firstly, I will present my findings on how the SPA tackled the perennial problems of 
police governance (outlined in Chapter 2) in its formative years, addressing the 
primary research question - i.e. to what extent, if at all, has the SPA resolved, or 
exacerbated, the perennial problems of police governance? These findings will be 
presented in Chapter 7. In particular, the analysis will focus on: 
 
Operational Independence: 
• Did the manifestation of this doctrine result in tensions and weak 
accountability mechanisms, in the formative years of the SPA? 
• What is the status of the notion of operational independence in the post-2012 
governance landscape? 
 
Local versus central: 
• Has the SPA emerged as an intermediary between the local and the central by 
sufficiently balancing competing interests? 
 
Further, in Chapters 8-9, the analysis will provide an evaluative analysis of the SPA’s 
Composition, Power, Autonomy and examine the ways in which principles of 
Deliberation were manifest in its approach to delivering police accountability. Finally, 
I will focus on the more forward looking analysis of the SPA and examine if an 




resolve the perennial problems of police governance. Specifically, as noted in Chapter 
5 (5.5), the findings will focus on these specific questions: 
 
Composition:  
• Does the SPA’s composition reflect epistocratic credentials?  
• If so, what knowledge, competencies and skills are reflected in its composition? 
• Is the knowledge composition of the SPA sufficient for the purposes of police 
governance? 
• Does the composition of the SPA reflect a broad demography? 
 
Power: 
• Has the SPA been able to implement its statutory powers into effective 
mechanisms of police governance and accountability? 
• Does the SPA have sufficient influence to fulfil its functions to deliver police 
organisational accountability? 
• Does the SPA have sufficient resources to carry out its statutory functions? 
 
Autonomy: 
• Is the SPA sufficiently independent of the Scottish Ministers, Police Scotland, 
and local government? 
• Are the members able to fulfil their statutory functions without interference? 
 
Deliberation: 
• Are deliberative principles manifest in the SPA’s approach to proactive 
scrutiny and retrospective accountability? 










PART IV - FINDINGS 
Chapter 7 - The Scottish Police Authority and the perennial problems 
of police governance 
 
This chapter deals with the primary research aims. The first section (7.1) provides an 
overview of the SPA’s organisational structure and analyses its initial approach to 
delivering police organisational accountability. Whilst the 2012 Act provided a 
legislative framework for the new governance arrangements, it did not prescribe how 
those powers should be implemented in practice. Instead the implementation of the 
new arrangements was left to negotiated agreement between the new stakeholders. As 
I argued in Chapter 3, the official reform agenda focused on strengthening financial 
accountability and national governance. Consequently, the perennial problems of 
police governance, i.e. the operational independence doctrine, and the tussle between 
the local and the central, were left unresolved. In section 7.2, I argue that these 
perennial problems that rendered the tripartite governance arrangements weak and 
ineffective (Chapter 2), manifested in the most abrasive fashion following the 2012 
Act. A series of scandals and high profile cases highlighted shortcomings in the new 
governance arrangements. By drawing on the perceptions of stakeholders (see Chapter 
6, 6.2.2 - Elite Interviews), I examine how these problems manifested at a time when 
the SPA was developing as an organisation, contributing to the SPA’s inability to 
deliver effective mechanisms of police accountability in its formative years.   
7.1 - Demystifying the SPA’s role in police accountability 
When the reforms came into effect, the SPA was a new organisation with very little 
public facing information about how it would carry out its role. Consequently, the first 
research aim was underpinned by the ‘how’ question, and this section deals with it 
explicitly by outlining the SPA’s organisational structure, formal powers, and an 
analysis of how its powers of police accountability were initially developed and 




7.1.1 - Organisational structure 
The SPA comprises of non-executive board members, including a Chair, with overall 
responsibilities of governance of the SPA, and Police Scotland. The board members 
are supported by executive officers, a full-time Senior Management Group (SMG), 
responsible for the day-to-day running of the SPA. When the SPA came into effect on 
the 01st of April 2013, it had thirteen non-executive board members, and it was led by 
the former Chair Vic Emery. The SMG comprised of executive officers in key roles 
that include a Chief Executive Officer, Director of Communications, Director of 
Forensic Services, Director of Financial Accountability, Director of Strategy and 
Performance, and a Director of Governance and Assurance.  
 
The chair of the SPA is responsible for the organisation, and forms a link between 
other non-executive board members and the Scottish Ministers, and may be called to 
account by the Scottish Parliament (The Scottish Government, 2014: para. 11-12). The 
Chief Executive Officer is the designated ‘Accountable Officer’27, answerable to the 
Scottish Parliament for the organisational functioning of the SPA, including all matters 
related to financial management, regularity, and expenditure (The Scottish 
Government, 2014: para. 15). Whilst the financing of the previous local police forces 
was shared between central and local government (Chapter 2 and 3), under the new 
arrangements, the SPA has responsibility for the entire budget of Police Scotland. 
When both organisations came into effect, the SPA was allocated £1.1 billion for 
annual spending, and it was financially responsible for 24,000 people, including 
17,496 police officers (Audit Scotland, 2013: 5). By the end of the reporting period 
2015/16, 97 per cent of the SPA’s budgets were spent on policing, 2.3 per cent on 
forensics, and 0.4 per cent on the SPA’s own maintenance (SPA, 2016a). In effect, the 
SPA is the legal employer of all civilian and police staff of Police Scotland, however, 
while it can appoint the civilian staff, the recruitment of police constables is under the 
scope of the chief constable’s powers of direction and control of the police 
organisation. The SPA does have formal powers to appoint senior officers of rank 
                                                 
27 The role and function of an Accountable Officer is established in the Public Finance and 




assistant chief constable or above, or senior civil staff for Police Scotland’s Senior 
Executive Team, in consultation with the chief constable.  
 
The purpose for this overview above is to highlight the complexity of the governance 
arrangements introduced by the 2012 Act. Whilst the SPA is the formal employer of 
Police Scotland, they are effectively two different organisations, with their own chains 
of command and management structures. Whilst an employer-employee relationship 
exists in formal legal terms, in practice the relationship dynamic between the two 
organisations is anything but hierarchical. In addition, whilst the SPA has financial 
leverage over Police Scotland, its own corporate resources are a fraction of the second 
largest police force in Britain. The impact of these issues on the SPA’s own capacity, 
power and autonomy is examined in greater detail in Chapter 8. But the complexities 
of the new governance arrangements become even more pronounced when considering 
the ambiguities in the legislative framework (also, see Chapter 3, 3.4), particularly in 
relation to the SPA’s role in managing and delivering organisational accountability, as 
explained below.  
7.1.2 - The Legal Ambiguities  
As I argued at length in Chapter 3 (see 3.4), whilst the reform agenda focused on 
enhancing national governance, and financial accountability, there was a distinct lack 
of focus on enhancing the organisational accountability mechanisms. This omission 
became apparent in the ambiguities in the 2012 legislative framework. The only 
explicit reference to ‘accountability’ in the 2012 Act is framed as a duty on the SPA 





There was no accompanying guidance or a public facing policy white paper outlining 
how the SPA would manage and deliver accountability, and much of it was largely left 
to negotiated agreement. This appears to be a conscious decision on part of the reform 
team: 
 
“we didn’t want to prescribe too much … you’ve got to set out 
that [legislative] framework in sufficient levels of detail but 
without being too prescriptive … it would be about the practice of 
that” – (Interview: Civil Servant) 
 
In addition to leaving the interpretation of the Act open to negotiation between the 
stakeholders, it appears that the wording of the 2012 Act was also left broad,   
 
“The maintenance of the police force, and all that, that statutory 
language I think it's pretty much the same as before, in relation to 
police governance responsibilities” – (Interview: Civil Servant) 
 
 
In replicating the language of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 in key areas related to 
police governance and accountability, the 2012 Act has also repeated the vagueness 
and ambiguities associated with the patchy governance arrangements that preceded it 
(Chapter 2 and 3). The 2012 Act, much like its predecessor, is decidedly vague and 
unclear about how the SPA’s powers could translate into actual processes and 
mechanisms of accountability. An opposition MSP indicated that the ambiguities in 
the legislation were identified when the Bill was being discussed in the Parliament: 
 
Functions of the SPA 
(1) The Authority’s main functions are—  
(a) to maintain the Police Service,  
(b) to promote the policing principles set out in section 32,  
(c) to promote and support continuous improvement in the policing of Scotland,  
(d) to keep under review the policing of Scotland,  
(e) to hold the chief constable to account for the policing of Scotland (including, in particular, the 
chief constable’s carrying out of the duties imposed by or mentioned in section 17). 




“I think the governance is weak, we argued from the outset that 
there were shortcomings in the Bill that would lead to problems, 
we didn’t realise the scale of the problems but have always been 
very concerned about the governance, about the relationship 
between the government, the chief constable and the board [the 
SPA] and also the lack of accountability locally” – (Interview: 
MSP, LibDem).  
 
The above quote by a Liberal Democrat MSP, notwithstanding the fact that the Scottish 
Liberals vigorously opposed the centralisation of the police (see for instance, Scottish 
Liberal Democrats Manifesto, 2011: 72), highlights several key strands such as weak 
structures of governance and accountability and a lack of clarity in terms of how the 
‘new’ tripartite relationship would play out in practice. These issues are discussed in-
depth below (section 7.2), and throughout the findings chapters (for instance, see 
Chapter 8, 8.2 - Power). However, I first outline below how, despite the legal 
ambiguities, the SPA developed its own accountability role after it came into effect.    
7.1.3 - Accountability Structures 
When it came to the implementation of accountability mechanisms and processes, the 
SPA framed its initial approach to accountability in terms of ‘scrutiny’ and agreed on 
a three-pronged approach at a board meeting in June, 2013 (SPA, 2013a) which was 
consolidated in a later document (Whyte, 2013). Drawing on the definition of scrutiny 
by the Centre for Public Scrutiny, the accountability function of the SPA was framed 
as ‘a critical friend’ in the policy making stage (further explored in Chapter 9), and the 
‘holding to account against stated aims’ in the more formal public accountability stage 
(Whyte, 2013: 23). In practice, the SPA agreed that its accountability processes would 
be implemented in three ways:  
 
a) Scrutiny Discussion: Important points would be added as a standing item on 
the agenda and discussed at a private or a public meeting, depending on the 
sensitivity surrounding the issue. Any information regarding the topic would 
be requested from Police Scotland, and other stakeholders and the non-
executive members of the SPA will be able to ask questions, any action points 




b) Scrutiny Inquiry: Between two or three non-executive members would 
conduct an inquiry on a specific matter of concern. Members may be able to 
consult with a cross-section of stakeholders and produce the findings within 
the agreed timescale in front of the whole SPA board for discussion.  
c) Scrutiny Review: A brief, more specific review into any matter of concern can 
be conducted by a short-term working group. The group can consult or seek 
advice from external stakeholders, and a final report is submitted to the board 
and other stakeholders.  
(SPA, 2013a: para.6). 
 
 
In light of the above, the public accountability of policing is managed by the SPA 
through scrutiny discussions that take place at the Public Board Meetings (PBMs). 
Similar to the proceedings at the previous local police boards, a performance report is 
published on behalf of the chief constable, which is then scrutinised by the non-
executive board members. The Chief Constable is required to attend the PBMs, along 
with the relevant senior officers of the senior executive team, and answer questions on 
pertinent issues, as well as apprising members of the SPA of any significant events 
since the last PBM. The frequency of the PBMs is varied, in 2013, 14 meetings were 
held across Scotland, whereas 9 meetings were held in 2014 and 8 meetings were held 
in 2015, including a ‘Special Board Meeting’ on Stop and Search. When the SPA came 
into effect, the PBMs were assisted by four working committees focusing on the 
different work streams identified by the SPA board. Between April 2013 and March 
2016, the committees were Audit and Risk Committee, Complaints and Conduct 
Committee, HR and Remuneration Committee, and Finance and Investment 
Committee. All committees were composed of non-executive board members, and 
were open to the public with issues of a sensitive nature discussed in private. However, 
following the governance review in 2016, the complaints and conduct committee was 




committees” rather than “decision-making committees” and it was recommended that 
these meetings be held in private28 (Flanagan, 2016: 30).  
 
In addition to the PBMs, the SPA has carried out a Scrutiny Inquiry into armed 
policing (2015) and a Scrutiny Review on Stop and Search (2014). Both matters are 
discussed in detail below (see, 7.2.1).  In addition to the three formal scrutiny stages, 
there are continuous informal, private meetings between executive officers of the SPA 
and senior officers from Police Scotland and other stakeholders such as HMICS, and 
civil servants, pointing towards a more deliberative style of proactive scrutiny as the 
new governance arrangements have continued to develop and evolve in the last three 
years (see Chapter 9).  
 
Despite the legal ambiguities, the SPA’s initial efforts in establishing mechanisms of 
police organisational accountability reflected considerable scope for proactive 
scrutiny, as well as retrospective public accountability. However, during the three 
years since its inception, there was a consistent view across the Scottish political 
landscape that the SPA had failed in its duties to implement effective mechanisms and 
processes of police accountability (CoSLA, 2014: paras. 24-25; Justice Sub-
Committee, 2016: 5, paras. 18-19). The political opponents of the SNP Government 
had no qualms in expressing that the SPA had failed in its governance role, and did 
not deliver any meaningful accountability: 
 
“There was such a gap in accountability that the parliament 
moved to set up the Sub-committee within a year of the police 
[reforms] we had set up, we felt that there was so little 
accountability that the parliament itself had to actually take steps 
and we constituted the policing sub-committee which is a cross 
party group. It doesn’t carry a government majority interest, we 
made a point of setting it up in a way that it was hoped that we 
would operate in a non-political way but in a very serious scrutiny 
role and I think it has served that role quite well. And I think it has 
                                                 
28 This decision has caused considerable controversy for the SPA recently. One non-executive board 
member resigned after raising concerns around transparency at a PBM on 15th December, 2016. The 
matter was discussed by the Scottish Parliament’s Public Audit and Post-legislative Scrutiny Committee 
on the 2nd March, 2017 and concerns have been raised by HM Chief Inspector for Constabulary in 
Scotland in a letter addressed to the Chair of the SPA. At a PBM on the 22nd of March 2017, the SPA 




highlighted the shortcomings of the SPA, because each and 
everything that we actually brought the police to account on, the 
SPA hadn’t considered”  
– (Interview: MSP, LibDem).  
 
 
“…oversight is absent at local level and there is no direction which 
delivers national accountability for the executive, no genuine 
governance... they [the SPA] knew what the issues were but they 
failed to take responsibility seriously, and to ask the difficult 
questions, and to stand up and be counted”  
– (Interview: MSP, Lab). 
   
The consensus among some of the most prominent policing scholars, and politicians 
from all sides of the political spectrum in Scotland was that the SPA was failing in its 
statutory duties to hold the chief constable to account (Murray, 2015a; Pearson, 2015). 
Critics of the SPA labelled it a “toothless” organisation (McDonald, Daily Record, 
2015), a term that had been routinely employed in the past to describe the local police 
authorities (Chapter 2), and a former leader of the SNP called for the abolition of the 
SPA (Sanderson, Herald Scotland, 2015).  
 
The perception that the SPA’s processes and mechanisms of accountability were 
inadequate prevailed because of a series of high profile scandals and controversies, or 
to use Yang’s (2014) term, ‘crises of accountability’ within the first two years of the 
reforms. The perennial problems of police governance, that existed prior to the new 
governance arrangements, were exacerbated following the 2012 Act. There were clear 
indications that at least in its formative years, the SPA had not been able to resolve the 
underlying problems of police governance.  
7.2 - The perennial problems revisited 
I argued in Chapter 2 that organisational accountability mechanisms during the 
previous tripartite governance arrangements were weak and ineffective due to the 
perennial problems of police governance, i.e. the operational independence doctrine 
and the perpetual tussle between local and central government for control over the 
police. These problems were predicated in the inherent ambiguities in the previous 




and the subsequent 2012 legislative framework, did not address these concerns 
(Chapter 3, also see above). Consequently, the perennial problems of police 
governance manifested more profoundly following the 2012 Act.  Several highly 
contentious operational policies, outlined below, indicated an apparent intent of the 
then Police Scotland’s senior executive team to maintain, and at times vigorously 
defend the sanctity of, the operational independence doctrine. Further, whilst the SPA 
had an overall legislative duty to hold the Chief Constable to account, the duties of 
local scrutiny were delegated to the local authorities.  This separation of roles and 
responsibilities created two complex tripartite relationships. Firstly, between the SPA, 
Police Scotland and the Scottish Government (discussed in Chapter 8), and secondly 
between the Local Scrutiny Committees, Police Scotland and the SPA (discussed 
below, 7.2.2). The manifestation of these unresolved problems, following the 2012 
Act, marked a turbulent first three years of the SPA and Police Scotland, as both 
organisations became subject of heightened political and media interest, and 
controversy (Murray, 2015a; Murray and Harkin, 2016; Lennon and Murray, 2016). 
The analysis of the SPA, in relation to the conceptual and analytical framework 
outlined in Chapter 5, will delve deeper into the reasons for the SPA’s own 
shortcomings (Chapter 8), and examine the recent developments that indicate a more 
positive turn towards a potential resolution of these problems (Chapter 9). The 
following sections give an overview of the incidents and scandals that caused the crises 
of accountability, followed by the perceptions of my interviewees in relation to the 
perennial problems in the post-2012 police governance landscape.   
7.2.1 - Operational Independence  
In the lead-up to the reforms, the issue of operational independence was not raised in 
the official policy circles, except by HMICS (Laing and Fossey, 2011), as one that 
needed resolving (Chapter 3) despite the extensive coverage this notion has received 
in police governance and accountability literature in Britain (Marshall, 1965; 
Lustgarten, 1986; Walker, 2000; Donnelly and Scott, 2002a; Jones, 2008; Scott, 2011; 
Reiner, 2013). As recently as 2011, the general wisdom in the Scottish policing 
landscape held that “decision-making in operational policing” was “the preserve of the 




Parliament, but prior to the reforms taking effect, the matter was picked up in the 
Justice Committee hearing on the 27th November 2012. To which, the previous 
Inspector of HMICS, Andrew Laing replied as such: 
 
We are back in the muddy territory where we have always been in 
that regard. Members might recall that in the run-up to the 2012 
act, I made a strong plea that we get a clear—or as clear as 
possible—determination about what I called operational 
independence and what John McNeill said was operational 
responsibility. The 2012 act has not covered that grey area, so it 
still exists (Andrew Laing, former HMICS, Justice Committee 
Hearing, 27th November, 2012: 2114) 
 
The conceptual and legal ambiguities aside, the practical implication of leaving this 
notion undefined, and unresolved, became evident in the most abrasive manner once 
the single force became operational. On the 01st of April 2013, the then Chief 
Constable Sir Stephen House issued a Standing Firearms Authority to deploy armed 
officers attached to Armed Response Vehicles (ARVs) on routine patrols throughout 
Scotland. The presence of armed officers on routine patrols in Northern areas of 
Scotland, with traditionally low levels of crime, caused unprecedented levels of 
political controversy and extensive coverage in the local and national media (see for 
instance, Daily Record, 2014). The policy became operational without prior 
consultation with the SPA (Justice Sub-Committee, 2014: 481-482), or the local 
authorities of the areas affected. After intense media scrutiny, the senior officers within 
Police Scotland vehemently defended the Chief Constable’s independence over 
operational decision making (Livingstone, 2014). The former Cabinet Secretary for 
Justice, Kenny MacAskill, responsible for the reforms, also defended the notion in the 
Scottish Parliament:  
 
“The decision where and when to deploy resources has always 
been an operational matter for the chief constable, who has the 
power to make decisions about the necessary and proportionate 
use of firearms. That position has not changed with the 
introduction of a single force” - (Kenny MacAskill, Meeting of the 





Similarly, Murray’s research into the use of stop and search powers in Scotland 
(2014a, 2015a) also highlighted excessive use of non-statutory29 stop and search. The 
target-driven culture instilled from the top signified how closely police operational 
policy is related to policing style and tactics, matters that would nominally be 
considered as ‘operational’. Police Scotland’s policy on stop and search had its roots 
in the previous Strathclyde Police force, led by the same chief constable, Sir Stephen 
House, and it was argued by observers that this represented a ‘Strathclydisation’ of 
policing culture in Scotland (Scott, 2014; Terpstra and Fyfe, 2015). The practical 
implications of this approach meant that the rates of stop and search in Scotland were 
four times higher than in England and Wales, and disproportionately targeted young 
children (Murray, 2014b: 3-4). Whilst the bulk of the data looked at the stop and search 
rates before the reforms, Murray’s research showed that the use of non-statutory stop 
and search had increased markedly under the newly centralised Police Scotland 
(2014a: 3). The use of stop and search powers, and how it was operationalised and 
exercised, was also identified as an issue within the operational domain of the chief 
constable and the policy was defended initially by Police Scotland and the Scottish 
Government (Hutcheon, 2015). However, continued pressure, mostly arising from 
academics, the media and politicians led to an independent review (Scott, 2015), a 
subsequent change in legislation, and the abolishment of non-statutory stop and search 
powers (Murray and Harkin, 2016: 1-2). 
 
The unresolved doctrine of operational independence cast serious doubts over the 
ability of the SPA to deliver organisational accountability of operational policing as it 
was highlighted during these ‘crises of accountability’.  These cases came to the fore 
at a time when the SPA was still negotiating its role and powers (see Chapter 8), and 
developing as an organisation. The intense media and political scrutiny of both Police 
Scotland’s operational policies, and the SPA’s inability to deliver effective 
mechanisms of accountability, created an opportunity for those in the Scottish policing 
landscape to engage more openly with the vague, yet sacred, operational independence 
                                                 
29 Non-statutory stop and search does not require reasonable suspicion; it is simply based on verbal 




doctrine. However, my interviews generated mixed responses on the issue, as I explore 
further below.  
7.2.1.a - Perceptions of stakeholders 
The persistent ambiguity regarding the notion of operational independence was 
reemphasised during my research. All my interviewees were immersed in the Scottish 
policing landscape and represented elite policy circles (see Methodology, Chapter 6), 
yet none could offer a consistent definition or description of the notion of operational 
independence. Each respondent gave a different interpretation of what they thought 
operational independence means, and the most common explanation centred around 
the boundary between deployment of resources or specific police operations and 
general policing policy. I have argued in detail in Chapter 2, by drawing on Lustgarten 
(1986) and Walker (2000) that this is a false distinction and the perceived boundary 
between policy and deployment is blurred. Police policies determine where police 
resources are deployed, and how the operations are carried out, as well as specific 
policing style.  The views and perceptions of those intimately involved in the 
implementation of the reforms, reiterated the complex and often undefinable nature of 
this concept that could have benefitted from some official clarity at a time of such 
wide-ranging structural reform, as noted by an opposition MSP: 
 
“I called for a debate about whether or not the chief constable’s 
powers need to be codified, and like you, I get lots of different 
answers, people think that there is a framework but nobody can 
actually describe what that framework is” – (Interview: MSP, 
LibDem).  
 
During my conversations with the stakeholders, the topic of operational independence 
often resulted in a deep sigh, followed by a very thoughtful and contemplative reply, 
as if I had touched on ‘something-that-everyone-knows-exists-but-no-one-quite-
wants-to-talk-about’. Yet, everyone did make attempts to describe or define it. If 
placed on a spectrum, the definitions ranged from ‘everything in the domain of the 
chief constable, is an operational matter’, through the age-old ‘distinction between 
policy and deployment’, to the view that ‘chief constable, like any public figure is 




open to scrutiny and a change of direction’. Between those succinct definitions there 
were some rather peculiar descriptions:  
 
“Now, it seems to me that policing is like a bus, the actual driver 
of the bus is in charge of deciding manoeuvres and getting 
through traffic, the route is decided by senior management at SPA. 
But they leave the driver to get on with driving the bus to the 
route. Policing is similar... the operational independence part of it 
is the bit about the bus driver. No one should or would tell a chief 
constable how to police the streets that’s what professional 
policing is about. However, in deciding the tactics that are to be 
used and in deciding how he will deal with his resources I think 
it’s quite proper that he should go to the committee [the SPA 
board] beforehand and say here’s what my plan is, here’s why I 
am planning to do it this way, here’s how much it will cost and 
here’s how I am going to use my staff, so if you could take a look 
at it and say that’s sensible” – (Interview: MSP, Lab). 
 
 
The latter part of the above quote indeed clarifies that everything in the domain of the 
chief constable should be open for discussion, the stance I took in Chapter 2. Perhaps 
the description closest to the traditional view of operational independence, 
unsurprisingly came from a senior officer: 
 
“Well operational independence obviously is one subject we don’t 
really like to discuss as you well know but operational 
independence for me is allowing the chief constable and his, we’ll 
say his because it is a him just now, his command team to make 
those decisions that are decreed from all the information and 
intelligence available to be the right decision” – (Interview: 
Ch/Supt, Police Scotland) 
 
However, the above view could arguably be superseded by a more measured response, 
from a more senior officer, who described the broad contours of the doctrine as such: 
 
“I don’t actually think there is a kind of defined bucket of activity 
that is purely the Chief Constable’s autonomous area of work, 
there are clearly issues that the Chief and the Chief alone has to 
take responsibility for, when we are talking about sensitive 
policing tactics, or the dealing with serious and organised crime or 
terrorist matters child protection, some huge areas of 
vulnerability … there’s legislation to prevent us talking about 




and measures there to make sure that there’s one person who has 
that responsibility… these things are real, that said they are in the 
minority of areas and it is in the extreme end of the business and 
for the vast bulk of issues including stop and search and including 
firearms there is absolutely no reason that we should not be 
discussing that openly with our police authority colleagues and to 
some extent jointly developing policy in a very transparent and in 
a kind of clear cut way” – (Interview: DCC, Police Scotland, 
emphasis added.).  
 
The use of the term operational responsibility, by the DCC, is in keeping with the long 
held position propagated by the Patten Commission (1999) that every public office 
holder was operationally responsible and not independent. The precise definition of 
operational responsibility is offered as such:  
 
“Operational responsibility means that it is the Chief Constable’s 
right and duty to take operational decisions, and that neither the 
government nor the Policing Board should have the right to direct 
the Chief Constable as to how to conduct an operation. It does not 
mean, however, that the Chief Constable’s conduct of an 
operational matter should be exempted from inquiry or review 
after the event by anyone” – (Patten Commission, 1999: 32). 
 
Following the armed policing controversy, HMICS conducted a review of Police 
Scotland’s Standing Firearms Authority and along other recommendations, it also 
recommended that the SPA and Police Scotland should consider the notion of 
“operational responsibility” (HMICS, 2014: 10). Whilst Patten’s recommendation, and 
the general notion of operational responsibility provides a safeguard against undue 
external influence in day-to-day operations, it does not offer sufficient clarity on the 
matter when considering accountability of police operational policies. In particular, 
the notion of operational responsibility does not provide clarity on whether 
accountability bodies can intervene before-the-fact, if prospective operational policies 
were deemed to potentially cause a negative public impact. For instance, consider the 
case of armed response vehicles being deployed on routine patrols without prior public 
consultation, or scrutiny. Such operational decisions would merit an intervention by 
legitimate accountability bodies, ideally on a proactive basis at the policy-making 
stage. Traditionally it is precisely this point where there has been increased likelihood 




the case with the previous local police authorities (Marshall, 1965; Lustgarten, 1986; 
Oliver, 1987; Walker, 2000; Reiner, 2010).   
 
Whilst the 2012 Act is decidedly vague on the matter, the most surprising aspect during 
my interviews was that the SPA, as a governing body, as a body with a formal duty to 
hold the chief constable to account, did not have an ‘organisational view’ on the matter. 
In the aftermath of the armed policing case, the former Chair Vic Emery came out 
publicly and stated that: 
 
“The return of this phrase “operational independence” to the 
airwaves is one of the more unfortunate aspects of comment over 
armed policing. The term is nowhere in the legislation that 
underpins policing. In the past many have been seduced by the 
desire to define the concept. They failed. I hope that we do not get 
distracted down that road again” – (Vic Emery, 2014)  
 
The statement by the former SPA Chair might have signalled a clear stance on the 
issue, however, at a Justice Sub-Committee hearing on armed policing, Mr. Emery 
acknowledged that the decision to deploy armed officers on routine patrols was within 
the operational independence of the chief constable, by virtue of his statutory 
responsibilities of ‘direction and control’ of Police Scotland (Justice Sub-Committee, 
2014: 480). What contributed to this change of stance is discussed in Chapter 8 (see 
8.2 and 8.3), but during my interviews with the SPA executive officers and non-
executive board members, the breadth of the SPA’s lack of clarity on the issue became 
apparent: 
 
“… there are such things as tactical operations which we would 
have no business knowing about because actually it is only the 
police who can run them, who have the knowledge to run them ... 
I don’t know because depending on the subject there would be 
different levels of interest and ultimately it depends on the impact 
in the end. So, I suppose policy vs deployment. - (Interview: 
Executive Officer A, SPA) 
 
“…no one in the SPA who has ever thought about second 
guessing operational responsibility or the decisions within the 
operational responsibility of the chief constable. We have always 




policy decisions and I think there’s probably been confusion about 
the terminology as well, policing has used policy as operating 
procedures and SOPs … and the police regard them as policies, 
for those of us who don’t come from a policing background we 
wouldn’t see it as policy. - (Interview: Executive Officer B, SPA) 
 
“…the Chief Constable has quite a lot of control and 
independence over day to day operational movement of the force. 
And I think that’s right, it should be that way we shouldn’t be 
interfering in any individual operation that’s absolutely clear. I 
think what we need to do though is get to a stage where we are 
better able to scrutinise the sum total of results of what is going on 
and say well how are you using your resources across the 
board…” - (Interview: Board Member A, SPA) 
 
“Well there’s a question! I think it's really interesting, I don’t think 
you can define it easily it’s almost a case by case thing. We have 
had again in the public domain issues played out where the Chief 
Constable has felt that something was an operational matter and 
we have felt that it wasn’t operational it was strategic so examples 
would be things like traffic wardens…” - (Interview: Board 
Member B, SPA) 
 
“Where there is a policy decision, it is absolutely legitimate for the 
government and politicians, and parliament, and the local 
authorities and for the SPA, to have a view and the police must 
give due regard to that view. I think the police would say it's all 
operational, it's not, it's policy, sending out armed officers with 
guns was a policy decision” - (Interview: Board Member C, SPA) 
 
 
“Of course there has to be operational independence but it has to 
be written around the spirit of co-operation, mutual 
understanding and respect…even though you have operational 
independence, there is a higher order duty called common sense” 
- (Interview: Board Member D, SPA) 
 
The purpose for outlining a summary of responses by all members of the SPA that I 
interviewed, alongside the perceptions of those involved in the Scottish policing and 
policy landscape, is to glean a sufficient understanding of what the notion of 
operational independence means in the context of the new police governance 
landscape. It is not the purpose of this study to put forward a definitive definition of 




responses highlight some key ideas that could perhaps contribute to a clearer more 
forward-looking understanding of the concept 
7.2.1.b - Discussion: ‘Operational Accountability’ 
The most complete description on the matter, consistent with my arguments in Chapter 
2 and above, came from a senior police officer who was serving at HMICS at the time: 
 
 “HMI has a very clear view on this…operational 
independence is a red herring … Chief Constables have from time 
immemorial used operational independence as a way to say butt 
out I'm going to do what I want to do … it's about operational 
accountability and, everything that chief constable does, he can be 
asked questions about, by legitimate individuals whether it's the 
SPA or the Parliament” - (Interview: HMICS) 
 
Taking the term ‘operational accountability’ and based on the key ideas that emerge 
from the perceptions above, the broad contours of operational independence and 
principles of organisational accountability in the contemporary police governance 
landscape can be sketched out.  Firstly, in agreement with the DCC’s quote (see above) 
and the notion of operational responsibility, I accept that a chief constable would 
ultimately have responsibility for areas of high sensitivity such as intelligence-led 
operations, and counter-terrorism. Disasters and emergencies too would require an 
immediate response from the police, in which case the command and control 
machinery would be activated with the chief constable along with the senior executive 
team at the helm of affairs. Potentially faced with tough choices under difficult 
circumstances, the experts at dealing with risk (Ericson, 1994) will have to draw on 
their skills, resources and capacity to respond to situations. In those exceptional cases, 
it would be unreasonable to expect a chief constable to gain clearance from the police 
authority, or from any local or central politician. The unfortunate shooting of Jean 
Charles De Menezes took place following an intense manhunt for a suspected suicide 
bomber. Whilst the subsequent Stockwell One report (IPCC, 2007) and the 
Metropolitan Police Authority’s own scrutiny report (MPA, 2008) made wide-ranging 
recommendations, there was no question that operational decision-making during the 
incident was within the scope of responsibilities of the senior officers of the 





Secondly, specific police operations that involve an arrest, or investigation, a response 
to a specific crime or a public order event, may also require tactical operations, for 
which it would not be appropriate for the SPA, or a local or central politician to 
interfere, in essence maintaining the traditional notion of ‘constabulary independence’. 
A caveat to such a notion would be that the Lord Advocate does have powers to instruct 
the police to carry out investigations pertaining to its powers of prosecution.  
 
Thirdly, there are permanent “ethical and legal obligations” that prevent the police to 
share specific information particularly related to individual cases (Harkin, 2015: 733). 
However, in all those cases, it would be entirely appropriate for legitimate 
accountability forums, to seek answers and explanations, reasons and justification, 
after the event.  
 
In all other cases concerning day-to-day policing, deployment of specialist resources, 
policing tactics, strategy, priorities, or indeed the movement and allocation of forces, 
or any policing operation or policy that could potentially cause a public impact, must 
be open for both proactive scrutiny, whilst the policies are taking shape, and 
retrospective accountability. It is a democratic responsibility of central and locally 
elected representatives to seek answers about the number of police officers available 
for the policing of their local area or constituency, or to ask the police to review 
policing tactics such as stop and search, if those tactics are deemed to be causing an 
adverse effect in the community. The principle of democratic policing requires the 
police to be responsive to reasonable demands of the electorate (Jones et al., 1996; 
Aitchison and Blaustein, 2013). It is essential to distinguish between proactive scrutiny 
of prospective policing policies, and interfering in the course of duty of a police 
constable in exercising their discretion. The long held legal view that the difference 
between a constable and a chief constable is one of rank alone (Lustgarten, 1986: 60-
61) needs to be revised in light of the wide-ranging responsibilities of the senior 






“it is entirely appropriate, I think, for politicians to discuss 
strategic and policy issues about how our police service operates 
within a democratic country, about what kind of style of policing 
we will have so whether we want armed officers on every street 
corner, whether tasers should be utilised across Scotland. I don’t 
see those as operational issues because those impact on 
communities, just like stop and search used at an industrial scale, 
it was no longer a day to day operational issue … they were 
infringing civil liberties and there were questions about human 
rights, and questions about the legitimacy of what they were 
doing, that’s not an operational matter anymore, that’s a matter 
for the politicians” - (Interview: MSP, LibDem). 
 
There is a lot of credence to Lustgarten’s (1986: 47-48) view that traditionally the 
notion of operational independence has been invoked, predominantly against the local 
police authorities, and rarely against central directives. This view is supported by 
Reiner’s (2010) observation that the calculative and performance based accountability, 
driven centrally, made operational independence illusory, yet the influence of the local 
police authorities remained inadequate (as discussed in Chapter 3, 3.3.2).  
 
My analysis in Chapter 8 (see 8.2 and 8.3) reinforces Lustgarten’s view as I show that 
in the new tripartite relationship, the notion of operational independence was invoked 
to insulate police operational policies from the SPA, on key matters such as armed 
policing the Chief Constable would bypass the SPA and apprise the Justice Minister 
directly. In essence, and specifically in relation to the operational independence 
doctrine, the SPA not only inherited the powers of the previous local police authorities, 
but also it inherited the same problem. However, the dynamic and fast-changing nature 
of the post-2012 Act governance arrangements mean that as the SPA continues to 
evolve and develop, there has been a steady move towards a more deliberative 
approach to proactive scrutiny, that may have rendered the traditional notion of 
operational independence obsolete, I examine those developments in Chapter 9.  I now 
turn my attention to the second perennial problem of police governance in the context 
of the SPA in the new governance landscape.  
7.2.2 - Local vs central: the perpetual struggle 
Despite the history of Scottish policing being rooted in localism, I argued in Chapter 




bystander in the face of encroaching centralisation and the operational independence 
of chief constables. One of the stated aims of the police reform was to strengthen local 
policing and local democratic accountability (Scottish Government, 2011c) and local 
policing was made a statutory requirement (Chapter 7, 2012 Act).  However, in the 
aftermath of the 2012 Act, the local government not only had to contend with losing 
its powers over police maintenance, and resource allocation, but it also lost any 
oversight over policing policy. While the SPA, in its formative years was mostly 
reactive, and the Justice Sub-Committee may have been hyperactive, the local 
authorities appeared to be rendered dormant by the new power relations introduced by 
the 2012 Act. The SPA has oversight over all of policing, but the responsibility to 
negotiate processes of local accountability, and to formulate local policing plans in 
cognisance of the local priorities technically lay with the local authorities and the local 
police commanders (Chapter 3, 3.1.7). But whilst the previous local police authorities 
had a chief constable to negotiate with, this new relationship dynamic was further 
complicated because, since the reforms, all of policing policy was determined centrally 
by the Police Scotland’s corporate executive. Therefore, while historically during 
tripartism, the perpetual tussle for control over policing was between local government 
and central government (Chapter 2 and 3), after the reforms, and highlighted by several 
cases, the local versus central debate manifested in the local authorities seeking 
oversight and explanation of Police Scotland’s centralised policies. The ‘new’ tussle 
between the local and the central focused on policing policies that had a perceived 
negative impact on local authorities. I outline the cases that caused contention between 
the local authorities and Police Scotland’s central executive below. 
 
Shortly after the reforms, over 100 officers carried out raids in Edinburgh’s sex-for-
sale saunas (Donnelly, The Herald, 2013). The legacy Lothian and Borders police and 
Edinburgh Council had previously adopted a policy of tolerance towards the sex-
industry, however, the ‘strategic’ decision to carry out the raids signified a shift away 
from the localised settlement towards an approach reflected in other parts of the 
country.  During the consultations prior to the single service, it was argued that a “loss 
of local knowledge” would diminish local service delivery and negatively impact local 




raid the saunas was implemented without any engagement with the Edinburgh Council, 
and without prior warning to any other organisation in the city (Terpstra and Fyfe, 
2015: 535). This centralised policy became a matter of controversy locally, amid fears 
that the new Police Scotland would take a ‘Strathclyde’ based approach of policing.  
 
“A lot of these things took place in quite early terms, a lot of the 
senior police officers have acknowledged that that thinking was 
probably misjudged … If you come from a background in which 
that had been a prevailing policy for multiple years then I think 
it’s an understandable misjudgement” - (Interview: Executive 
Officer B, SPA).  
 
Further, the withdrawal of traffic warden support (Police Scotland, 2014a), the closure 
of approximately 60 frontline police stations (BBC News, 2014), and the decision to 
reduce the contact, command, and control centres from eleven to five across Scotland 
(Police Scotland, 2014b) all took place within the first year of the new arrangements. 
Recent research into the impact of these decisions on local policing found that Police 
Scotland had not consulted the local authorities (Terpstra and Fyfe, 2015; Henry et al., 
2016). Where consultations had taken place, for instance on the traffic warden issue, 
the views of the local authorities were not taken on board (CoSLA, 2014). Looking at 
the local scrutiny arrangements in three sites across Scotland, we found that there was 
no formal avenue for the local authorities to escalate issues back to the senior officers 
of Police Scotland, either through their local police commander or through the SPA 
(Henry et al., 2016: 12-13).  
 
The Chief Constable’s ‘operational’ policy of armed officers on routine patrols caused 
controversy in the north of Scotland where it was felt that the centralised policy had 
taken effect without consulting, or even notifying the Highland Council, or the SPA 
(see above, 7.2.1). The then Independent MSP, John Finnie, raised this issue in the 
Parliament in May 2014, and the issue was discussed and raised subsequently by the 
Highlands Council in June, 2014. The pressure on Police Scotland mounted through 
the intervention of the Justice Sub-Committee on policing, that conducted a public 
hearing on the matter in August 2014. In October 2014, whilst the chief constable 




Highlands Council played a part in this reversal is unclear.  The previous local police 
authorities were routinely criticised for failing to balance the competing demands of 
local policing, and broader national strategic objectives (Tomkins, 2009; also, see 
Chapters 2 and 3). However, these centralised policy decisions highlighted that the 
reforms did leave an obvious gap in police accountability and local oversight, 
manifesting in “structural disconnects” (Henry, et al., 2016: 9-13) between central 
decision making, primarily by the senior officers of Police Scotland, and the impact of 
those policies on local authorities. While the tensions between the local authorities and 
the central executive of Police Scotland were transpiring, the SPA instead of calling 
the chief constable to account and driving through a change in policy, at best, could 
only act as an intermediary. This is examined further below.  
7.2.2.a - The SPA as an intermediary 
The traditional tripartite relationship consisted of central government, chief constables 
and police authorities. The new governance arrangements have created two sets of 
complex tripartite relationships; between the SPA, the Chief Constable and the 
Scottish Government (explored further in Chapter 8, see 8.2 and 8.3) and between the 
SPA, Police Scotland’s central executive, and the local scrutiny committees. The SPA, 
is apparently located at the centre of both relationships, ideally situated to form the 
role of an intermediary.  
 
Since the reforms, concerns were raised locally about the SPA’s inability and a 
perceived lack of interest to raise local issues at the national level (Henry et al., 2016). 
While the previous local police boards had a clearly defined role over the maintenance 
of local police forces, they were often criticised for not exercising their powers to hold 
local policing to account. The SPA’s role in relation to local accountability under the 
new arrangements is also ambiguous. The 2012 Act, places a duty of engagement, 
consultation and scrutiny on local authorities and local commanders, and the 
operationalisation of these arrangements, much like everything else in the 2012 Act, 






“…there was a definite sense that, the government didn’t wish to 
be too prescriptive on local arrangements, but actually in the 
process of consultation there was a communication, with local 
governments saying we would like you to be a bit more specific … 
So, in the end there was description, broadly of what the rights 
and responsibilities were for local scrutiny engagement, and that 
description was very deliberate, because we knew that governance 
was really sitting with the SPA. But we wanted to give as much 
opportunity at a local level for that, you know the local policing 
plan, scrutiny of that local policing plan, consultation on priorities, 
agreement on the plan and so on” - (Interview: Civil Servant) 
 
The local scrutiny arrangements have manifested in the creation of local scrutiny 
committees in all of the thirty-two local areas of Scotland, all operating in a “diverse 
set of ways” (Henry et al., 2016: 4). The SPA has set up channels of communication 
with each of the local scrutiny committee by allocating a board member to three or 
four local authority areas. This communication channel was welcomed by the members 
of the local scrutiny committees I spoke to, however there were indications that the 
processes needed further development: 
 
“I meet with the SPA representative often and he comes to at least 
50 per cent of our scrutiny meetings to listen and observe” - 
(Interview: Convenor, Local Scrutiny Committee, Site 2) 
 
“We are very fortunate to have [SPA Board member] as a regular 
attendee at our local scrutiny meetings. There was an enquiry 
board because we were so upset about the issue of side firearms, 
so we made a representation to the SPA. But that’s one board 
member and one voice. There are things that need to be tweaked 
or fine-tuned” - (Interview: Member, Local Scrutiny Committee, 
Site 1) 
 
The main point of concern locally was around a lack of formal powers, and escalation 
routes for the SPA to raise local concerns nationally (Henry et al., 2016: 12). The 2012 
Act does not give any formal powers to the SPA to scrutinise local police commanders, 
but paradoxically, it does have an oversight role over policing across Scotland. A point 






“accountability is a very interesting word because the Chief 
Constable is accountable to the SPA, so I am not accountable, 
strictly speaking to the local scrutiny committee, but I am 
scrutinised by them. As an individual, I feel accountable to the 
people of the [local authority area], so very much feel I am held to 
account by them although in legislation that is not the case” - 
(Interview: Divisional Commander, Police Scotland, Site 3).  
 
Police officers feeling accountable to law, their communities, or their own conscience 
is a theme that is often repeated in empirical studies on police governance and 
accountability (see for instance, Day and Klein, 1987: 105-106; also, Reiner, 2010). 
However, the above quote also points to an inherent failing of the 2012 Act to provide 
clarity in terms of where the SPA’s powers of accountability lie, and whether or not 
the local scrutiny committees can actually hold local policing to account. When I asked 
an opposition MSP about what was required at the local level to improve local 
oversight of policing, the reply was: “empowerment” (MSP, Lab). Yet the SPA’s own 
position on where local accountability lies, appeared to be consistently clear. All of 
the members I spoke to, insisted that it was for the local scrutiny committees and the 
local police commanders, and Police Scotland’s central executive to negotiate what 
local scrutiny arrangements would look like, with the SPA providing broad oversight 
and support. The SPA members were of the view that local authorities could 
effectively implement mechanisms of local scrutiny through greater engagement with 
the local police plans: 
 
“the greatest bulwark against an overly centralised, authoritarian, 
very inflexible police service is buy into those local plans, if we 
can tightly tie in the outcomes of a local plan to the community 
priorities, it provides a clear direction to the local commander to 
have to deliver against … there is an ongoing work to promote the 
idea that actually just how much influence I think elected 
members, local councillors still have” - (Interview: Executive 
Officer B, SPA)  
 
 
“They have to take responsibility for their own local scrutiny for 
performance in their area and for ensuring that the [local] policing 
plan that they are presented with by the Chief Superintendent 
actually fits their community’s needs … I talk to colleagues about 




that plan as they can, have it drawn up with their thoughts and 
priorities in mind rather than their priorities being slotted in at the 
end” - (Interview: Board Member A, SPA).  
 
 “The message I gave to all of them [LSCs] was be assertive in 
saying what you want from policing and be challenging … you 
have a lot of influence and control because you have to sign off the 
local plan” - (Interview: Board Member C, SPA) 
 
During the first three years of the reforms, the SPA has regularly hosted ‘partners in 
scrutiny meetings’, inviting the convenors, lead officers and other councillors involved 
in the local scrutiny committees across Scotland, to share their experiences and best 
practice. However, we found that there was a perception among some sites that the 
SPA’s initiatives did not have a “lasting impact on local practice” (Henry et al., 2016: 
18). It was not disputed that the local authorities are legally entitled to approve the 
plan, and some local authorities felt that they had sufficient input into the formation of 
the local police plan and that there was “sufficient flexibility to tweak priorities in the 
light of new information or emergent issues” (Henry et al., 2016: 8), but it was felt by 
both local and central stakeholders that at least in the first year, the local police and 
the multi-member ward plans30 did not take local views on board, and had in fact been 
issued centrally by the senior executive of Police Scotland with no local input.   
 
“the police made a very strong symbolic move pre-1st of April 
2013…to go for a plan for every ward in the country, you know 
what could be more local than multi member ward plans and we 
had no real time to be able to consult people around that. The 
reality is that in some parts of the country those area ward plans 
don’t reflect the shape of our already established area partnership 
plans” - (Interview: Executive Officer B, SPA). 
 
“Each local authority was getting maybe 40 or 50 plans, some of 
them had over a 100 plans delivered to them … I don’t know 
anybody in the south of Scotland who was consulted with on a 
plan and equally it was amazing that all these plans, and I know 
from my experience in policing, that they were created at 
headquarters by a resource unit whose dedicated duty was to 
                                                 
30 Police Scotland published a ward plan for 353 multimember wards across Scotland. Each ward relates 
to a geographical unit, through which local councillors are elected, within a local authority area (Henry 




deliver [ward] plans by a certain date. Done.” - (Interview: MSP, 
Lab).  
 
Further, the local police commanders that I spoke to, also highlighted that the 
multimember ward plans had no traction locally and did not reflect or recognise the 
diversity within the wards: 
 
“The initial challenge about the multi member ward plans and 
local plans are that they all look the same, we work to a similar 
template…the grouping of a ward, and you’ll see this across the 
country, [anonymised] is a very affluent area … but it's part of 
Ward 1 which includes [anonymised] which is one of the poorest 
areas and it's an area where we have significant issues with 
violent crime. But they are clubbed together. - (Interview: Local 
Area Commander, Site 2).  
 
“Each of the ward has a local ward plan that was the direction of 
the previous Chief Constable, that hasn’t really got any traction 
here locally. We have serviced them, gone through the 
mechanisms of producing them and updating them but local 
people are not really interested in them at all. So the primary focus 
here locally is on the local policing plan and nobody pays any 
attention to the ward plans” - (Interview: Divisional Commander, 
Site 3). 
 
Since the SPA came into effect, it has made attempts to play the role of an intermediary 
by encouraging the local authorities to influence local policing and local accountability 
through the local police plans. However, most of the problems affecting local 
accountability were due to the inward-looking and highly-centralised policy making 
by the Police Scotland senior corporate executive (CoSLA, 2014, 2015; Henry et al., 
2016).  
7.2.2.b - Discussion: The local v central tussle reimagined 
As argued above (7.2.1), at least in the first two years of the new arrangements, the 
SPA had very little influence over police policies and operational decision-making. 
Under such circumstances, Police Scotland’s organisational policies, whilst criticised 
in retrospect, were not being scrutinised before-the-event, although this has started to 
change as the SPA continues to evolve in a dynamic landscape (see Chapter 9). The 




contact centres has continued to vex local authorities (Henry et al., 2016).  It is 
apparent that the new governance arrangements have manifested in a complex set of 
relationships between the various stakeholders. In the reimagined tripartite 
relationship between the SPA, Police Scotland and local scrutiny committees, the 
balance of power, at least in the first two years of the reforms, remained firmly tilted 
towards Police Scotland’s senior executive team.  
 
An SPA member, quoting a senior officer, remarked that under the stewardship of the 
former Chief Constable Sir Stephen House, Police Scotland’s senior executive 
operated on the principle of “DAD – decide, announce, defend” (Interview: Board 
Member C, SPA). Further, under Sir House, Police Scotland’s centralised decision 
making was zealously obsessed with targets, and that also had a negative impact on 
local policing for instance, stop and search (Murray, 2014a, 2014b, 2015a; Lennon and 
Murray, 2016), and roads policing (Henry et al., 2016: 13). The target driven culture, 
not only affected local police accountability, but also had implications on the 
discretion of local police officers, as observed by an SPA board member and a 
representative of HMICS:  
 
 “At a meeting in [one local area], a senior officer said we are now 
moving to do more enforcement in policing roads, and I asked 
when did that become a policy - more tickets were being issued, 
people were getting tickets because officers felt they had lost 
discretion” – (Interview: Board Member C, SPA) 
 
“I think to be fair, officers don’t feel they have discretion, because 
the performance framework was so savage” - (Interview: 
Representative, HMICS) 
 
In addition, the allocation of specialist units such as roads policing, public order 
policing and armed response units, under the domain of the assistant chief constables, 
did not always consider the views of the local scrutiny committees, and local 
commanders, exacerbating a “disconnect within Police Scotland” (Henry et al., 2016: 
12-13, emphasis my own). These centralised policies, without taking local policing 




fits all approach” that would follow the creation of Police Scotland (Terpstra and Fyfe, 
2015: 535).  
 
In my conversations with the local commanders, a perceived divide between ‘us’, i.e. 
all local stakeholders vs. ‘them’, i.e. Police Scotland’s central executive became 
apparent. In one local area, after an interview with a local divisional commander, the 
officer pointed outside the window at a riot van and remarked “you see that riot van 
out there, that is the problem, prior to centralisation one of those wouldn’t be seen in 
this area, they were never needed”. In the three local sites, we found that the 
relationships between the local commanders and local scrutiny committees were 
positively developing and there seemed to be a degree of mutual trust (Henry et al. 
2016: 8). However, it was particularly acknowledged by the local commanders that the 
criticisms of Police Scotland were often focused towards the centre:  
 
“I keep emphasising that the police officers who work in [name of 
the local area] are largely the same who worked [here] before... we 
are a part of the community not some other alien force that is 
being visited on them. Same people as before and they all know 
them. As a result of this, an interesting dynamic starts to evolve 
where locally you're ok, it's the Police Scotland thing that’s 
wrong”. (Divisional Commander, Site 1) 
 
“So here comes the conflict between national and local. And I am 
the piggy in the middle because I have a personal view which I 
will speak about behind closed doors, I have a corporate view in 
which case I am the person that conveys the corporate piece of 
Police Scotland and privately I don’t necessarily agree with it. So, 
it was quite challenging to convey that corporate message as it's 
not a separate police force up here, it is Police Scotland and we are 
just a small portion of that”. (Divisional Commander, Site 3) 
 
The perpetual tussle between the local and the central has been exacerbated by the 
2012 Act and it has manifested in two ways. The traditional struggle for powers of 
police governance between local and central elected representatives has continued to 
feature strongly since the reforms. In addition, there have been persistent tensions 
between local authorities and Police Scotland’s central executive over policies that are 
developed nationally, but have local ramifications. The SPA is situated at the centre of 




recent developments suggest that the SPA is ideally placed to effectively act as an 
intermediary between local and central democratic stakeholders and the police, and 
serve as a conduit between the police and the public (see Chapter 9).  
7.3 - Conclusion  
My analysis in this chapter has shown that the SPA, in its formative years, had not 
been able to resolve the perennial problems of police governance. These problems that 
predated the 2012 Act, manifested in the most abrasive fashion after the reforms. All 
the cases, scandals and controversies discussed in this chapter point to weaknesses in 
organisational accountability mechanisms, particularly in relation to police operational 
policies, confirming my argument that the pre-2012 Act policy discourse had missed 
an opportunity (Chapter 3, 3.4).  
 
The 2012 Act did not clarify how police organisational accountability would be 
achieved, and the notion of operational independence had been left undefined, as 
before. There was no subsequent guidance on how the SPA could implement its 
powers of holding the chief constable to account into actual mechanisms and processes 
of accountability. Further, by leaving the local authorities and local commanders to 
negotiate local scrutiny arrangements, the new governance arrangements created two 
complex tripartite relationships. Despite the SPA’s early attempts to act as an 
intermediary between Police Scotland’s central executive and the local scrutiny 
committees, the target driven culture during the former Chief Constable’s tenure made 
proactive scrutiny of policing policy an impossible task in the first two years of the 
new arrangements.  
 
In the following chapters, I present further analysis of the SPA through the analytical 
framework outlined in Chapter 5 (5.5). More specifically, I focus on the SPA’s 
composition, and its power and autonomy, in relation to the traditional tripartite 
relationship with Police Scotland and the Scottish Government (Chapter 8). In Chapter 
9, I will argue that developments following the high-profile cases such as stop and 




governance that may have started to resolve the perennial problems of police 




Chapter 8 - The SPA’s credentials as an institutional epistocracy: Broad 
Composition, Power and Autonomy  
  
This chapter is the first of two chapters that presents my analysis of the SPA in relation 
to the conceptual and analytical framework outlined in Chapter 5. It is to be reiterated 
that this study has looked at the SPA in its formative, and perhaps most turbulent years 
since its inception and the findings chapters (7-9) capture the developments from the 
passing of the 2012 Act to the SPA’s Governance review in March 2016. Needless to 
say, this has been a constantly evolving landscape. In cognisance of the conceptual 
model of the SPA, and its creation as a body composed of independent members with 
professional skills and competencies, I drew on the notion of epistocracy and proposed 
a prescriptive conceptual framework (Chapter 5, 5.3). I argued that for an epistocracy 
to be institutionalised, it needs a broad composition, power, and autonomy (Chapter 5, 
5.1). Further, an epistocratic arrangement will need to weave in principles of 
deliberation in its approach to delivering police accountability mechanisms (Chapter 
5, 5.2). I proposed that if all components of the framework are in place, an ‘epistocratic 
and deliberative’ arrangement will be able to resolve the perennial problems of police 
governance and deliver effective mechanisms of police organisational accountability 
(Chapter 5, 5.4).  
 
I have shown in Chapter 7, that in the formative years of the SPA, the perennial 
problems, - i.e. the operational independence doctrine, and the perpetual tussle 
between the local and the central remained unresolved and manifested in the most 
abrasive fashion, representing weaknesses in police organisational accountability 
mechanisms. In this chapter I argue that the SPA’s inability to deliver effective 
mechanisms of accountability were compounded due to weaknesses in its composition, 
differing interpretations of its role and powers, and external impositions resulting in a 
lack of autonomy.  
8.1 - Broad Composition 
I argued that knowledge is the defining characteristic of epistocracy, and it would be 




epistocracy is subjected to a demographic objection (Estlund, 2008), and the proposed 
epistocratic arrangement will need to reflect a broad demography (Chapter 5, 5.1). In 
order to utilise the framework for the analysis of the SPA, I raised the following 
questions: 
 
• Does the SPA’s composition reflect epistocratic credentials?  
• If so, what knowledge, competencies and skills are reflected in its composition? 
• Is the knowledge composition of the SPA sufficient for the purposes of police 
governance? 
• Does the composition of the SPA reflect a broad demography? 
 
I deal with these in turn below. 
 
Q. Does the SPA’s composition reflect epistocratic credentials?  
Q. If so, what knowledge, competencies and skills are reflected in its composition? 
 
As March, 2015, when the fieldwork began, the SPA was composed of 14 non-
executive board members, including the chair, six permanent executive officers and 
an interim Chief Financial Officer appointed in February, 2016 (SPA, 2016a: 21). It 
has generally been accepted that all of the members were appointed on the basis of 
specific skills, expertise and competencies (Scott, 2013a). As with everything else in 
the 2012 Act (see Chapter 7), the precise knowledge requirements necessary for the 
SPA as a police governing body was not specified and the Act left it for the Scottish 
Ministers to appoint persons they consider to have the “relevant skills and expertise” 
(Schedule 1, s.2(2)). During the extensive consultations that took place prior to the 
reforms, it was identified that professional directorship experience, expertise in HR 
and finance, and a professional base was lacking in the previous local police 
authorities, and it was recommended that any new governance arrangement should 






The SPA has been constantly evolving throughout the duration of this study and there 
have been numerous changes in its composition since March, 2016. A recent drive to 
appoint new non-executive board members for the SPA by the Scottish Government 
gives a more general indication of the competencies needed to carry out the role. The 
list of required competencies includes leadership skills, experience of corporate 
governance, an understanding of performance management, and personal 
effectiveness which includes communication, working collaboratively and resilience 
(SPA, 2016b: 12-13). The legal status and the broad organisational structure of the 
SPA follows the same pattern as other non-departmental public bodies operating 
across the public sector in Scotland (for a list, see Audit Scotland, 2010b). But the 
SPA’s composition based on a broad range of knowledge, skills, experience and 
competencies (see fig. 8.1), also resembles the myriad EU institutions, expert groups, 
and regulatory authorities formed on the basis of a blend of expertise and skills 
(Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2010; Rosenvallon, 2011; Eriksen, 2011; Holst, 2012; Cross, 
2015). All of these compositions represent a dimension of epistocracy, due to the broad 
application of the concept (Holst, 2012, 2014; see Chapter 4, 4.5).  
 
 
Figure 8.1- Expertise, Competencies and Skillsets of the SPA hierarchy. More than one competency 





The credentials of the SPA, as an expert body were accepted by all of my interviewees, 
and the senior officers of Police Scotland particularly welcomed the fact that the SPA 
members came from different professional backgrounds rather than representing party 
political interests, a DCC noted that “at least in formulaic terms” the SPA added a 
professional and expert dimension to the new governance and accountability 
landscape.  
 
Despite being located centrally, the initial SPA board also consisted of a few members 
who were councillors and had previous experience of working in the local police 
authorities, this blend of experience and knowledge, it was envisaged, would enhance 
police governance: 
 
“several of the councillors used to serve in the previous joint 
police authorities, so again in terms of that knowledge and 
expertise, and holding policing to account … we've got that 
knowledge and we also have a range of external private sector 
expertise so there’s people with IT background, entrepreneur, 
business development, financial background there’s people with 
HR background and we also have one member who is an ex-police 
officer.  So we seem to have covered all the kind of key criteria 
and together it helps them form an opinion … of various things 
and I suppose in terms of councillors across the mix we have also 
got councillors from the different political parties so there is no 
one political persuasion that’s ever seemed to be linked with the 
SPA, so it’s a good balance” - (Interview: Executive Officer A, 
SPA).  
 
The diversity of knowledge, competencies and skills reflected within the composition 
of the SPA does conform to the broad application of the notion of epistocracy. As I 
noted in Chapter 5, claims to knowledge and expertise do not necessarily mean 
specialisation in a specific field (Collins and Evans, 2007: 77). Particularly in relation 
to policing and police governance, the reliance on knowledge will not be limited to 
technical matters. It is granted that with powers over police budgets and resources, the 
SPA undoubtedly needs professionals with finance, audit and HR background, 
however, the inclusion of members with local government experience underpins that 
the knowledge of the previous arrangements, partnership-working and co-production 





I proposed that the knowledge composition of an epistocratic arrangement would be 
determined by the specific knowledge demands of a given field (Chapter 5, 5.3.1.a). 
Based on what we know about the SPA’s initial composition, I now examine whether 
the SPA’s composition reflected a broad demography, before addressing whether the 
composition as a whole was sufficient for the intended purposes of police governance 
and accountability.  
 
Q. Does the composition of the SPA reflect a broad demography? 
 
As I argued in Chapter 5 (5.1), Estlund (2003, 2008) raised a demographic objection 
to an epistocracy, fearing that such an arrangement may inherently be biased in terms 
of gender, social class, knowledge or race. I responded to this criticism by arguing that 
achieving a demographic balance is easier where members are appointed, as opposed 
to relying on an election (Chapter 5, 5.3.1.b). For instance, the demographic 
breakdown following the PCC elections in England and Wales, gives credence to this 
view. In relation to the 2015 PCC election nominations, the Police Foundation noted: 
“the pool from which our new PCCs will be drawn is highly unrepresentative of the 
population as a whole and is less representative than when these elections were last 
fought in November 2012” (Muir, 2016).  Similarly, other research into the previous 
local police authorities, that comprised solely of elected councillors, has shown that 
out of 149 councillors in the various local police authorities across Scotland, only 28 
(19%) were female (Etherson, 2013: 107).  
 
In the SPA, as of March, 2016, four of the eleven non-executive board members, and 
two out of six executive officers were women (SPA, 2016a: 37). One of the female 
non-executive board members also belonged to a BME group. The Scottish 
Government has made a public pledge to appoint more female board members on 
public bodies, and aim to achieve a 50-50 gender balance on all public boards by 2020 
(Scottish Government, 2016). There is currently no similar plan to encourage BME 
candidates to be appointed on public boards, even though BME groups represent 4% 





In relation to democratic policing, governance and accountability, the issue of race and 
policing is a pertinent one, however, it has not featured profoundly in the public debate 
in Scotland, as it has in England and Wales (Walker, 2000; Henry and Fyfe, 2012). 
Whilst I found no evidence of bias based on race, gender, or educational qualification, 
in the composition of the SPA, a demographic objection in relation to an epistocracy 
within an established democratic order may not be that pertinent. The threat of elitism 
could be countered through principles of deliberation (Chapter 5, 5.3.4) and horizontal 
accountability to professional peers (Schillemans, 2011). However, I raised concerns 
in Chapter 4 (4.3), by drawing on Bevir, that the legitimacy of ‘experts’ traditionally 
comes into question, if they are perceived as “self-interested actors intent on advancing 
their own careers” (2012: 58-59). Some interviewees expressed concerns in relation to 
the SPA’s composition, claiming that it was served by the same people who served at 
different public boards across Scotland. For instance, an opposition MSP indicated 
that: 
 
“Currently we have got a whole load of familiar faces from other 
governance areas, familiar wee faces who all come together and 
don’t want to rock the boat” - (Interview: MSP, Lab).  
 
I will examine this point in detail below in relation to Autonomy (8.3). I now turn to 
analysing the perceived weaknesses in the SPA’s knowledge composition.  
 
Q. Is the knowledge composition of the SPA sufficient for the purposes of police 
governance? 
  
The SPA’s composition reflects a broad coverage of the different governance related 
skills and competencies (see, fig. 8.1 above), however, during my interviews with the 
stakeholders it was felt that the SPA had not been able to deliver effective mechanisms 
of police accountability because its board members lacked a nuanced understanding of 
policing, and despite having some local representation on the board, there was a loss 




8.1.1 - Lack of policing knowledge  
At the time the SPA came into effect, there was one ex-police officer who was 
appointed as a non-executive board member, however, it was felt by my interviewees 
that the overall membership of the SPA lacked a nuanced understanding of policing. 
Practitioners from across the spectrum said that more recent policing experience may 
be beneficial for the overall knowledge composition of the SPA: 
 
“one of the members does have a police background but he retired 
as a sergeant many years ago … therefore, they have no real up to 
date knowledge and expertise in policing” - (Interview: Ch/Supt, 
Police Scotland).  
 
“I think as soon as you are removed from policing … your 
knowledge becomes less and less relevant in time … it probably 
would be quite useful to have somebody else with a policing 
background you know just to give a different perspective… it is 
maybe a double-edged sword but somebody with recent 
experience would probably be quite helpful” - (Interview: 
Executive Officer A, SPA). 
 
“one of the challenges for the SPA is, or has been over the last 
three years, a lack of understanding of policing” - (Representative, 
HMICS) 
 
In an inspection of the police reform process, in 2013, Audit Scotland also observed 
that while some of the SPA staff had experience of the creation of the former Scottish 
Police Services Authority, none had experience of operational policing at a senior level 
(Audit Scotland, 2013: 18). A senior police officer compared the SPA with the Scottish 
Fire and Rescue Service and argued that:  
 
“the Fire Board is well informed because Jimmy Campbell who 
sits on that was a chief fire officer in Fife and he was a chief fire 
officer at Lothians and now sits on the Fire board. Now that again 
doesn’t make him an absolute expert but allows him to bring some 
context to a lot of the discussions that take place, now yes we in 
policing can bring context if we go and meet with them [the SPA] 
but when they have their private meetings, there’s no policing 






When probed further on what kind of policing knowledge was missing from the SPA’s 
composition, it was suggested by the respondents that it was essential for a police 
governance body to have an overall understanding of police corporate management 
and organisational decision making, pertaining to the complex nature of modern police 
organisations. In June 2015, a former Chief Constable of the legacy force, Northern 
Constabulary, was appointed to the SPA board to plug that gap in knowledge. It was 
observed by a HMICS representative that this inclusion had further strengthened the 
SPA: 
 
“So an ex-chief constable on the board, he's run a force, he knows 
how things should work and did it very successfully, so he knows 
the right questions to ask, and he knows what governance is 
about, and he also knows when to keep his nose out of minutiae 
and things like that. So, I think over time we will see the 
competence and the capabilities grow in the board” - (Interview: 
Representative, HMICS)  
 
Whilst the inclusion of a senior ex-police officer was welcomed on the basis that it 
would enhance the breadth of knowledge within the SPA’s composition, concerns 
were also raised about the need for the SPA to be sufficiently independent of the police:  
 
“I think having police knowledge at the SPA board, can be helpful 
but equally … could sometimes be a dangerous thing” - 
(Interview: Former Minister) 
 
 
“It is absolutely essential that those who are on the committee of 
the SPA should represent the public, not the police” - (Interview: 
MSP, Lab)  
 
“Well you’ve got a national police force that has an enormous 
amount of power … so you need a strong board and you need a 
board that brings a lot of different experience to it” - (Interview: 
MSP, LibDem).  
 
It was not only recognised by politicians from across the spectrum that the SPA board 
should be independent of the police (see quotes above), but an SPA board member 







“I think what we all lack is expertise in policing and I think that’s 
a big disadvantage, however, having said that you don’t want a 
whole load of ex-coppers because they have a different 
perspective and it's not an independent perspective so I don’t 
know how you balance that. We have recently appointed an ex-
police officer and in fact we had one already so now we have got 
two, and I think that creates potential conflicts, as well as 
bringing in some positive stuff about operational understanding 
which we don’t have, it brings in a potential of: are you really 
going to criticise the thing that you dedicated thirty years of your 
life to” - (Interview: Board Member B, SPA, emphasis added). 
 
A body responsible for police governance and accountability, to be composed of ex-
police officers raises obvious concerns. I argued in Chapter 5, that it is pertinent that 
an epistocratic arrangement is not perceived to be colluding with the police or the 
politicians and its members will need to be sufficiently autonomous and independent.  
I deal with autonomy in relation to independence from political actors below (8.3), but 
here, in regards to the presence of ex-police officers within the SPA’s composition, 
the potential concerns I raised in Chapter 5 (5.3.3) regarding regulatory capture are 
reiterated (Zinn, 2002; Carpenter and Moss, 2014; Kwak, 2014).  Savage (2013) has 
argued that the effectiveness of police complaints mechanisms, within the context of 
police accountability rests on the independence of such mechanisms from the police. 
Through the empirical analysis of three independent complaint handling bodies: The 
Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, the Independent Police 
Complaints Commission in England and Wales, and the Garda Síochána 
Ombudsman’s Commission in the Republic of Ireland, Savage found that the notion 
of independence in the context of police accountability and complaints handling 
encompassed impartiality, distance from the police, and objectivity (2013: 101-103).   
Particularly in relation to distance from the police, one interviewee referred to it as 
“not feeling any sort of attachment to the police” (quoted in Savage, 2013: 102). The 
research also raised concerns of investigators “adopting the language and ‘mindset’ of 





The concerns raised by the SPA board member above, indicating potential conflicts, 
may refer to the senior ex-police officer potentially showing empathy towards the 
police. However, Savage found that in police complaints bodies, investigators with a 
non-policing background, would often end up joining the police, reflecting a sense of 
“cultural ‘empathy’ with the police” (2013: 105).  Whilst I cannot empirically establish 
whether the appointment of a senior ex-police officer had improved the SPA’s 
governance in practice, or indeed, if it had resulted in decisions being dominated by 
one or two perspectives, this issue has raised the potential of regulatory capture within 
the composition of the proposed framework, either through the appointment of ex-
police officers or through members showing empathy towards the police.  
 
The potential threat of regulatory capture could be minimised if the composition of an 
epistocratic arrangement reflects a broad range of knowledge and expertise. I argued 
in Chapter 5 (5.2) that deliberative principles of justification and reason-giving should 
be weaved into the mechanisms of accountability. The same principles would serve as 
a check in the internal decision-making of an epistocratic arrangement, manifesting as 
an exchange of reasons and evidence in private meetings. In addition, horizontal 
accountability to professional peers (Schillemans, 2011; Romzek et al., 2012) can 
minimise the potential threat of just one perspective dominating discussions and 
decision-making. Forcehimes (2010: 73-74) argues it is indeed the responsibility of 
epistocrats to be willing to engage in “reasons, arguments, and evidence” and that one 
perspective should not be privileged over the other, but instead epistocrats should be 
open to subjecting their own views to “rational scrutiny” (Forcehimes, 2010: 76).  
 
The perception that there was a lack of policing knowledge within the composition of 
the SPA was further compounded by the lack of training offered to new members, 
particularly those with no prior experience of working in a governance and 
accountability role.  
8.1.2 - Insufficient Training 
I found that it was the deficiency in training and development of the members, and not 




board, as a whole, lacked policing knowledge. The non-executive board members, 
particularly those who had previously not worked with the police in any capacity, 
showed their dissatisfaction with the training provided to them.  
 
One of the reasons for the insufficient training was the pace of the reforms, from the 
moment the Act was passed to the arrangements coming into effect. This was 
confirmed by Audit Scotland’s inspection of the police reforms (2013) and highlighted 
by several respondents: 
 
“Looking back … anecdotally just seems that everybody was so 
focused on creating Police Scotland that they had almost forgotten 
about what was actually required for the SPA” - (Interview: 
Executive Officer A, SPA) 
 
“…starting to move from appointment of chair and the support 
staff including a handful of early seconded people I was struck by 
how little planning had been done into establishing an authority 
in comparison to what now we have done ourselves” - (Interview: 
Executive Officer B, SPA).  
 
 “In my own view the appointments were far too late … we were 
appointed in October, we had a training session in December and 
the new service was up and running in April so the entire focus 
was on getting the new [police] service up and running” - 
(Interview: Board Member C, SPA) 
 
In relation to training and development of the new members, it seemed that, as noted 
by a civil servant, “they would learn on the job”. It was, therefore, left to the SPA 
executive officers, and Police Scotland to develop training for the non-executive board 
members:  
 
“part of the issue with the authority was that they only had a very 
light touch induction training … its only through proactive 
engagement by Police Scotland have we started to have 
development days with them so that they start to understand 






“…[on presentations by senior officers] … was very much a case 
of you know this is what we do, here are the challenges, this is 
what we plan to do, and they were very sharp very focused but at 
the right level … so actually when papers come before [the board 
members] in any of the committees they actually have some 
background knowledge of the topic so they can ask intelligent 
questions” - (Interview: Executive Officer A, SPA).  
 
What specific knowledge areas were covered in those training and development days 
was not immediately apparent, however, some sessions would include visits to 
specialist support units, “dogs and puppies” (Ch/Supt, Police Scotland) or “beauty 
parades of armed officers” (Board Member B, SPA), but quite often, some training 
and development days also included briefings on strategic issues: 
 
“The members have, I think quarterly or six monthly briefings on 
different key topics, so things like cybercrime, trafficking, counter 
terrorism and really the idea is that it’s part of the information 
sharing to make sure they are aware of that policing landscape 
and equally it is also to say what are the challenges, what are the 
issues and what Police Scotland is doing about them” - (Interview: 
Executive Officer A, SPA).  
 
As I argued in earlier chapters (Chapter 2 and 3), a reliance on the police for 
information by the previous local police authorities, strengthened the operational 
independence of chief constables, and senior officers would often present the 
information they would like to be scrutinised on. The SPA’s approach, in its initial 
years, had been no different. The lack of meaningful training for the new SPA 
members meant that they could not develop a sufficient understanding of policing from 
an operational accountability point of view, which manifested in a lack of confidence 
to raise issues of public concern, as noted by an MSP: 
 
“They have always lacked that confidence or the ability to 
challenge the chief constable and they need to very quickly harden 
up and be able to face the chief constable and not scrutinise the 
things he wants them to scrutinise but scrutinise the things that 
they recognise as a future challenge” - (Interview: MSP, LibDem).   
 
A crucial phase for an accountability mechanism is the information phase (Bovens, 




they were appointed, they were not sure about: a) what sort of information they could 
request from the police, and b) their own ability to interpret and challenge that 
information. An executive officer emphasised that while policing knowledge was not 
necessary for them to carry out their duties, members needed to be able to understand 
the information that was presented to them, and ask robust questions around that 
information. But a board member highlighted that it was not always clear whether the 
information being presented to the SPA was impartial: 
 
“If we’re being presented with data, how do we know what that 
actually means? A chief constable has a vested interest in 
presenting the best spin on what those figures mean… how 
independent is that analysis? Cause that must be a difficult role 
you know, if you're analysing data for the most powerful police 
officer in the country and it says not quite what he wants it to say, 
is there any pressure? We don’t know” - (Board Member B, SPA) 
 
Whilst the inclusion of a former chief constable to the SPA board was envisaged as 
strengthening the knowledge base of the SPA, in the longer term, the existing members 
needed training on what constituted operational policing. In the formative years of the 
SPA, instead of an independent objective criterion on what elements of police function 
members should be scrutinising, the members relied on the police to train them, and to 
provide them with the information that formed the basis of scrutiny. This form of an 
arrangement amplifies the threat of collusion that can lead to regulatory capture, as I 
argued above. The existing knowledge composition of the SPA needed to be 
complemented with specific knowledge and training on what constituted police 
accountability and scrutiny, and how the information presented by the police could be 
interpreted, analysed and challenged. Later analyses of the SPA in relation to 
deliberation shows that as the new arrangements evolved and developed, the SPA did 
start to strengthen its epistocratic credentials by drawing on external knowledge and 
evidence, particularly through established networks such as the Scottish Institute for 
Policing Research, as well as through horizontal deliberation with other expert 




8.1.3 - Lack of local knowledge 
My analysis so far suggests that the SPA did not understand the complexity or the 
impact of police operational policies on local communities, and that is one of the 
reasons why it was not able to sufficiently balance local interests against centralised 
policies (Chapter 7, 7.2.2). The appointment of local councillors on the board was 
propagated by CoSLA. During the consultations, it made representations to the 
Scottish Government and strongly suggested that a new centralised governing board 
should include a set number of representatives from local authorities (CoSLA, 2011). 
Whilst the Scottish Government did not set a quota for local representation, it did 
appoint several board members with knowledge of local governance (see, fig. 8.1 
above). When I asked a former Minister about why CoSLA’s request of a quota for 
local membership on the SPA’s board was not entertained, the reply was blunt: 
 
“this idea that the police committees under the old regional 
services were great, they were frankly useless. Some worked 
better than others but most of them were not particularly good 
and the idea that you just got on it because you are an elected 
councillor and it would also have given you another way to add to 
your wages - unacceptable. You were only going to go on if you 
were capable of contributing significantly … It does not depend 
on the political affiliation it depends on the what you bring to 
the institution”. - (Interview: Former Minister) 
 
In the run-up to the reforms, there were fears that centralisation of the police forces 
would lead to a loss of local knowledge (Chapter 3), this argument has often 
underpinned the perpetual tussle between the local and the central. However, as I have 
established in Chapter 7 (7.2.2.a), the reforms created two complex tripartite 
relationships: one between the Scottish Government, Police Scotland and the SPA, and 
the other between Police Scotland, local scrutiny committees and the SPA. Under the 
previous arrangement, there was a direct relationship between the chief constable and 
their respective local police authority. One MSP noted that the targets driven culture 
associated with the early days of Police Scotland, could have been tackled had that 





“while you might say they didn’t investigate perhaps the finance 
of the organisation or some of the things as well as they might 
have done. What they did was they created a culture for their 
police force. So of course, they appointed the chief constable, who 
met the kind of cultural needs that they had for that area” - 
(Interview: MSP, LibDem). 
 
It was felt that by removing the powers of governance from the local police authorities, 
an essential element of local knowledge, and trust between the police and local 
authorities, that had built over decades of tripartism would be eroded. One board 
member with experience of the local arrangements also felt that the local police 
authorities were effective at raising local concerns with the police: 
 
“I think the old boards had a good focus on what was needed in 
local communities or even on a wider regional base about what 
the difficulties were. You got that up through councillors from the 
grass roots, what experiences the public were seeing and feeling 
and … that would make its way to the board quickly and the chief 
constable would answer around that and so it became a focus of 
discussion and a priority for improvement” - (Interview: Board 
Member A, SPA) 
 
A HMICS representative shared a similar view, arguing that despite the reports by the 
previous Chief Inspectors being critical of the local police authorities (Chapter 3), they 
did not reflect the diversity in arrangements and practice across Scotland: 
 
“I wouldn’t agree wholeheartedly in the then HMI view around 
previous boards. I think it varied…some boards had people with 
twenty years’ experience as councillors of scrutinising policing. 
They knew exactly the right questions to ask, … and some boards 
actually did hold the service to account far better than others” - 
(Interview: Representative, HMICS).  
 
The criticisms and weaknesses of the local police authorities have been covered in 
detail in the previous chapters (Chapter 2 and 3). However, the perception that local 
police authority members had strong claims to ‘local’ knowledge can also be disputed. 
Research into the previous local police authorities found that “95% of the 109 
respondents indicated that they had resided in their Police Board area for greater than 




126).  As I have argued in Chapter 4 (4.4.2), the local police authorities were regional, 
and members were drawn from the various localities within that region. As noted 
earlier, of the 34 members in the Strathclyde Joint Police Board, only eight represented 
Glasgow (Scottish Government, 2011d: 16, para. 2.19). If we were to apply the same 
principle to the SPA, for instance, and ensured that eight of its members represented 
the former eight local police authority regions, would the SPA then be able to make 
strong claims to ‘local’ knowledge? I have previously argued that ‘local’ knowledge 
should form part of an ideal epistocratic composition in relation to police governance 
and accountability (Chapter 5, 5.3.1.a). However, it is more problematic to identify the 
criteria through which claims to local knowledge can be established. With regard to 
the SPA’s composition, just as ex-police officers were appointed to fill the gaps in 
policing knowledge, it appears the rationale for appointing some local councillors was 
specifically to fulfil the perceived lack of local knowledge: 
 
“in a sense their democratic background is a competence. So, they 
are not there as a representative of any particular area, but they 
bring the fact that they are local elected members, they have that 
kind of democratic competence they bring that into the SPA” - 
(Interview: Civil Servant). 
 
A reliance on local councillors to bring in local expertise can also lead to unintended 
consequences of partisanship as I have alluded to earlier (Chapter 4, 4.4.2). As 
highlighted by the local divisional commanders, some local scrutiny committees were 
often dominated by partisan interests: 
 
“There is a particular lens through which the councillors tend to 
look at things particularly if they are independents, they are not 
SNP, they are already motivated to think ill of all things Police 
Scotland. So, it becomes political quite quickly and it is evident in 
the scrutiny meetings. It is very obvious the parties that 
councillors represent, and it is very predictable the stance taken by 
individual councillors based on political allegiances” - (Interview: 
Divisional Commander, Site 1) 
 
“they will challenge but sometimes there is political point scoring. 
You can see if one member of one party asks a question, the other 
party doesn’t agree, they challenge each other in that open forum, 
and we think don’t get personal in that forum, it's about what's 




and holding me and my team to account” - (Interview: Divisional 
Commander, Site 2) 
 
Whilst there was no evidence that members with local government experience took a 
party-political view in the SPA board meetings, drawing on my arguments above in 
relation to regulatory capture, a broad knowledge composition would ensure that a 
range of views and perspectives inform decision-making. The inclusion of members 
with local government experience did not resolve the tensions between the local and 
the central, as I have established in Chapter 7, in a similar vein as how the inclusion 
of senior ex-police officers did not address the lack of training in relation to the 
scrutiny of operational policing, as argued above.  
 
Lustgarten has articulated the virtues of centralism and localism effectively arguing 
that central control is needed for greater “co-ordination and uniformity” and to 
“compensate for local inequalities” (1986: 178). Conversely, local actors lay a strong 
claim to knowledge of local areas and local needs by virtue of being representatives of 
their respective electorates, allowing for avenues of greater local participation 
(Lustgarten, 1986: 177). Therefore, policing policy would need to be adaptable to the 
various concerns and needs of various localities, for instance, urban areas may have 
different policing needs than rural areas and so forth. The SPA’s status as a central 
actor in the two tripartite relationships ideally situates it to play the role of the 
intermediary, - i.e. between the Scottish Government and Police Scotland, and between 
the local scrutiny committees and Police Scotland. Under such an arrangement, ‘local 
knowledge’ within the SPA’s composition is less essential given its broad strategic 
role. Whilst my analysis shows that in its formative years, the SPA was unable to form 
an effective bridge between the local and the central (Chapter 7, 7.2.2), recent 
developments (see Chapter 9) have allowed the SPA to enhance its role as an 
intermediary, often acting as a conduit between the local and the central. By showing 
greater awareness and an understanding of problems affecting local authorities, the 
SPA may be able to fill this particular gap in knowledge, and ensure greater 




8.1.4 - Discussion: The SPA’s composition and lessons for the framework 
My analysis of the SPA’s initial composition shows that when it came into effect, its 
members were appointed on the basis of a broad range of experiences and skills. 
Further, its members sufficiently represented a broad social demography, particularly 
in comparison to the membership of the previous local police authorities in Scotland, 
and the current PCCs in England and Wales. The SPA’s composition corresponds well 
to my proposed institutional epistocracy (5.3.1). However, the analysis of the SPA’s 
composition in relation to its ability to deliver effective mechanisms of police 
governance and accountability provides empirical insights through which the 
framework can be enhanced.  
 
In relation to the knowledge composition of the SPA, my analysis above shows that 
there had been a distinct focus on appointing members with ‘professional’ expertise 
and experience. This included governance, HR, and finance background, policing 
knowledge, experience of local government, and directorship experience (see fig. 8.1 
above). However, this knowledge composition did not enhance the ability of the SPA 
to scrutinise police operational policies, or to effectively act as an intermediary 
between the local and the central (see Chapter 7). Other reasons for this are examined 
below (8.2 and 8.3), however, specifically in relation to the knowledge composition, 
the analysis above shows that the members did not receive sufficient training, and 
relied on the police to provide the information, and to train them on how to scrutinise 
it. As I will show below (8.2), the SPA has a broad ‘governance’ role and whilst the 
professional skills of the members may have been relevant for other roles such as the 
allocation of funding, resourcing, and HR, for the purposes of accountability, their 
existing skills were deemed as insufficient. On that basis, a case could be made for an 
inclusion of lay members with non-professional backgrounds to the existing 
knowledge composition of an epistocratic arrangement.  
 
Holst’s application of epistocracy (2011, 2012) certainly involves all variations of 
knowledge and does not specify technical or professional expertise. It would be 
plausible to include lay members representing local communities, without any 




whole board should consist of members with no professional experience, but a careful 
balancing of different variations of knowledge can strengthen the processes of police 
accountability, with the caveat that no single perspective would be preferred over 
others. As I argued above and elsewhere (Chapter 5, 5.3.4) principles of reasoning, 
justification, and evidence should inform the overall decision-making process. There 
is no specific “technical” knowledge or expertise that would serve as a pre-requisite 
for police accountability, as one MSP suggested that it was about asking the “daft 
laddie questions”: 
 
“They are there in my view to ask the daft laddie questions and 
get an explanation. Even where it might seem to officials it’s quite 
evident why we are doing things that we are doing, a member of 
the public, -  i.e. member on the authority should have the 
authority to say to a chief constable I don’t understand why you 
patrol the way you do. And for the chief constable to produce a 
paper that explains the reason for it. A paper which has substance 
and not merely a set of words which amount to only headlines. So, 
I think that the actual board members should quite properly 
represent the general public” - (Interview: MSP, Lab) 
 
A former Minister told me that he had in fact propagated the inclusion of a lay person 
on a board, but it was turned down by the civil servants: 
 
“that is my grievance as a Minister, there is a head teacher of a 
primary school here who is a remarkably good woman who I kept 
suggesting she should be put on the various boards and would 
never be put forward because she didn’t fit their ‘person who sits 
on quangos and public boards kind of perspective’. She had done 
a remarkable job and met all the criteria but never got put on a 
board and still couldn’t get through this civil service bureaucracy 
that skips honest people like her and puts some serial quango 
kings and queens who sit on numerous boards and actually 
haven’t contributed to any of them” - (Interview: Former 
Minister). 
 
Traditionally, the local police authorities were reluctant to scrutinise police operational 
policies because they often deferred to the professional expertise of the senior officers 
(Chapter 4, 4.4.1).  Lustgarten (1986: 170) argued that “the unbridled professional 
dominance” had been challenged in some professions such as teachers, through the 




Walker (2000), I argued that police operational policies are often based on political 
priorities, rather than professional expertise, despite the claims to police 
professionalism (Fyfe, 2013) and operational independence (see Chapter 2, 2.4). 
Therefore, the inclusion of lay members, drawn from various communities may serve 
to enhance the epistocratic credentials of my proposed governance arrangement.  
 
There are difficulties around how lay persons would be appointed and what standard 
or competence would merit one person’s selection over another. The process could be 
entirely randomised, and selections could be made on a rotational basis. Deliberative 
democrats have found ways to circumvent the requirements of mass participation 
(Fishkin, 2009; Lafont, 2015) by proposing inclusion through randomised 
(Landemore, 2013b), or stratified sampling (Escobar, 2014a). Landemore argues that 
random selections can improve the cognitive diversity of a group, and enhance the 
quality of deliberations (2013b: 1218-1219). Landemore summarises Hong and Page’s 
(2004) complex model of cognitive diversity as such: 
 
“a diversity of ways of seeing the world, interpreting problems in 
it, and working out solutions to these problems. It denotes more 
specifically a diversity of perspectives (ways of representing 
situations and problems), diversity of interpretations (ways of 
categorizing or partitioning perspectives), diversity of heuristics 
(ways of generating solutions to problems), and diversity of 
predictive models (ways of inferring cause and effect)” - (Page, 
2007: 7 in Landemore, 2013b: 1211). 
 
Landemore argues that while cognitive diversity is not limited to a diversity in 
professions, age, and background, those characteristics do contribute to cognitive 
diversity (2013b: 1216). As I have included deliberation as a check on the proposed 
epistocratic arrangement (Chapter 5, 5.3.4), the inclusion of randomly selected lay 
persons, with the caveat that not a single perspective would dominate others may have 
the potential to enhance decision-making, and improve police accountability.  
 
The epistocratic credentials of an arrangement composed of ‘lay’ members might be 
questioned, particularly in relation to the capacity of those members to understand, 




argued in my discussions on knowledge (Chapter 5, 5.3.1.a) claims to knowledge and 
expertise do not necessarily mean specialisation in a specific field (Collins and Evans, 
2007: 77). The more pertinent objection to the inclusion of non-professional lay 
members would be their ability to objectively recognising the validity of knowledge 
and available research (Cross, 2015: 91). The SPA’s model provides a solution for 
this. As I will show in Chapter 9, the SPA’s executive officers were instrumental in 
negotiating partnerships and engaging with Police Scotland at various institutional 
levels to establish its governance and accountability role, whereas board members had 
overarching responsibilities of decision-making and public accountability. It is in fact 
the executive officers who worked with Police Scotland to develop training initiatives 
for the SPA board members to be able to understand and scrutinise police information. 
Through a division of labour between members with professional expertise, and non-
professional ‘lay’ members, an ideal composition may be achieved whereby lay 
members are given a more public scrutiny role, supported by expert executive officers, 
and professional board members focusing on other areas of expertise such as Audit, 
Finance, IT, remuneration, and procurement.  
 
The above analysis of the SPA provides empirical insights and lessons for the 
conceptual framework, however, a broad composition is one component of the 
framework. I proposed the framework as a holistic approach to police governance and 
accountability (Chapter 5) and therefore power and autonomy are also crucial 
components that determine the overall capacity of an institutionalised epistocracy to 
undertake its functions effectively. In addition to the weaknesses in its composition, 
the inability of the SPA to deliver robust mechanisms of police governance and 
accountability, particularly in the first two years of the new arrangements was also due 
to misinterpretations in its role and power, as I examine below.   
8.2 - Power 
I argued that for an epistocracy to be institutionalised and situated within an 
established democratic order, it will need clearly defined delegated powers, so it can 
establish an accountability relationship with the police (Chapter 5, 5.3.2). Drawing on 




informal power resulting from negotiated agreement. With statutory powers to govern 
Police Scotland and to hold the chief constable to account, the SPA resembles a 
formalised institutional epistocracy that draws its authority from legislation, and is 
situated within a democratic order. I raised the following questions for the analysis of 
the SPA in relation to my conceptual framework (Chapter 6, 6.5.1), and I examine 
them below: 
 
• Has the SPA been able to implement its statutory powers into effective 
mechanisms of police governance and accountability? 
• Does the SPA have sufficient influence to fulfil its functions to deliver police 
organisational accountability? 
• Does the SPA have sufficient resources to carry out its statutory functions? 
 
My analysis of the SPA’s role so far shows that the powers of the SPA were not clearly 
defined, and the 2012 Act left the implementation of its role and function to negotiated 
agreement (Chapter 7). As one civil servant noted that during the legislation process, 
the idea was to set up the SPA, and allow it to negotiate its own functions, scope of 
duties, training and knowledge requirements:  
 
“the SPA in the end will be a set of people who will have to 
discharge their duties, and how they discharge their duties, is how 
they choose to discharge their duties” - (Civil Servant).  
 
Following the appointments of the then Chief Constable Sir Stephen House and the 
SPA Chair Vic Emery, the Scottish Government, the SPA and senior officers of Police 
Scotland began negotiations to determine the roles and responsibilities of the SPA, and 
what its governance role would look like in practice, determining the “boundaries of 
tolerance” (Executive Officer B, SPA). The ‘new’ tripartite actors were involved in 
the negotiations by virtue of the formal powers afforded to them in the 2012 Act, 
giving semblance to the old tripartite relationship with the SPA replacing the local 
police authorities. I argued in Chapter 7, that the language of the Act was vague and 
unclear, and it created new ambiguities resulting in practical delays in the 




SPA’s formal powers, and how its precise role would be operationalised, resulted in a 
period of intense negotiations between the SPA, Police Scotland and the Scottish 
Government. During the negotiations, the debate often rested on competing 
interpretations of the language of the Act itself. For instance, the early negotiations 
centred around the meanings of “may and shall” (Justice Committee, 2012: Col. 2116), 
“prescriptive and permissive” (Col. 2117), and “mandatory and discretionary” powers 
(Col. 2125). As surmised by one respondent: 
 
“The first Chief Sir Stephen House and the first Chair Vic Emery 
had very different interpretations of the Act. And there was 
significant friction around what does ‘maintain’ and ‘support’ and 
‘scrutinise’ mean. And there were months of fighting over, was it 
the SPA that ran HR and finance, or did Police Scotland have any 
function in that. So, we lost a lot of time in that conflict” - 
(Interview: Representative, HMICS). 
 
In the Scottish policing and political circles, this came to be known as the turf war 
between the SPA and Police Scotland, the outcome of which determined not only the 
boundaries of tolerance, but the new boundaries of influence. 
8.2.1 - Turf Wars 
The formal powers of the SPA in relation to the maintenance of Police Scotland were 
subject to early contestations particularly from senior officers of Police Scotland, the 
civil servants and the Scottish Government (Audit Scotland, 2013). As part of its 
maintenance role, the SPA sought to deliver all the support functions including HR, 
Finance, ICT, and Procurement to Police Scotland by incorporating these services 
within its own organisational boundary. This would have given a considerable level of 
influence to the SPA over Police Scotland’s corporate functions. Initially, it was 
acknowledged by the Scottish Government that any “business partnering agreement” 
between Police Scotland and the SPA, was within the scope of the formal powers of 
the SPA (Audit Scotland, 2013: 16). One board member suggested that the chief 







“The Chief Constable agreed after a lot of debate, signed an 
agreement with the SPA that all of the services needed to maintain 
policing would be under the auspices of the SPA” - (Interview: 
Board Member C, SPA) 
 
However, the passing of the corporate functions of Police Scotland to the SPA was 
perceived to come into direct conflict with the chief constable’s powers of direction 
and control of the police. The then Chief Constable Sir Stephen House, in giving 
evidence to the Justice Committee in November 2012, remarked that: 
 
“Is there a 100 per cent meeting of minds on the governance 
structure between the Police Authority and the police service? No, 
there is not 100 per cent yet…my belief is that our agreement is 
that, on a day-to-day basis, the directors of finance and HR will 
work at the police headquarters - in, as I have put it, the same 
corridor as myself—and will come to my morning meetings and 
be part of my senior management team” 
- (Stephen House, Justice Committee Hearing, 27th November, 
2012: 2106-2107).  
 
During the Justice Committee evidence session, the extent to which this turf war was 
about influence, in general, and not just about the corporate functions became clear. 
The Chief Constable, reminded the members that the 2012 Act places the direction and 
control of the “entire Police Service” under his domain, and not just the police 
constables (Stephen House, Justice Committee hearing, 27th November, 2012: 2126). 
In the same session, in an explicit question about who leads policing in Scotland, his 
reply left no doubts:  
 
“To be clear, I lead the police. I do not believe that there is any 
doubt about that in anyone’s mind” - (Stephen House, Justice 
Committee Hearing, 27th November, 2012: 2116).   
 
The extent to which the drawing of informal lines of power was an immediate priority 
was exemplified by the revelation that both the previous SPA Chair and the Chief 
Constable sought independent legal advice, at public’s expense, in regards to the 
interpretation of their respective roles and responsibilities. To the dismay of the MSPs 
present at the Justice Committee, neither approached the Scottish Government, who 




member indicated that the confusion regarding the legislative functions of the SPA and 
how they would be interpreted was also apparent among the MSPs:  
 
“Parliament passed an Act, you could argue whether the 
politicians who passed it really read it, I would argue sometimes 
from the comments they made they didn’t understand what they 
passed, but the Act was very clear that the SPA was responsible 
for the maintenance of policing” - (Interview: Board Member C, 
SPA). 
 
The Chief Constable’s insistence on integrating all of the corporate functions within 
his direction and control also reflected the desire within Police Scotland’s hierarchy to 
maintain the operational independence over the day-to-day running of the police 
organisation, and to have input on matters not necessarily related to law enforcement 
or order maintenance (Chapter 7, 7.2.1). The Chief Constable’s stance over the 
maintenance role of the SPA ensured that his influence over the organisational decision 
making would not be corroded. This was the understanding from within the SPA, 
particularly as it was felt that the senior officers of Police Scotland might have been 
threatened by the SPA’s potential influence: 
 
“Any chief constable in the legacy forces obviously had complete 
power over what they did with the force, so with the creation of 
Police Scotland I think they [Police Scotland] had a particular view 
on how it would be run which would just be a bigger version of 
the previous forces. However, the introduction of the SPA whilst it 
was similar to the previous joint police boards actually technically 
had more power in legislation and a greater oversight role”. - 
(Interview: Executive Officer A, SPA) 
 
Despite the SPA having a greater governance and oversight role in statutory terms, the 
Chief Constable, following an intervention from the Scottish Government (also, see 
8.3), managed to maintain his own influence, whilst weakening the SPA’s position, a 
reminder of the lop-sided tripartite arrangements (Chapter 2) and exacerbating the 
perennial problems of police governance (Chapter 7). Following extensive 
negotiations, the Cabinet Secretary for Justice formally asked the SPA to relinquish its 




2013: 17). This was subsequently agreed upon by the SPA in a public board meeting, 
effectively rubberstamping a change in direction: 
 
We now believe that it is time to move on to be a much more 
scrutinising, policy and strategy organisation than a delivery 
organisation. If you remember—in fact, I doubt that you would 
ever forget—we had two roles in the beginning: a maintenance 
role and a governance role. What we are basically saying is that 
the maintenance role will pass back to the Police Service of 
Scotland. (Vic Emery, former SPA Chair, Justice Sub-Committee 
hearing, 27 June, 2013: 151-152).  
 
Following this change in direction, the control of corporate functions was transferred 
over to the Chief Constable. The SPA subsequently announced its “good governance 
vision” focusing on “strategy, policy, scrutiny, and engagement” (SPA, 2013c: 4). This 
might have meant that the SPA would focus on its accountability role with a renewed 
vigour, but the turf war to decide the boundaries of tolerance had in fact shaped the 
new boundaries of influence, in favour of the Chief Constable. This episode also 
marked the beginning of an interventionist approach undertaken by the then Cabinet 
Secretary for Justice, particularly evident in the first two years of the new 
arrangements. I examine this further below (see 8.3), however, another reason for the 
lack of influence of the SPA since its inception was due to its limited resources.  
8.2.2 - Resource divide 
The ambiguities surrounding the informal lines of power between the SPA and Police 
Scotland were not just limited to semantics, but also because both organisations were 
two separate legal entities (Audit Scotland, 2013: 16). It comes as no surprise that 
immediately following the reforms, both organisations were vying for influence. 
While Police Scotland was a culmination of the previous eight legacy forces, with all 
the resources, expertise, and experience, the SPA “had a cold start from nothing” 
(DCC, Police Scotland). Yet the SPA’s organisational capacity has been capped at 50 
staff, whilst it has oversight over effectively two organisations totalling an overall staff 





While Police Scotland have a large team of analysts working on a permanent basis and 
a Senior Executive team that is much larger in size than the SPA’s own executive, the 
existing non-executive members I spoke to, highlighted that even with the right 
expertise, the time constraints placed on them by the Scottish Government has limited 
their capacity to operate effectively: 
 
“If you operate according to a taxi meter, then you are 
fundamentally disregarding the requirements of the board 
member” - (Interview: Board Member D, SPA) 
 
The passing of the maintenance functions to Police Scotland was supported by the 
view that the SPA should focus on strategic oversight, and such a move was supported 
by opposition MSPs: 
 
“the SPA was trying to build its own empire … It was there to 
hold the police to account for how they were policing and how 
they were using their resources and it didn’t do that, it wanted to 
run the police force. So they didn’t understand it's role properly” – 
(Interview: MSP, LibDem) 
 
“Vic wanted to be in charge of finance and he wanted to be in 
charge of all the civilian staff involved in policing. So that meant 
he wanted to get his hands on the steering wheel of the bus. He 
also wanted to sit at the back and watch how he drove. He cannae 
do that. So, what he should have been doing right from the outset 
is saying we’ll give you the money for the diesel, we’ll give you all 
the staff that you need to drive this bus and we’ll sit at the back 
and we’ll see if you’re doing it right” - (Interview: MSP, Lab) 
 
With over 97 per cent of the budget allocated to the SPA being spent on policing, and 
only 0.4 per cent on its own organisational maintenance (SPA, 2016a), the SPA’s 
ineffectiveness thus far can also be attributed to its limited resources. The non-
executive board members are appointed on a part-time basis. In the first two years, 
there were no limits on the amount of time the non-executive members could spend in 
their roles and subsequently claim expenses for. However, following the Clutha 
helicopter disaster, the Chair of the SPA, and several board members were revealed to 
have claimed expenses to attend the funeral of the three police officers who died in the 




Government imposed a limit on the non-executive members to claim a maximum of 
£300 per day for a time commitment of up to five days per month (Scottish 
Government, 2015b). Members felt that this cap on how much time they could spend 
on SPA business had further hampered their ability to carry out their responsibilities 
effectively. One member noted that following the new restrictions, only the time spent 
attending the committee meetings would be paid for, and not the time spent on 
preparation and travelling.  
 
As the position of non-executive board members is not a voluntary post, there does not 
appear to be any incentive, irrespective of their professional integrity, to prepare 
extensively for scrutiny meetings. Such time and financial constraints could plausibly 
have contributed to a limited capacity of the SPA to deliver operational accountability 
effectively. Consequently, limited resources can also limit the opportunities for the 
board members to develop a nuanced understanding of policing from a governance 
and accountability point of view.  
8.2.3 - Discussion: Power and lessons for the framework  
 I argued in Chapter 5 (5.2) that accountability mechanisms consist of three phases: 
information phase, debating phase and consequences phase (Bovens, 2010). For an 
accountability relationship to be established, the account-giver must feel an obligation 
to present information to the accountability forum, denoting an element of power.  
 
My analysis of the SPA above shows that due to the contestations around the SPA’s 
role and powers, and the subsequent turf-war between the previous Chief Constable, 
and the former SPA Chair, the SPA was not able to establish itself as an effective 
accountability forum. The lack of information, particularly in the first year of the 
reforms, contributed significantly to its overall ineffectiveness: 
 
“it has been a pretty combative relationship between the SPA and 
the Chief, not collaborative…you are only as good as the 
information you have, asking for information was a real battle, so 
the members didn’t have information to help them hold the police 
to account. And I think you will see in some HMI reports the way 
we worded it is that the police service should help others hold the 




around, here's the information, here are the issues here to 
challenge, not what questions would you like to ask?” - 
(Interview: Representative, HMICS).  
 
As noted earlier in Chapter 5 (5.3.2), “unclear power relations create a space for 
competing interpretations” (Olsen, 2015: 427). Based on my analysis in this chapter 
and elsewhere (Chapter 3 and Chapter 7), one of the strongest criticisms of the 2012 
Act is that it left too much to negotiated agreement. The powers of the SPA were vague 
and ambiguous and whilst it had a duty to hold the chief constable to account for the 
policing of Scotland, there was a lack of clarity on how those powers could be 
implemented. The SPA was mostly late to react to the high-profile cases such as stop 
and search and standing firearms authority. In both instances, the Justice Sub-
Committee called in the senior officers of Police Scotland, and the SPA, and took the 
lead on delivering public accountability by asking questions, seeking clarifications, 
and demanding further action to be taken. There was a perception that the SPA lacked 
purpose, and it was acknowledged by one of the board members:  
 
“who can blame the Scottish public in thinking this is a waste of 
time, this body. Because eventually politicians were making 
statements on these issues, and HMICS were doing something. 
And at the end of the day, the SPA limped into view almost 
because it had no other option…as soon as it became obvious 
there was public concern then we should have occupied that 
territory and said we will look at this objectively and fairly and 
come to a view” - (Interview: Board Member D, SPA). 
 
The analysis of the SPA empirically supports the inclusion of power as a key 
characteristic to my proposed framework. Power is not only essential for an 
epistocracy to be institutionalised, it is crucial for the accountability mechanisms to be 
effectively implemented. In the previous tripartite governance arrangements, the local 
police authorities were often called toothless due to the perception that they 
rubberstamped key decisions taken by their respective chief constables (Scott and 
Wilkie, 2001; also, Chapter 2 and 3). The SPA was subjected to the same criticisms 
while it was developing and evolving as an organisation (Chapter 7). In addition to 
power, it is also pertinent that the proposed epistocratic arrangement has the resources 





Without clearly defined powers, the capacity of the proposed epistocratic framework 
to resolve the perennial problems of police governance or to provide robust 
mechanisms for police organisational accountability would be severely limited. 
However, my analysis in Chapter 9 shows, in the absence of clearly defined powers, 
through deliberation, the SPA managed to restore some influence, establishing 
mechanisms of proactive scrutiny under the ‘shadow of hierarchy’.  
8.3 - Autonomy 
 
Q. Is the SPA sufficiently independent of the Scottish Ministers, Police Scotland, and 
local government? 
Q. Are the members able to fulfil their statutory functions without interference? 
 
I proposed in Chapter 5 (5.3.3) that an institutional epistocracy must be able to carry 
out its functions independently, within the confines of its delegated powers. It is the 
essence of democracy that too much power should not be concentrated in a single place 
(Jones et al., 1996).  I argued that epistocrats should be non-partisan and impartial, any 
perception of partisanship or partiality would result in a loss of legitimacy and purpose. 
Further, for the proposed epistocratic arrangement to resolve the perpetual tussle 
between the local and the central, it is crucial that it is suitably independent and 
balances the competing local and central interests through deliberation, on the basis of 
knowledge, expertise and evidence (Chapter 5, 5.4).  
 
My analysis of the SPA shows that as well as a loss of power and influence, the 
outcome of the turf war in favour of the Chief Constable also increased the perception 
that the SPA, was in fact an extension of the Scottish Government, its members merely 
acting at the behest of Scottish Ministers, rather than governing through expertise and 
knowledge.  The strongest perception of a lack of autonomy to manage and deliver the 






“To some extent, I think, in a system where there is a great deal of 
political oversight and talking as we are, I could say that there 
have been occasions when governments view has been through 
the civil service quite forcibly put to us as a potential direction on 
matters” - (Interview: Board Member A, SPA). 
 
“I'm an experienced board member, I have sat on a lot of boards, I 
have never had more contact with Ministers than in this role so I 
think that in itself is very interesting... there was a real interaction 
when the new Cabinet Secretary took over we were, I was going to 
say invited, called to St. Andrews house so that he could eye ball 
us all actually and set out his expectations” - (Interview: Board 
Member B, SPA). 
 
“The central government throughout the entire process has been 
far too heavily involved … rather than having a separation of 
duties between government, SPA, police we very much had the 
government and the police, and the SPA almost as onlookers, and 
in that environment, it was never going to work” - (Interview: 
Board Member C, SPA) 
 
“That [central government involvement] has always been the fear 
of the SPA in the three years we have been in existence so whilst 
there is no day-to-day interference with what we are doing, I think 
there has been a perception and the threat that if we overstep our 
responsibilities or if we were to upset the chief constable then the 
Cabinet Secretary would intervene to stop us from whatever it is 
we were doing, and that perception has had an effect on the 
ambitions of Police Scotland.” - (Interview: Board Member D, 
SPA).  
 
The above comments may not be representative of the whole SPA board, but in the 
aftermath of the turf war, and in relation to the inadequate processes and mechanisms 
of police operational accountability (see Chapter 7), there was a growing perception 
that the SPA was not allowed to develop as an independent governing body.  As I 
outlined in Chapter 3 (see, 3.1), the 2012 Act affords considerable powers to the 
Cabinet Secretary for Justice to appoint the chair, and to influence the final 
composition of the SPA board, and the way it operates. The Scottish Ministers also 
have formal powers to give directions to the SPA, so long as those directions are not 
related to police operations. This direct involvement may be acceptable and even 




Scotland report found that the chairs of the NHS bodies regularly met with the Cabinet 
Secretary, and enjoyed a “close relationship with Scottish Government” (Audit 
Scotland, 2010: 16). However, the official justification for the creation of the SPA was 
for an arms-length governance body to sit between policing and central government 
(Scottish Government 2011c: 13, para. 3.9). A former Minister, I interviewed, 
confirmed that “we were quite clear that there would have to be a body in-between”. 
Yet there was a growing perception that the weak accountability mechanisms were in 
fact due to consistent Ministerial interventions:  
 
 “Every time we try to bite, the government removes a 
tooth … I have been shocked, absolutely shocked at the level of 
government interaction” - (Interview: Board Member C, SPA). 
 
The perception among most of my interviewees was that due to the proximity between 
the former Cabinet Secretary for Justice and the Chief Constable, the SPA was often 
bypassed on key decisions. The case of deployment of armed officers on routine 
patrols across Scotland highlighted that the Chief Constable did not share this 
information with the SPA: 
 
“MacAskill reported to me when I asked him that when the Chief 
Constable decided that his officers would patrol with firearms, the 
chief constable came and briefed MacAskill privately. He didn’t 
brief the convenor of the [SPA] board. He bypassed the board and 
went to the Minister” - (Interview: MSP, Lab). 
 
The close contact between the former Justice Secretary and the former Chief Constable 
was also acknowledged by a HMICS representative who indicated that the level of 
contact between the two had left the SPA outside the loop on big decisions, particularly 
at a time when the SPA was still developing as an organisation: 
 
“the previous Cabinet Secretary for Justice Kenny MacAskill was 
incredibly close to Sir Stephen House, they had a very high regard 
for each other and they were in daily contact all the time. So, that 
doesn’t help an SPA that’s fledgling and trying to find its strategic 





As I outlined in Chapter 3, the consultations prior to the reforms, the 2012 Act and the 
subsequent centralisation of the police forces and the creation of the SPA were 
overseen by the Scottish Government led by the SNP. In the aftermath of the reforms 
and following the publication of Murray’s findings on the use of stop and search 
powers in Scotland (2014a), policing became a politically sensitive matter (also, see 
Chapter 6, 6.3). In fact, upon publication of the stop and search report, the Scottish 
Government held an event, which was attended by the former Cabinet Secretary of 
Justice, with a view to defend the tactic and to promote its benefits (Murray, 2017: 7). 
The event coincided with the SPA’s own inquiry into the use of stop and search.  One 
board member who was involved in the Scrutiny Review told me that: 
 
“Before Kath did her report, the police had a pre-emptive strike at 
a session at Glenrothes. Kenny MacAskill came and said this is a 
good thing, I was sitting about to lead the review of stop and 
search and thought I'm about to look at the facts and figures and 
produce an evidenced based report, the Cabinet Secretary for 
Justice has already made up his mind” - (Interview: Board 
Member C, SPA).  
 
The above quote underlines the influence of the former Justice Minister in matters 
pertaining to policing. Such level of involvement not only raised question marks about 
the independence of the SPA, but also its purpose. The board members I interviewed, 
all raised concerns about the level of Scottish Government influence, hampering their 
abilities to perform their functions independently. Some members also highlighted 
fears of reprisals, if they did not follow Ministerial directions: 
 
“we are there by gift of the Minister, the Cabinet Secretary, if we 
don’t do what we are expected to do, I think there's a very good 
chance that we won’t get reappointed” - (Interview: Board 
Member B, SPA) 
 
“if you stand against the government you might not get 
reappointed” - (Interview: Board Member C, SPA) 
 
The appointments of non-executive board members in Scotland are regulated by the 
Commissioner for Ethical Standards who sets out a code of practice for the Scottish 




of this underlying motivation to get reappointed, it is plausible that certain board 
members would take a similar view to the one proposed by the Justice Minister, 
increasing the likelihood of undue Ministerial, and central government interference. 
This has the capacity to severely undermine the epistocratic claims of the SPA, if on 
key decisions, the SPA board members follow Ministerial line, rather than base their 
decision-making on available evidence and expertise.  
8.3.1 - Discussion: Autonomy and lessons for the framework 
The analysis of the SPA, above, provides a strong empirical foundation for the 
inclusion of autonomy in my proposed framework outlined in Chapter 5. I argued that 
for an epistocracy to be institutionalised, it is imperative that such a body has delegated 
powers, and that it does not serve narrow partisan interests. If the experts, appointed 
for a specific purpose, were not able to carry out their functions independently then 
such an arrangement would lose its legitimacy and purpose (Rosenvallon, 2011).  
 
The process of appointments of board members, coupled with an underlying potential 
of reliance of board members on the Justice Minister, for reappointments, raises 
problems and question marks about impartiality of experts. There are suggestions 
among MSPs, particularly from the opposition benches that the members of the SPA 
should be appointed by the Parliament, for direct democratic oversight and greater 
distance from central government. One MSP emphasised this point: 
 
“While the legislation was going through, we had amendments 
down which would have meant that the appointments were made 
by Parliament or by a commission, in particular the appointment 
of the chair of the board would not have been the appointment of 
the Justice Secretary but a commission in the way we appoint the 
Human Rights commissioners or something like that. And that 
was rejected” - (Interview: MSP, LibDem) 
 
Such an arrangement would create some distance between the Scottish Government 
and the SPA, allowing the board members to carry out their functions within the 
confines of their delegated powers. However, one civil servant raised a pertinent 






“So people argue for democratic accountability and then argue 
against political control, so if you had the Chief Constable 
reporting to the Cabinet Secretary for Justice, that would be a bad 
thing, that would be political control, but if you had a Chief 
Constable reporting to locally elected members then that’s 
democratic accountability. Well that’s exactly the same thing, so 
people were not being consistent, in the way they look at it, if 
you're going to have democratic accountability, and that’s about 
accounting to people who are elected, they are politicians, then the 
possibility of political control is inherent” - (Interview: Civil 
Servant) 
 
The above quote touches at the heart of the issue of the “regulatory puzzle” and the 
“paradox of police governance” as conceived by Walker (2000: 4-5). I argue that by 
appointing experts, and delegating powers of police governance to them, the 
democratic state should seek to limit its own influence in policing policy, for reasons 
explored in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 at length (Chapter 2, 2.4.1; Chapter 4, 4.4.2). It 
is for that institution then, an epistocracy - to undertake its delegated functions within 
the confines of its powers.  
 
An institutionalised epistocracy is accountable to the democratic state (Holst and 
Mollander, 2014), however, undue central government influence in its approach to 
police governance and accountability can lead to perceptions of partiality and 
partisanship. A lack of autonomy can further perpetuate the tensions between the local 
and central government, resulting in lop-sided governance structures, as was the case 
previously during tripartism. The SPA, as an institutionalised epistocracy with 
delegated powers, situated at the centre of two tripartite relationships, has the potential 
to serve as an impartial and non-partisan intermediary between the local and the 
central, and between the public and the police. However, it needs to establish some 
distance from the Scottish Government if it is to achieve its potential. As I have argued 
in relation to the framework, if the SPA is perceived as an extension of central 
government, merely carrying out ministerial duties, instead of drawing on expert 




8.4 - Conclusion 
The tribulations of the SPA in its first two years, as examined in this chapter and in 
Chapter 7, were summed up by one board member: 
 
“We have created an image for ourselves as being ineffective, not 
being proactive, being reactive, being in the government’s pocket, 
being in Chief Constable’s pocket, being useless, being on a gravy 
train, you know all of those things, they are really hard to 
overturn” - (Board Member B, SPA). 
 
The analysis of the SPA so far provides a strong empirical foundation for my proposed 
conceptual framework. In particular, it shows that the inclusion of a broad 
composition, power and autonomy are key characteristics that contribute to the overall 
capacity of an institutional epistocracy to deliver effective mechanisms of police 
organisational accountability.  
 
This chapter has highlighted that the inability of the SPA to implement effective 
processes and mechanisms of operational accountability were due to weaknesses in its 
knowledge composition resulting from a lack of training, and insufficient time given 
to board members to develop an understanding of operational policing. The powers of 
the SPA were not clearly defined and the differing interpretations led to a turf war that 
resulted in the SPA losing much of its influence at a time when it was still developing 
as an organisation. Finally, the Scottish Government, through the Justice Minister, did 
not allow the SPA to carry out their functions independently, leading to the perception 
that it was an extension of central government. Board members in particular, raised 
concerns about reappointments, if they did not follow Ministerial directions.  
 
The analysis of the SPA stresses the importance of a broad composition, power, and 
autonomy, for an epistocratic approach to police governance. I will argue in Chapter 9 
that all of these components are strengthened by the inclusion of deliberation, which 
provides a crucial democratic character to the proposed epistocratic arrangement. All 
of these components are interdependent, and provide for a holistic approach to police 
governance and accountability, as my analysis of the SPA in relation to deliberation 




Chapter 9 - The SPA’s approach to police accountability - The 
deliberative ideals  
 
This is the second of the two chapters that presents the analysis of the SPA in relation 
to my proposed conceptual framework outlined in Chapter 5. In this chapter, I argue 
that since the high-profile cases of stop and search and armed policing, the deliberative 
principles have become implicit in the SPA’s approach to governance and 
accountability, and this has helped alleviate some of the problems the SPA 
encountered in its formative years. As the new governance arrangements have 
continued to evolve, the SPA has gradually established an accountability relationship 
that encompasses proactive scrutiny as well as retrospective accountability, and it is 
underpinned by deliberative principles of justification and reasoning. This has also 
resulted in an improved provision of information from the police.  
 
I conclude the findings chapters (7-9) by arguing that despite weaknesses in its 
composition, a lack of clarity in its power, and impositions resulting in a lack of 
autonomy (Chapter 8), the SPA’s approach to police governance and accountability is 
evolving and encapsulating the ideals of an ‘epistocratic and deliberative’ approach to 
police governance.  These developments have the potential to resolve the ‘operational 
independence’ doctrine, or at least render it dormant, until invoked by an overzealous 
chief constable, as well as enhancing the SPA’s potential to strengthen its position as 
an intermediary, to provide a balance between the local and the central.  
9.1 - Deliberation and accountability mechanisms 
Q. Are deliberative principles manifest in the SPA’s approach to proactive scrutiny 
and retrospective accountability? 
Q. Have deliberative principles resulted in better provision of information from the 
police? 
  
In outlining my proposed framework in Chapter 5, I argued that deliberation refers to 




(Chapter 5, 5.3.4). By drawing on a restricted definition of accountability as a 
mechanism (Bovens, 2010; see Chapter 5, 5.2) I argued that the three phases of 
accountability, i.e. information phase, debating phase, and consequences phase can be 
achieved through my proposed ‘epistocratic and deliberative’ approach to police 
governance (Chapter 5, see Table 5.1). I argued that the most crucial phase of 
accountability mechanisms is the debating phase as this is where accountability takes 
place in practice (Day and Klein, 1987; Mulgan, 2000; Bovens, 2010). The inclusion 
of deliberative principles of justification and reasoning during this phase can allow 
proactive scrutiny of policing policies as they are being developed, as well as 
retrospective exchange of reasons and justification ex post facto (Chapter 5, 5.2). This 
argument is confirmed and consolidated by the analysis of the SPA’s emergent 
approach to police governance and accountability that is underpinned by deliberative 
principles, as I examine below.  
 
Following the turf-wars (Chapter 8), the SPA restated its accountability role in terms 
of scrutiny and oversight. However, this led to renewed tensions between the SPA and 
senior officers of Police Scotland. In the first two years of the new arrangements, there 
was a strong sense within the Police Scotland hierarchy that the SPA did not have any 
business scrutinising police operational policies, particularly on a proactive basis (see 
Chapter 7). The SPA’s attempts to establish a proactive scrutiny relationship with 
Police Scotland unsurprisingly met with resistance, causing further confusion about 
the SPA’s role, at a time when the organisation was still at an embryonic stage. As I 
argued in Chapter 7 and 8, the case of the standing firearms authority represents one 
of many examples where the SPA was bypassed during the operational decision-
making processes.  However, the then SPA chair stated a desire for the SPA to have a 
more proactive role in scrutinising police policies: 
 
“There is a maturity in our arrangements with the police on the 
extent to which the SPA becomes involved in the chief constable’s 
decisions. Our scrutiny role is very much after the fact, and that is 
not really my view of governance … we need to move to a 
situation in which we are consulted in advance of policy decisions 
being made instead of simply scrutinising those decisions after the 
fact” - (Justice Sub-Committee hearing on Armed Policing, 21 





In 2016, in his governance review, the new Chair of the SPA, reemphasised that the 
SPA needs to take “responsibility for reviewing policing policy … this should be a 
proactive process and done collaboratively with Police Scotland” (Flanagan, 2016: 
21, Recommendation 20). I found that following the initial period of upheaval and 
uncertainty (discussed in Chapter 7 and 8), the SPA has made considerable progress 
in achieving a degree of proactive scrutiny, however, there was some early resistance 
from Police Scotland.  
 
The resistance against proactive scrutiny was largely due to what the previous SPA’s 
chair referred to as ‘scrutiny after the fact’. That was the primary modus operandi and 
a legacy of the previous tripartite governance arrangements in Scotland. This type of 
‘explanatory and co-operative’ governance mechanism (see Chapter 4, 4.2.2) allowed 
for a culture of retrospective accountability that did not impede on the operational 
decision making of the senior officers, whilst also allowing the police forces to fulfil 
a statutory obligation31 to give an account of their performance to locally elected 
representatives. A recent research study spanning all eight local police boards, noted 
that it was common for the chief constable to present an annual report on force 
performance, and whilst this sometimes triggered questions, or requests for further 
information from local board members, the reports were mostly accepted without 
further discussion, dialogue or scrutiny (Etherson, 2013: 147). A council officer who 
currently assists a local scrutiny committee, in one local authority area, gave me her 
insights on how she perceived the police board meetings took place during the previous 
arrangements:  
 “On occasion I attended the previous joint board … it was 
the weirdest experience for me… [the current local] scrutiny 
committee meetings can be bruising if the members are not happy, 
but in the previous joint board the same councillors from our 
authority, who can be very challenging and tough, were absolute 
lambs in an environment where the Chief Constable was there in 
his full regalia and his officers were all there with all of their stuff 
on, there was no scrutiny that was evident. I saw police officers 
congratulate themselves on how well they were providing 
services and members almost applauding. I could not believe that 
                                                 




it is the same members who scrutinise other public services in 
such a different way” - (Interview: Lead Officer, LSC, Site 3). 
 
While the experience of this officer may not be representative of all local police board 
meetings that took place in other police areas, it potentially highlights the kind of 
accountability the senior officers of Police Scotland, who had all served in the previous 
legacy forces32, may have been accustomed to, and perhaps comfortable with.  
 
The creation of the SPA, with a governance and oversight role, as well as a duty to 
hold the chief constable to account, represented a paradigm shift insofar as the existing 
mechanisms of accountability were concerned, introducing an added requirement for 
proactive scrutiny. This is examined further in relation to the annual police plans. 
9.1.1 - Annual Police Plans 
In the absence of clear accountability mechanisms, the SPA’s early emphasis had been 
on assessing police performance in relation to the policing priorities, and the SPA’s 
own strategic police plan. Despite the 2012 Act being vague and ambiguous about 
what it meant by ‘the duty to hold the chief constable to account’, it placed clear 
expectations on both the SPA and Police Scotland about the need for policing in 
Scotland to adhere to the policing principles (see, Box 9.1).  
 
 
                                                 
32 For instance, the former Chief Constable had served in the same role at Strathclyde Police, one DCC 
had also served in Strathclyde Police and two DCCs had previously served in the Lothian and Borders 
Police, before Police Scotland came into effect. 
The policing principles are— 
(a) that the main purpose of policing is to improve the safety and well-being of persons, localities and 
communities in Scotland, and 
(b) that the Police Service, working in collaboration with others where appropriate, should seek to achieve 
that main purpose by policing in a way which— 
(i) is accessible to, and engaged with, local communities, and 
(ii) promotes measures to prevent crime, harm and disorder. 
 




The policing principles form the basis for the strategic police priorities that are set out 
by the Scottish Ministers in consultation with the SPA and Police Scotland (s33). Once 
the strategic police priorities are published and laid out in front of the Scottish 
Parliament, the SPA then has a duty to prepare a strategic police plan (see, Box 9.2).  
 
In cognisance of the SPA’s strategic police plan, and the strategic police priorities 
outlined by the Scottish Ministers, the chief constable has a statutory duty to prepare 
and publish an annual police plan (see, Box 9.3), setting out the policing arrangements 
for the whole of Scotland.  
 
 
Crucially, as Box 9.3 highlights, the 2012 Act instructs the chief constable to send a 
copy of the draft plan to the SPA, inviting the SPA to comment on the draft plan, and 
to give due regard to those comments. The SPA itself has to give reasons for the 
strategic objectives set out in its strategic police plan. In practical terms, the annual 
police plan has to have regard to the strategic objectives outlined by the Scottish 
Ministers and the SPA’s strategic police plan, which places a strong statutory impetus 
on the SPA to establish processes of proactive scrutiny during the policy-making 
A strategic police plan is a plan which— 
(a) sets out the main objectives for the Authority and for the policing of Scotland, 
(b) explains the reasons for selecting each main objective, 
(c) describes what the Authority considers should be done by it or by the Police Service in order to 
achieve the main objectives, 
(d) where reasonably practicable, identifies outcomes by reference to which the achievement of 
the main objectives may be measured, and 
(e) includes any other information connected with the Authority’s functions, or policing, which the 
Authority considers appropriate. 
Box 9.2 - Section 34 of Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 
When preparing an annual police plan, the chief constable must— 
a) send a copy of a draft plan to the Authority, 
b) invite the Authority to comment on the draft plan within such reasonable period as the chief 
constable may specify, and 
c) have regard to any comments received within that period 




phase. But the language used in the act, with explicit references to consultation, 
reasons, explaining and giving due regard imply deliberative principles. I argued in 
Chapter 8 (8.2), that the 2012 Act left the precise implementation of the SPA’s powers 
to negotiated agreement, however, a consequence of such a scenario was increased 
deliberation between the various stakeholders in the new police governance landscape. 
This not only included Police Scotland, the Scottish Government, and the SPA, but 
also HMICS, Audit Scotland, PIRC, CoSLA, and the local scrutiny committees (see 
Chapter 3, 3.1).  
 
When the reforms came into effect, however, the SPA board members were prevented 
from having any involvement in the shaping of the annual police plan. One senior 
officer made it clear the SPA was only sent a copy of the annual police plan because 
the legislation required as such: 
 
“The annual police plan has to go to the Police Authority for 
discussion because that’s what the legislation says, it’s not for 
approval and that’s again something you’ve got to be careful of 
because there are some members of the authority previously were 
of the belief that they approved the police plan … they have a 
legislative right to see the plan but not to approve it and even 
parliament don’t have the right to approve it because it’s the 
annual police plan decreed by the chief constable” - (Interview: 
Ch/Supt, Police Scotland). 
 
The comment of a senior officer above indicates the kind of attitude that might have 
been prevalent in the hierarchy of Police Scotland in the first three years of the reforms. 
A representative of HMICS also alluded to this: 
 
“I think the police service has lost its way in its first three years by 
being institutionally arrogant” - (Interview: HMICS) 
 
Opposition MSPs had also raised concerns about the culture that had been allowed to 
prevail under the leadership of the previous chief constable, seemingly due to 





“One of the things that I think has been a big loss with the reform 
has been that the role of the chief constable, has no other peer of 
his equal in the profession in Scotland, and that is dangerous. So, 
in the past you had 8 chief constables and they were all of an equal 
standing and each of them carried out their role in a very different 
way and they were able to bounce things off each other and I 
suspect if there was someone doing something that seemed rather 
over the boundary the other chief constables would have felt able, 
and would have done, would have challenged them and who can 
do that in Scotland now?” - (Interview: MSP, LibDem) 
 
“the chief constable and people around the chief constable seem to 
have got to a process in which they will do as they chose under 
the guise of their operational independence and that any notion of 
policing by consent was artificial and consultation was more about 
media handling rather than genuine consultation and it was an 
absence of the candour, genuine candour on the way in which 
policing was being conducted in the first three years of Police 
Scotland” - (Interview: MSP, Lab) 
 
Despite resistance from the senior hierarchy of Police Scotland, the SPA members that 
I spoke to were clear that they continued to engage with the senior officers on the 
matter of the annual police plans and there was no doubt in their mind that this was a 
hook in for them to start to develop some form of proactive scrutiny of policing policy, 
recognising that the Act had placed an obligation on the chief constable to consult with 
the SPA on the issue: 
 
“The act doesn’t require us to approve it. It places obligation on 
the chief constable to consult with us” - (Interview: Executive 
Officer B, SPA). 
 
 
“There’s the top level outcomes that the Government has set, the 
priorities for policing, there is then what we set out in the strategic 
police plan and below that there is what the chief [constable] sets 
himself in his annual police plan. So, those things should all come 
together and we should be measuring [police performance] 
against all of that … but it is a bit haphazard … I would like to 
scrutinise the annual police plan as it is being developed” - 





However, the resistance from the senior police officers permeated in such a way that 
even the statutory obligation ‘to consult’ the SPA in relation to the annual police plan, 
was not fulfilled in the first year of the reforms.   
 
“… there was a relatively limited amount of consultation done in 
truth that took place around that [the annual police plan] … there 
wasn’t much dialogue” – (Interview: Executive Officer B, SPA) 
 
“I think in fairness you know in the first year we probably didn’t 
do as much engagement with the police authority” – (Interview: 
Ch/Supt, Police Scotland) 
 
The turf wars that had marred the relations between the former chair of the SPA and 
the former chief constable (Chapter 8, 8.2) undoubtedly had an effect on the level of 
engagement and consultation, and the provision of information in the first year of the 
new arrangements. However, despite early resistance from Police Scotland, the 
relationship between the SPA and Police Scotland appeared to be maturing and 
evolving at the time of my fieldwork.  HMICS played a crucial role, as a facilitator, 
and in its numerous reports, it made recommendations that the SPA and Police 
Scotland should engage more often. For instance, in its report following the armed 
police controversy, HMICS advised Police Scotland to engage with the SPA in at least 
7 out of 10 different recommendations (HMICS, 2014: 9-10).  Further informal 
meetings and interactions between the SPA and the senior officers of Police Scotland, 
often facilitated, or attended by HMICS, became opportunities for deliberation, 
involving reasoning and justification, allowing the SPA to gain sight of prospective 
police policies at an early stage (also, see 9.3 below).  
 
Members of the SPA and Police Scotland acknowledged that the relationship between 
the two organisations was improving due to more dialogue, reasoning and 
justification. While not explicitly mentioning deliberation, the benefits of these 
inherent deliberative qualities were realised in relation to the annual police plans in the 






“…the annual police plan went through the whole process of 
explaining to the authority … what they’ve done with their 
comments and why they haven’t done anything with them … you 
have to explain that through to them …” – (Interview: Ch/Supt, 
Police Scotland). 
 
“by some earlier interaction and involvement and discussions … 
by the time the letter was written, Police Scotland were already 
reforming the plan to fit with what we were asking for” – 
(Interview: Board Member A, SPA).  
 
Further, a member of the SPA, also acknowledged that the involvement of HMICS 
may have helped this process: 
 
“Well, the Inspector of Constabulary was around and about some 
of those discussions, I’d imagine that helped the discussions … he 
was looking at undertaking a review of Police Scotland’s strategic 
planning at the time so it probably helped encourage those 
undertaking the work in Police Scotland rather than rushed, to 
plan together, think about what their I suppose, obligations were 
to other bodies in doing that” - (Interview: Board Member A, 
SPA). 
 
Through ongoing deliberations, a more collaborative relationship between the two 
organisations had developed, and executive officers of the SPA played a key role in 
becoming an intermediary between the board members and the senior officers of Police 
Scotland. Whilst there was more consultation, the implicit deliberative nature of the 
new relationship also allowed the SPA to develop processes of proactive scrutiny. For 
instance, the executive officers, who according to a HMICS representative “did all the 
heavy lifting”, would regularly meet with the senior officers of Police Scotland and 
these meetings, in essence, became forums of ‘sense-checking’ before the more 
formalised forms of retrospective accountability such as the PBMs and working 
committee meetings led by board members:  
 
“we are being proactive and that’s also backed up by the fact that 
all officers within the SPA, we are going out making sure that we 
are attending these meetings so that even if Police Scotland are 
talking about things at an early stage, we can help shape it” - 





“We have, I think, it is either weekly or fortnightly meetings to 
check things to come along what’s happening, what’s in the 
pipeline, what are the issues…” – (Interview: Executive Officer B, 
SPA).  
 
As the principles of reasoning and justification became implicit in the nature of 
communication between the SPA and Police Scotland, there were signs that a holistic 
approach to police governance and accountability had started to evolve and this was 
exemplified by the signing of the joint policy engagement protocol between the SPA 
and Police Scotland.  
9.1.2 - Joint Policy Engagement  
A second example of the SPA’s approach to proactive scrutiny, through deliberation, 
was the joint policy engagement protocol, signed in the aftermath of the armed policing 
controversy. It was recommended by HMICS that: 
 
“Police Scotland should adopt a comprehensive stakeholder 
management process for major policy changes, apply community 
impact assessments as a matter of course and ensure this is 
supported by a detailed communications plan. In particular, there 
should be agreement between Police Scotland and the Scottish 
Police Authority around how significant national policy changes 
are communicated in advance” - (HMICS, 2014: 9). 
 
This paved the way for the SPA members to engage with Police Scotland in advance 
of policy decisions being implemented, allowing significant scope for proactive 
scrutiny and better provision of information from the police. For instance, the 
document states: 
 
 “Police Scotland commits to engage in advance with the SPA on 
any policy or approach that is likely to raise significant public 
interest or on which they would require to communicate and 
engage with partners and the public on a national basis 
 
Together, SPA and Police Scotland commit to ensuring that the 
key issues and outcomes of engagement are discussed with the 
Scottish Government in a timely manner, ensuring that the 
Government has an opportunity to provide policy input before 
decisions are finalised, and brought to public attention in an 




governance and scrutiny meetings”. – (Joint Agreement on Police 
Policy Engagement – February, 2015, emphasis added) 
 
In principle, the joint policy engagement protocol would ensure that the tendency of 
Police Scotland’s senior officers to bypass the SPA, such as in the case of the standing 
firearms authority, was minimised. It also ensures that Police Scotland would engage 
in advance with the SPA, and crucially, allows other partners, (such as local 
authorities, HMICS, Audit Scotland and PIRC), to have an input in the deliberations 
before policies are finalised and rolled out in a public forum.  Further, it also provides 
opportunities for the Scottish Government to have broad oversight over prospective 
policing policies that could likely cause a negative public impact. Such an arrangement 
not only exemplifies the interdependencies of different actors in a network-based 
governance setting (Rhodes, 1996; Bevir, 2010) but as I argued in Chapter 4 (4.5) it 
also allows the democratic state to ‘steer’ policing policy without direct intervention, 
or influence, providing overall democratic legitimacy.  
 
There has been a perception within the SPA that the joint policy engagement protocol 
had changed the rules of the game and now there were opportunities for the SPA to 
have more of an input and oversight of policing policy, as it was being developed: 
 
  “That’s a real fundamental piece and it has quietly 
developed and launched and that has some real potential… we sat 
together with senior policing figures in order to draw out what 
policies and operational decisions mean to us, and as a result we 
have signed the joint protocol agreement and that’s something 
three or four years ago no observer in policing would have ever 
said the police would sign up to … chief constable committing to 
engage not only with ourselves but actually much more widely on 
any issue in which there is a public interest” - (Interview: 
Executive Officer B, SPA) 
 
As illustrated by the comment above, the potential of the joint engagement policy 
protocol is remarkable. I have argued at length in Chapter 2 and 7, about the need to 
ensure police operational policies are subject to scrutiny from respective governing 
bodies, with the caveat that specific operations are insulated from undue political 
interference. This protocol potentially renders the traditional notion of operational 




communities would need to be discussed and deliberated on in advance. At least in 
principle, the joint policy engagement protocol means that there should be a better 
provision of information from the police, followed by deliberations and an exchange 
of reasoning and justification. It is here, through proactive scrutiny of prospective 
policing policies, that the SPA can utilise its epistocratic credentials by drawing on 
knowledge and evidence, both internally and externally through forums such as SIPR, 
to counterbalance police expertise, ensuring that future policing policies have a strong 
evidence base.  
 
The joint policy engagement protocol, underpinned by horizontal deliberation, has also 
paved the way for the SPA and Police Scotland to jointly develop and publish a 10-
year policing strategy document entitled Policing 2026 that will inform future policing 
practice, organisational structure, strategic priorities, and operational policies (Police 
Scotland and SPA, 2017). The document has been developed through a period of 
interaction and deliberation between Police Scotland and the SPA, and it has benefitted 
from external academic and practitioner input, through the platform of SIPR, providing 
an evidence base for future policing strategy in Scotland. This recent development 
exemplifies that the SPA’s emergent approach to police governance is underpinned by 
epistocratic and deliberative characteristics.  
 
While the SPA’s growing influence in shaping police operational policies as they are 
being developed is a positive step, it does raise concerns about the SPA’s effectiveness 
as an accountability forum, particularly in relation to the third phase of accountability, 
i.e. the consequence phase. However, I found that deliberative principles had allowed 
the SPA to re-establish some influence after the initial turf-war, and the threat of 
reputational damage allowed it to establish a proactive accountability relationship 
under the ‘shadow of hierarchy’.   
9.1.3 - Deliberation and powers of sanction 
Bovens (2007; 2010) has argued that an essential characteristic of an accountability 
relationship is the ability for the accountability forum to decide sanctions, or 




underpins the key democratic principle of redress (Chapter 5, 5.2). I argued that any 
contentious policing policy carries a risk of reputational damage due to negative 
publicity and research has shown that whilst it may be the “weakest possible sanction 
executives of public organisations are highly alert to perceived negative publicity” 
(Schillemans, 2011: 391).  This was recognised by the senior officer of Police Scotland 
and the SPA board members: 
 
“the media can be incredibly damaging to the thing that is our 
lifeblood which is consent. If the public confidence in us goes into 
decline, then that does affect policing. It affects the way people 
feel the fear of crime, people’s feelings of community, all of these 
things are really what we spend huge amounts of effort trying to 
build and in one fell swoop you know a series of headlines can do 
untold damage to it. So, can you ignore headlines? No, you can’t. 
Can you control them? No, you can’t.  … what we are seeking 
to achieve here is public consent” – (Interview: DCC, Police 
Scotland).  
 
“policing guards its reputation very jealously and I think it does 
that because it knows that public confidence is important in the 
role that they undertake” - (Interview: Board Member A, SPA). 
 
The members of the SPA were also acutely aware of their own reputations, due to the 
intense media pressure in the aftermath of the high-profile cases (see, Chapter 7, 7.2; 
also, Murray and Harkin, 2016).   
 
“some of the more controversial subjects which perhaps have had 
media scrutiny which seem to have arisen out of nowhere and 
shouldn’t happen in the future so we are being proactive” - 
(Interview: Executive Officer A, SPA) 
 
“There is a thing about Scotland’s media that now focuses about 
half of its resources down in the Scottish Parliament so therefore if 
something comes up there it becomes a national story and it runs” 
- (Interview: Board Member A, SPA) 
 
“The issue of firearms was whipped up by the media” - 





As the above statements highlight, members of the SPA and senior police officers were 
aware of potential risks of negative media coverage. The nature of policing is such that 
the risk of reputational damage is omnipresent. The role played by the media in the 
context of the post-2012 Act policing landscape merits attention in its own right, and 
it would be outside the scope of this study to focus on the role of the media in 
delivering a dimension of public accountability of the police. However, the issues of 
stop and search and armed policing resulted in an intense period of political and media 
scrutiny with the Justice Sub-Committee on Policing and the Scottish press taking the 
lead on public accountability of the police and the SPA. The joint policy engagement 
protocol was developed as a result of what researchers elsewhere describe as 
“collective action” (Romzek et al., 2012: 446; also, see 9.3 below) following horizontal 
deliberations between the SPA and Police Scotland, and facilitated by other actors such 
as the Scottish Government, HMICS, Audit Scotland, PIRC and CoSLA. These 
developments exemplify that in the absence of clear lines of hierarchy, robust 
horizontal accountability mechanisms provide a check against the various stakeholders 
and provide learning stimuli that can lead to a change in behaviour (Schillemans, 
2011). It also demonstrates that after an initial period of contestations and differing 
interpretations about the SPA’s role and powers of police accountability, following a 
turbulent period, Police Scotland did change their approach, allowing the SPA to gain 
sight of policing policies in advance. In his governance review, the current SPA Chair 
stated that the SPA was not a watchdog as it had no powers of sanction, “it has to 
govern essentially through its relationships and influence rather than having a direct 
ability to instruct” (Flanagan, 2016: para. 69). However, as the joint policy engagement 
protocol shows that the threat of reputational damage can often be used as a bargaining 
tool and even in the absence of formal powers of sanction, an accountability 
relationship can be established under the ‘shadow of hierarchy’.  
 
These developments have contributed to the dilution of the traditional notion of 
operational independence and enhanced the SPA’s potential to scrutinise and shape 
police operational policies as they are being developed. Further, horizontal 
deliberation with other stakeholders such as the local scrutiny committees, the Justice 




enhance its potential to act as an intermediary between the central and local 
government. This connectedness allows policing policy to be more responsive to 
reasonable demands of the elected representatives and local communities, as I examine 
below.  
9.2 - Responsiveness through deliberation 
Policing scholars have used responsiveness in the context of police governance as a 
key democratic characteristic, arguing that policing policy should be democratically 
responsive (Jones et al. 1996: 195, also, Aitchison and Blaustein, 2013). I argued in 
the context of my proposed framework that deliberative principles can encompass 
responsiveness and participation (Chapter 5, 5.2). 
 
The joint engagement protocol allows the SPA to engage and consult with partners, 
and that includes local authorities. Whilst I argued that the SPA had not been effective 
in acting as an intermediary between the local scrutiny committees and Police 
Scotland’s senior executive, (7.2.2.a), recent developments point to a more 
deliberative nature of engagement. Following our research (Henry et al., 2016) and the 
SPA Governance Review (Flannagan, 2016), the SPA has participated in regular 
forums for convenors and lead officers representing the local scrutiny committees 
across Scotland (CoSLA, 2016).  
 
In terms of engagement with local communities, the SPA members indicated that there 
were plans to consult the public on a number of issues, in particular the issue of body-
worn cameras: 
 
“there will be a lot more public attitude work and ideally on 
issues which have not yet developed a public debate at the right 
time would be about the body worn cameras … it comes with a lot 
of interdependencies for me and wider concerns, there are some 
victim groups that support this and then there is another 
section…I think this is a classic area in which we need to test 
public attitudes” - (Interview: Executive Officer B, SPA)  
 
“I would say depends on the issue but yes and the plan would be 




first go to people, to gauge what local communities are thinking of 
policing. It has to be wider than that ultimately and especially on 
issues of major public concern. So for instance if there was a 
proposal … to equip all the officers with body worn cameras. I 
think we’d want to go out to the wider public on that. But we’d 
probably start by going to the local authorities and saying what do 
they think on behalf of their communities then build from there 
and go to the stakeholders who had more specialist interest as 
well so obviously the Human Rights Commission but you might 
talk to representative groups from maybe civil liberties, disability, 
ethnic communities because it might be, what you do on 
something like that might be perceived differently by different 
sections of the community and it's not always obvious until you 
ask people what they think about that” - (Interview: Board 
Member A, SPA). 
 
The SPA has also engaged with the public on various issues, its Scrutiny Inquiry into 
armed policing (SPA, 2014a) attracted 149 responses from members of the public, it 
also hired an independent firm to conduct a National Public Attitudes Survey and 
carried out face-to-face evidence sessions across Scotland. The quotes from the SPA 
members above, indicate that at least on issues of public concern and particularly in 
relation to operational policies that may have a negative public impact, the SPA has 
an intention to engage with the local authorities, as well as local communities. 
However, as I have argued in Chapter 5 (5.3.4), in order not to succumb to partisanship 
and majoritarianism, principles of deliberation mean that any unreasonable demands 
can be refused with reasoning and justification (Loader and Walker, 2007; Aitchison 
and Blaustein, 2013). The deliberative principles in the SPA’s approach to police 
accountability are further exemplified by the following example: 
9.2.1 - Case Study - Deliberative Accountability in action  
Police Scotland announced the merger of Aberdeen City Division with Aberdeenshire 
and Moray Division and the merger of ‘K’ and ‘L’ Divisions33. Under the previous 
governance arrangements, this would have been within the scope of the ‘operational’ 
decision-making of the chief constable. The SPA engaged proactively with Police 
                                                 





Scotland, and following months of consultations, engagements and deliberations, 
raised the following questions in relation to the mergers: 
 
• Question 1: Evidence on the approach taken by Police Scotland to engagement 
and consultation with local interests in each areas, what feedback was received 
and how it was considered by Police Scotland, and how issues raised during 
the engagement phase has shaped and informed Police Scotland decisions on 
whether to proceed, or not, with divisional structure changes; 
• Question 2: Evidence on how Police Scotland propose to ensure that Local 
Authorities continue to enjoy appropriate access, and responsiveness, to senior 
decision-makers from Police Scotland where changes are proposed; 
• Question 3: How senior officer resilience and work-life balance across the 
service will be supported within any change or rationalisation – locally and 
nationally -and especially within the superintending ranks; 
• Question 4: Assurance on how any proposed changes have been considered 
alongside existing community planning structures and will contribute to 
partnership working and the successful delivery of shared outcomes; 
• Question 5: How work to assess and quantify potential efficiencies has 
progressed and what a timeline for realisation may look like; 
• Question 6: How any proposed structural changes will read across to decisions 
about the police estate, given the strong prominence stakeholders in both the 
north-east and west coast have given to the status of local headquarters 
buildings; 
• Question 7: What preparations for further planned communications have been 
made to inform and engage internally and externally with local interests and 
the workforce in each area where changes were under consideration? 
(SPA, 2015a) 
 
Following further information presented by Police Scotland, the SPA approved the 
merger of the Aberdeen City and Aberdeenshire and Moray Divisions, despite 




merger of the K and L Divisions. In writing to the Justice Minister, the SPA Chief 
Executive gave reasons: 
 
“As a result of the evidence considered, I can report that SPA members were satisfied 
that Police Scotland had demonstrated an effective approach to engagement and that 
the proposals now being taken forward have been developed to take account of 
concerns and issues raised. This includes the decision not to proceed at this time with 
one of the two proposed changes 
 
As a result, from today (28 October 2015) Police Scotland will begin communications 
internally and externally to confirm that the divisions currently aligned to Aberdeen, 
Aberdeenshire and Moray areas will from the beginning of 2016 operate as a single 
division. They will also confirm that the proposed merger of K and L divisions will not 
be taken forward, but will be reviewed again not earlier than the third quarter of 2016-
17.” (SPA, 2015b).  
 
The above exemplifies how the SPA has managed to weave in principles of 
deliberation into its approach to police accountability of operational policies. The 
evidence provided by Police Scotland was published (SPA, 2015a) and subsequent 
reasons were given for the decisions made. This example further illustrates that the 
balance of power had shifted somewhat in favour of the SPA, through continued 
deliberation and engagement.  
 
Police Scotland had to justify their decision and persuade the SPA rather than asking 
for the decision to be rubberstamped, as was the case under the previous arrangements 
(Chapter 2 and 3). As a former Minister said: “once you get down to having to coerce, 
it’s a sign of failure”. Persuasion, on the other hand, is an inherent principle of 
deliberative dialogue (Dryzek, 2001), and it has gradually become evident in the SPA’s 
approach to police governance and accountability. The emphasis of the SPA on local 





The above analysis shows that through deliberative principles, the SPA has started to 
act as an intermediary between the Police Scotland senior executive and the local 
scrutiny committees. It is an active participant in the recently established Police 
Scrutiny Convenors Forum, aimed at providing a formal route for the escalation of 
issues affecting the local scrutiny committees (CoSLA, 2016).  Further, continued 
deliberation with Police Scotland, and through horizontal deliberation and engagement 
with other key stakeholders such as HMICS, Audit Scotland, PIRC, and the Justice 
Sub-Committee on policing, the SPA has managed to implement mechanisms of 
proactive scrutiny, which means that any policing policy, likely to have a public impact 
must be brought before it for scrutiny, before it is implemented. In essence, this would 
relate to all operational policies that were historically shielded from external scrutiny 
under the guise of operational independence and police professionalism. This 
arrangement is consistent with my proposals in Chapter 7, and it may have rendered 
the traditional notion of operational independence dormant, unless invoked once again 
by an overzealous chief constable.  
9.3 - Discussion: Deliberation and lessons for the framework 
Due to the evolving nature of the post-2012 Act arrangements, the SPA’s deliberations 
with Police Scotland have taken place largely behind closed doors. This raises the 
spectre of proactive scrutiny taking place in informal, private meetings rather than the 
more transparent public reasoning that is associated with deliberative democracy 
(Dryzek, 2001; Gutmann and Thompson, 2004; Fishkin, 2009; Lafont, 2015). My 
analysis of the evolving nature of the new arrangements show that this was a necessary 
aspect of relationship and trust building, following an initial period of turmoil (Chapter 
8, 8.2), and HMICS and the Scottish Government played a facilitative role to ensure 
greater symbiosis between the two organisations. However, the SPA is responsible for 
holding the police to account, and despite their role being framed as ‘a critical friend’ 
there have been arguments that they needed to come out publicly and take the lead on 
issues such as firearms and stop and search:  
 
“They are not a critical friend, they are there to deliver governance 





Whilst the policy engagement protocol states that the public could be consulted on 
issues of concern, and that policies will be announced in a public forum, there is an 
increased likelihood that the real deliberation, whilst the policies are being shaped, will 
continue to take place behind closed doors. This arrangement raises concerns regarding 
regulatory capture, that I alluded to in Chapter 8 (8.1), particularly if there is a 
perception that there is too little distance between the SPA and Police Scotland.  
However, from the SPA’s point of view, particularly as it was trying to restore the 
balance of power and influence that it had lost in its early years (Chapter 8, 8.2), the 
members felt that these informal meetings had some benefits from a governance point 
of view: 
 
“We also have informal forums or safe space discussions so that’s 
where our members can meet on a regular basis, I think its 
monthly where they invite Police Scotland to come and actually 
discuss topics of interest so you know what are they thinking, 
what are their biggest challenges where can the SPA input…so 
there’s kind of regular check points” - (Interview: Executive 
Member A, SPA) 
 
Following the governance review, the SPA board decided to hold committee meetings 
in private as it was argued that these were “working committees” rather than “decision-
making committees” (Flanagan, 2016: para. 75). Since January 2017, the SPA's four 
sub-committees have met in private with no agendas, papers or minutes published to 
the public. This decision has been criticised by external stakeholders, with HM Chief 
Inspector of Constabulary in Scotland writing to the SPA Chair, and the SPA board to 
review this decision. It has also led to a resignation of one of the board members who 
raised concerns at an SPA’s PBM in December 2016. Following her resignation, the 
Scottish Parliament’s Public Audit and Post-Legislative Scrutiny Committee has 
intensely criticised the SPA’s lack of transparency and at a recent meeting, one MSP 
equated the SPA to the “Kremlin” (Scottish Parliament, 2017: Col. 5).  
 
Whilst informal scrutiny of policing policy does raise concerns around a lack of 
transparency, in a network governance approach there are other stakeholders involved 
in policing policy, providing mechanisms for horizontal accountability between the 




also an interested actor, and as my analysis has shown it has had considerable influence 
and interest in matters pertaining to policing, hampering the ability of the SPA to 
establish itself as an independent body (Chapter 8, 8.3). The 2012 Act has resulted in 
a complex set of arrangements where bodies like Audit Scotland, HMICS and PIRC 
have an interest in how the SPA and Police Scotland handle their finances, manage 
complaints, and provide an effective and efficient service (see Chapter 3, 3.1). This 
multifaceted arrangement creates opportunities for horizontal checks and balances 
between the various actors including direct democratic oversight.  
 
I argued in Chapter 5, drawing on Romzek et al., (2012), that informal accountability 
mechanisms can often lead to realisation of shared goals. They have shown through 
empirical analysis of network-based governance arrangements, primarily involving 
non-profit organisations, that the emphasis on shared goals and collective action can 
lead to better information sharing on the basis of trust and reciprocity (Romzek et al., 
2012: 446). Particularly, in the absence of clear lines of power, informal accountability 
mechanisms can develop within the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Romzek et al., 2012: 447). 
Further, other research on partnership working between various agencies in a network 
governance arrangement has also found that horizontal accountability can address 
accountability deficits and provide a strong basis for feedback and learning stimuli 
(Schillemans, 2011: 400).  
 
In the absence of formal powers of sanction, and in light of the SPA’s inability to 
implement robust mechanisms of accountability in its formative years, proactive 
scrutiny, even if it is taking place informally, still provides external oversight over 
policing policies. The SPA board members I spoke to were particularly supportive of 
the idea of private meetings, precisely because it allowed them to gain sight of policing 
policies at an early stage. This meant that policies could be examined without undue 
media and public interference.  
 
“there is an issue around some private discussion taking place 
before the board. It is not an issue, it's helpful, it allows for matters 
to be aired in a non-threatening way, to allow policy making to go 
on, to explore all the possibilities and hopefully for the police 




civilian Directors to bring stuff to us, to test ideas and to allow for 
some planning and some of that takes place at committees but 
some of it also at some working groups at member’s meetings that 
allow early airing and discussion of stuff. Which I hope helps 
decision making in the longer term because where things aren’t 
clear there is then an ability for board members to ask for further 
information and that will end up in the public report that goes out 
in the board decision” - (Interview: Board Member A, SPA) 
 
 
“So things like, well let’s take the contact centres where there was 
a rationalisation and the plan is that there will be three, if that had 
just come straight to the board here's the plan this is it, it would be 
very difficult for us to discuss issues like that in a public forum for 
the first time ever because of the way media works and all the rest 
of it, if you have discussions like that in public then things get 
misrepresented so we do our early thinking at these informal 
members meetings and then do the formal, but it's not about stage 
management… it's at a very early stage before plans are 
formulated” - (Interview: Board Member B, SPA) 
 
 
Despite the recent criticisms around a lack of transparency, the private safe-space 
meetings during the formative years of the new arrangements had in fact created a 
relationship of trust and reciprocity between the SPA and Police Scotland, as a means 
of “getting things done” to manage early tensions (Crawford and Jones, 1995: 21) and 
contributed towards a shared goal, i.e. to ensure policing policies do not have a 
negative public impact, as per the joint engagement protocol (9.1.2). However, this 
arrangement, whilst necessary to allow the new governance protocols to develop and 
evolve, should not become business as usual. The essence of deliberative democracy 
is public reasoning and justification, and particularly in an epistocratic governance 
arrangement, deliberation provides a democratic dimension because it encapsulates 
key democratic principles such as information, redress, responsiveness and 
participation (Chapter 5, 5.2).  
9.4 - Conclusion: democracy and epistocracy reconciled? 
The analysis of the SPA in this chapter provides a strong empirical foundation for the 
inclusion of deliberation as a democratic check against epistocracy, and supports my 




and mechanisms of accountability can not only ensure delivery of robust mechanisms 
of accountability but also enhance and promote key principles of democratic 
governance.  
 
As I have shown above the deliberative ideals allowed for better provision of 
information, the omnipresent threat of reputational damage allowed the SPA to 
develop processes of proactive scrutiny, ensuring that policing policies that may be 
contentious and may lead to a negative public impact were challenged and reversed 
early on, underpinning the principle of redress. Further, the SPA has shown a greater 
interest in engaging with the members of the public on key issues such as armed 
policing, and there are plans to engage with various stakeholders, including the public 
on issues such as body-worn cameras, underpinning responsiveness and participation. 
However, principles of deliberation also mean that the SPA will often have to refuse 
unreasonable demands from the public or local or central political actors. Whilst the 
SPA has shown with the example of the Aberdeen Division merger that it can sustain 
pressure from the local authorities and draw on evidence and information to explain 
and justify decisions, it is yet to situate itself as sufficiently independent of the 
influence of the Scottish Ministers, as my analysis in Chapter 8 showed.  
 
The analysis of the SPA shows that the inclusion of deliberation can also strengthen 
other characteristics of the framework. For instance, since its inception, the SPA has 
engaged with external stakeholders, and academics, to enhance its epistocratic 
credentials, and fill the gaps in its own knowledge composition. The SPA jointly 
organised ThinkTanks with Police Scotland and SIPR, which served as a platform for 
the SPA to draw on external knowledge and evidence. The SPA’s most recent strategic 
police plan entitled Policing 2026 was developed through explicit engagement and 
deliberation with academics, practitioners, and local and central political stakeholders. 
In 2016, SIPR held an International policing conference inviting academics and 
practitioners from across the globe. The presentations focused on the six key 
components that informed the SPA’s strategic police plan, i.e. Performance, 
Partnership, Prevention, Place, Public Accountability, and People and 





Further, whilst the analysis of the SPA in Chapter 8 showed that its powers were not 
clearly defined, resulting in differing interpretations of its role and function, through 
continued engagement and deliberation, it has managed to restore the balance of power 
by enhancing its influence. This has mostly been achieved through informal, private 
safe-space meetings between the SPA, Police Scotland, HMICS, and other key 
stakeholders in the landscape of police governance. Despite criticisms and concerns 
around a lack of transparency, my research has shown that such an arrangement has 
allowed the SPA to establish an accountability relationship on the basis of deliberative 
principles, requiring the senior executive of the police to explain and justify decisions 
before they are implemented. This arrangement has developed under an omnipresent 
threat of reputational damage to both Police Scotland, and the SPA, following intense 
media, and political scrutiny of both organisations in the early years of the new 
arrangements. The threat of reputational damage to the police in particular, that relies 
on public confidence and consent, has allowed the SPA to develop a shadow of 
hierarchy, compensating for the lack of formal powers of sanction. Nevertheless, 
power remains an important characteristic for my proposed framework as the 
establishment of an epistocratic arrangement requires some delegated powers.   
 
In relation to autonomy, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that the SPA has 
started to operate independently, without undue interference from the Scottish 
Ministers. The presence of other key stakeholders such as HMICS, Audit Scotland, 
PIRC, local scrutiny committees, and the Scottish Parliament, whilst enabling greater 
horizontal deliberation, does have the capacity to limit the autonomy of the SPA.  
However, it is crucial for the SPA’s legitimacy and purpose, that it remains impartial, 
and non-partisan, that its composition remains diverse, and that not a single perspective 





Chapter 10 - Conclusion 
This thesis examined the Scottish Police Authority and its emergent role in delivering 
police governance and accountability after the 2012 Act. In cognisance of the SPA’s 
model, as a body composed of members with professional expertise, instead of elected 
councillors, I drew on the notion of epistocracy (Estlund, 2003, 2008) to develop an 
original conceptual and analytical framework for the analysis of the SPA.  
 
I argued that, in the context of police governance, an epistocratic arrangement can not 
only be justified, but in fact it may be more desirable than the previously tried and 
tested models of democratic governance, provided that it can be institutionalised 
properly and if it can enhance key principles of democratic governance, whilst 
resolving the ‘perennial’ problems of police governance, i.e. - the operational 
independence doctrine, and the perpetual tussle between the local and the central.   
 
I proposed an ‘epistocratic and deliberative’ approach to police governance arguing 
that an epistocracy could be institutionalised if its composition reflects a range of 
knowledge, expertise and skills, and represents a broad social demography (Holst, 
2011, 2012, 2014). Further, I argued that an institutional epistocracy would need 
delegated powers to have an established role within a democratic order (Holst and 
Mollander, 2014). In order to ensure that the proposed epistocratic arrangement does 
not serve partisan interests, I argued that it will need to be sufficiently independent of 
the police and the local and central political actors, including the component of 
autonomy (Jones et al., 1996; Rosenvallon, 2011).  Finally, I argued that an epistocratic 
arrangement would have to weave in principles of deliberation, underpinned by 
justification and reason-giving, into its mechanisms of accountability (Mulgan, 2000; 
Bovens, 2010), and that the inclusion of deliberation encapsulates key principles of 
democratic governance such as information, redress, responsiveness and participation 
(Jones et al. 1996).  
 
Whilst the composition, power and autonomy relates to the overall capacity of an 




delivers police governance and operationalises the mechanisms of accountability. 
Deliberation also gives an epistocracy, a democratic character, particularly because it 
encapsulates key principles of democratic governance. Further, it allows an 
epistocratic arrangement to enhance its claims to knowledge through horizontal 
deliberations with academics, practitioners and external stakeholders.   
 
The analysis of the SPA provides strong empirical support for my proposed 
framework. I found that, during its formative years, the SPA’s inability to resolve the 
perennial problems of police governance, and to establish robust mechanisms of police 
organisational accountability was due to a combination of weaknesses in its knowledge 
composition, lack of clarity regarding its powers, and external impositions, particularly 
by the Scottish Government, resulting in a lack of autonomy.  
 
However, recent developments have shown that the SPA has been able to overcome 
these problems, and it has managed to implement mechanisms of proactive scrutiny of 
police operational policies through deliberative principles. This in turn has resulted in 
better provision of information from the police, and a prior engagement on key issues 
pertaining to ‘operational’ policies.  Through horizontal deliberation and engagement 
with other key stakeholders such as HMICS, Audit Scotland, PIRC, local scrutiny 
committees, and the Scottish Parliament’s Justice Sub-Committee on Policing, the 
SPA has started to establish an accountability relationship under the shadow of 
hierarchy, restoring some of its influence that it ceded during the initial turf war. The 
SPA has actively engaged with members of the public on key issues such as armed 
policing, and it plans to engage with a cross-section of stakeholders on the issue of 
body-worn cameras. These developments hint at more responsiveness and 
participation.  
 
The joint policy engagement protocol between the SPA, the Scottish Government and 
Police Scotland means that all operational policies that could potentially have a public 
impact have to be presented before the SPA for scrutiny, prior to implementation. This 
arrangement has potentially resolved the ‘traditional’ notion of operational 




constable. The SPA is also enhancing its epistocratic credentials by continually 
engaging with academics and practitioners through the platform of SIPR, allowing it 
to draw on knowledge and expertise that it lacks, in order to counterbalance police 
expertise.  
 
The ‘epistocratic and deliberative’ approach to police governance has become 
implicitly evident in the way the SPA performs its role and functions, as it continues 
to develop and evolve as an organisation. Through engagement with the local scrutiny 
committees at the newly established Local Scrutiny Convenors Forum, the SPA may 
be best placed to act as an intermediary between Police Scotland’s senior executive 
and the local police authorities. However, the SPA is not sufficiently independent of 
the Scottish Government, its members are reliant on the Ministers for reappointments, 
and due to fears of reprisals, they may be more inclined to follow Ministerial 
directions. My proposed epistocratic arrangement is ideally situated as a buffer 
between the police and the politicians, balancing the interests of the local and the 
central, by informing its decision-making based on knowledge, evidence, and expertise 
rather than serving narrow partisan interests. Until and unless the SPA can establish 
some visible distance from the Scottish Government, it cannot resolve the perpetual 
tussle between the local and the central. If there are continued perceptions that the SPA 
is just an extension of the Scottish Government, its members merely carrying out the 
wishes of the Justice Minister, then the SPA would lose its legitimacy and purpose. 
The SPA was envisioned as an ‘arms-length body’ by its architects and it needs to 
establish that distance.  
 
My proposed ‘epistocratic and deliberative’ framework, strengthened by the empirical 
analysis of the SPA, provides a holistic way of thinking about police governance and 
accountability. In addition, it shows how: 
 
a) An epistocracy could be institutionalised in the context of police governance, 
b) An institutional epistocracy could implement robust mechanisms of police 




c) Deliberative principles weaved into the actual mechanisms of police 
accountability could encapsulate and operationalise key principles of 
democratic governance  
d) The ‘perennial’ problems of police governance, i.e. the operational 
independence doctrine, and the perpetual tussle between the local and the 
central could be resolved 
 
Thus, this study makes an original contribution to the existing body of knowledge on 
police governance and accountability (Lustgarten, 1986; Walker, 2000; Jones, 2008; 
Donnelly and Scott, 2002a,2002b), and democracy and policing (Jones et al., 1996; 
Marenin, 1982; Manning, 2010; Aitchison and Blaustein, 2013). This study also fills 
a gap in knowledge by focusing on the SPA’s role in delivering police governance and 
accountability in the post-2012 Act police governance arrangements in Scotland. The 
proposed ‘epistocratic and deliberative’ approach to police governance and 
accountability could also be adapted as an analytical framework to examine police 
governance arrangements in other jurisdictions particularly to examine the nexus 
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Appendix B - Breakdown of interviewees 
Note: Unless explicitly stated, all respondents in role when the fieldwork started in 
March 2015.  
 
MSPs 
Former Minister  
2 x Opposition MSPs (Labour and Liberal Democrat) 
 
The Scottish Police Authority  
2 x Executive Officers 
4 x Non-executive board members 
 
Police Scotland  
1 x Deputy Chief Constable 
1 x Chief Superintendent 
3 x Local Divisional Commanders (As part of the partners in scrutiny research) 
2 x Local Area Commanders (As part of the partners in scrutiny research) 
 
HMICS 
1 x Serving police officer (Assistant Chief Constable) 
 
Local Scrutiny Committees (As part of the partners in scrutiny research) 
1 x Convenor  
2 x Lead Officers 
1 x Councillor 
 
Other  
Civil Servant involved in the reform programme 









Appendix C - Sample Access Letter 
Dear Sir/Madam 
  
I write to you in connection with my PhD research exploring the new landscape of police governance 
in Scotland. As part of my research I aim to conduct interviews with all key stakeholders and as the 
Scottish Police Authority occupies a central role in the new governance arrangements, I would be very 
grateful if you would agree to an interview.  
  
The purpose of this research is to explore and analyse how police accountability is managed and 
delivered since the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act came into effect on 01 April 2013. The 
establishment of the Scottish Police Authority as a body tasked with maintaining Police Scotland, 
promoting policing principles, and holding the chief constable to account makes it a key institution in 
the new accountability landscape and a natural focus for this study.  This research will benefit greatly 
from your perspective as a Board member of the SPA. 
  
The interview would broadly focus on the role of expertise in police governance, mechanisms of 
accountability and the relationship of the SPA with Police Scotland and other stakeholders.  
  
The research is being carried out as an independent PhD study (please see the attached information 
sheet and consent form) in accordance with the Economic and Social Research Council's ethical code 
of conduct[1] and it is being supervised by Dr. Alistair Henry (Associate Director of the Scottish Institute 
for Policing Research) and Dr. Andy Aydın-Aitchison at the University of Edinburgh.  
  
I hope that you would agree to this interview and I can meet at a time and location of your 
convenience.  
  


















Appendix D - Sample Interview Schedule 
Expertise 
 
What expertise and skills are needed to scrutinise the operational policies of a professional 
body such as Police Scotland? 
 
Do you think that the SPA has the required expertise and capacity to carry out its statutory 
responsibilities effectively?  
 
How do you build capacity and expertise? What kind of training is offered to members who 
work with Police Scotland on a regular basis? 
 
In terms of holding the chief constable to account, what are the underlying challenges that 
the SPA face? 
 
Scrutiny Review Task Groups 
 
Why was there a need to set up the Scrutiny Review Processes? 
 
How were the Scrutiny Review Task Groups set up? 
 
Were there any difficulties in obtaining information from Police Scotland on stop and search 
and deployment of armed police officers? What lessons have been learned to ensure future 
reviews are seamless?  
 





Was the SPA aware of the decision of Police Scotland to raid saunas in Edinburgh? 
 
Why has the SPA not set up a scrutiny task group to scrutinise local policy changes? 
 
What is the SPA doing to encourage local authorities to scrutinise local policies? 
 




How does the SPA manage its relationship with COSLA, MSPs and other stakeholders in police 
accountability landscape? 
 
How does the SPA ensure and encourage public participation? 
 





The Scrutiny Review on armed policing has taken evidence from members of the public, how 




What is your understanding of the term ‘operational independence’?  
 
Has this notion caused difficulties in putting in place mechanisms of police accountability? 
 
Is there a need to re-define this notion to reflect the post-2012 Act governance landscape? 
 
Possible Questions for Recommendations 
 
What would you suggest the SPA should work on to improve the mechanisms of police 
accountability in Scotland? 
 






Appendix E - Sample Information Sheet and Consent Form 
This research is being carried out as an independent PhD study at the University of 
Edinburgh. The purpose of this research is to explore how police governance and 
accountability is managed and delivered in the new governance landscape. 
 
The establishment of the Scottish Police Authority tasked with maintaining Police 
Scotland, promoting policing principles and holding the Chief Constable to account 
makes it a natural focus for this study. As part of the research I am conducting 
interviews with a cross-section of interested stakeholders in the Scottish police 
governance landscape.  
 
The interviews can usually last around 1 hour and will be audio taped to ensure 
accuracy. Transcription of the interviews will be available on request. All responses 
will be treated strictly in accordance with the ESRC research code of conduct34. Your 
name and personal information will not be used and I will maintain the highest 
standards of anonymity and confidentiality. Please note that in some cases in order to 
contextualise your answers I may have to refer to your title, however, I will do 
everything reasonable to make sure you are not personally identifiable.  
 
As part of this PhD, I am developing a conceptual framework of Epistocracy, or 
knowledge based governance, that will represent a novel approach to the study of 
police governance and make a valuable contribution to the current discourses in 
Scotland. An independent academic study of this nature is pertinent given the ongoing 
governance review and I aim to share my findings and recommendations with a range 
of stakeholders and practitioners. 
 
If you have any questions about the study, then please do not hesitate to contact me  
 
Ali Malik
                                                 






Project Title: Exploring the landscape of police governance in Scotland 
Researcher: Ali Malik (Ali.Malik@ed.ac.uk) 
Position: PhD Candidate  
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the 
information sheet for the above study and have had 
the opportunity to ask questions. 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and 
that I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving 
reason. 
3. I agree to take part in the above study. 
4. I agree to the interview being audio recorded.  
5. I agree to the use of anonymised quotes in the thesis. 
6. I agree that in some cases my job title will be used to 




Name of Participant  Date   Signature 
 
 










Appendix F - SIPR-SPA-Police Scotland ThinkTanks Terms of Reference 
The SPA/SIPR Think Tanks have been established to facilitate SPA engagement with 
research evidence on matters related to policing, broadly refined, and its practice.  The 
Think Tanks will run regularly and will aim to identify topics of importance through 
dialogue with Board members of the SPA. 
 
Ali Malik is a fully-matriculated PhD candidate at the University of Edinburgh.  He is 
studying the post-2012 Act police governance arrangements in Scotland.  Ali’s roles 
and responsibilities in the Think Tanks include: 
 
• Providing general administrative support to the Steering Committee35 in 
organising Think Tank sessions 
• Working with the Steering Committee to develop the research content of 
Think Tank sessions (including working with the Committee to identify 
appropriate topics and speakers, and contacting speakers and invited 
participants) 
• Attending Think Tank sessions and writing up a note of themes raised and 
discussed (but without attribution to specific persons, other than invited 
speakers) for the record.  These notes may be published by the SPA/SIPR. 
 
It is understood that Think Tank sessions themselves are ‘safe spaces’ in which 
participants can voice views for the purposes of discussion without having those views 
attributed to them.  Deliberations within Think Tank sessions are therefore not part of 
the fieldwork of the PhD and should not be reported within the PhD or subsequent 
publications without the express written consent of the individuals concerned.  It is 
recognised, however, that the Think Tanks provide Ali with a means of meeting and 
networking with SPA Board members and other important office bearers in the field 
and that he may use such contact to inform people about his research and request 
consensual interviews with them (which they have every right to refuse).  All research 
for the PhD will be subject to the University of Edinburgh’s ethical review processes. 
 
Payment.  Ali will be paid for time spent on activities related to his work with the 
Think Tanks and can claim reasonable travel and subsistence expenses.  The daily rate 
is £151.  The hourly rate (based on a 7 hour working day) is £23.  Receipts and notes 
of time spent on relevant activities should be submitted to the SIPR Knowledge 
Exchange Officer at regular intervals. 
 
1 December 2014 
                                                 
35 At the time of writing the Steering Committee is made up of Tom McMahon (SPA), Nick Fyfe (SIPR) 
and Alistair Henry (SIPR). 
